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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine the issues concerning Section 1 of 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. When the Act was first passed in 
December 1995 it was considered to be a major break through in obtaining 
equality and protection for disabled people. 
This research demonstrated how Section 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act 
is fundamentally flawed. The dissertation starts by considering why disabled 
people are socially excluded - with such examples as building design, 
employment issues and inaccessible transport. Using this background it 
looked at how the anti-discrimination law evolved and its framework 
developed. Moreover, the research looks at how Section 1 was developed on 
the medical model and how the concept of disability is gradually moving 
towards that of a more accessible social model. Through the use of case law 
it demonstrates how people with mental and physical impairment had been 
not gained the protection of Section 1, as previously envisaged when the Act 
was first passed. Furthermore, the research shows how limited the definition 
of disability is when considering inclusions and exclusions under the 
legislation. 
Finally, the dissertation looks at the new amendments implemented under the 
Disability Discrimination Act 2005, and whether they are effective in 
addressing the fundamental flaws of the original Act. 
- 14- 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this dissertation is to show that although the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (hereafter DDA 1995) gave protection to disabled 
people with obvious disabilities such as people in wheelchairs or blind people, 
unfortunately, the DDA 1995 had a definition of who was disabled which was 
simple in concept but created complications if not confusion in practice 
because it was based upon a narrow and restrictive medical model 1 . 
Obviously the first line of attack against a claim for discrimination for a 
Respondent or Defendant would be to challenge whether the Claimant was in 
fact disabled within the meaning of Section 1 of the Act. This created much 
case law as to who could be defined as disabled under the Ad's definition of 
disability and who could rely on the protection of the DDA 1995. The aim of 
this dissertation is to demonstrate this by referring to the mechanisms of 
Section 1 of the DDA 1995. It should be noted that new amended legislation, 
which came into force in December 2006 held much promise in overcoming 
the limitations of the individual complaints approach taken by under Section 1 
of the DDA 1995. The new legislation will be discussed in the Conclusion of 
this dissertation to demonstrate how the deficiencies of the DDA 1995 have 
hopefully been remedied in the DDA 2005.To understand the meaning of 
disability it is necessary to distinguish between an impairment and the 
disability, which stems from it. An impairment is the functional limitation within 
See Page 29 for fuither discussion on Medical Model of Disability 
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the individual caused by physical, mental or sensory factors. A disability is the 
loss or limitation of opportunities to take part in normal life in society on an 
equal basis with others that may be imposed on people with impairment by 
physical and social barriers. 
The protection afforded by the DDA 1995 only extended to those who fell 
within the Act's definition of a disabled person. When the Act first came into 
force the definition appeared to be simple and straightforward, but with the 
passage of time and case law it was not as straightforward as it seemed. One 
of the failings of the DDA 1995 was that it did not have a clear and definitive 
definition of disability as such. This led to confusion resulting in a vast 
amount of case law with regard to the definition of disability. It could be 
assumed that judicial systems such as Tribunals and Courts could rely on 
other authorities/legislation to resolve the definition of disability by reference to 
legislation such as the Mental Health Act 1983 or to criteria for disability 
welfare benefits such as Disability Living Allowance and Incapacity Benefit. 
However, if a person met the definition of disability under the Mental Health 
Act or for eligibility for a disability welfare benefit, this did not automatically 
afford protection to that person under the DDA 1995. If a person did not meet 
the criteria as being disabled under the Mental Health Act or for a disability 
benefit they only needed to show that they satisfied the definition of a disabled 
person contained in the DDA 19952  but they may not have qualified for a 
benefit The different definitions of disability stated in welfare benefits/mental 
2 
 Si of the DDA 1995—If a person has a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial adverse 
effect on hisfher ability to carry out daily activities this must last or be likely to last for 12 months. 
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health legislation conflicted with those of the definition of disability in the Act. 
That meant that there were conflicting legislation and regulations and 
therefore no clear universal definition of disability to guide Tribunals and 
Courts when deciding whether a person had a disability or not. Under Section 
1 of DDA 1995 a person is defined as disabled who: 
"Has a physical or mental impairment, which has a substantial and 
long-term adverse effect on his or her ability to carry out normal day-to-
day activities " 
The Tribunal or Court needed to consider the elements of this definition to 
decide whether a Claimant had a case to bring under the Act. As previously 
suggested the DDA 1995 created complications, if not confusion in practice. 
Each element within the definition merits closer attention and the following 
questions had to be asked: 
Did the Claimant have an impairment and did it have an adverse effect on the 
ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities? 
If so, was the adverse effect substantial and was the adverse effect 
long-term? 
The Tribunals and Courts had to consider these issues even before 
considering moving on to whether that person had been discriminated against. 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
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If the Claimant could not establish they had a disability then the case failed on 
the issues of discrimination. 
The legislation went on to say the impairment might be a physical or a mental 
impairment. The Act not only covered physical disability but also those with 
mental illnesses and those with learning difficulties. Unfortunately, there was 
no statutory definition for either a 'physical' or 'mental' impairment, nor was 
there any definition in the Guidance or the Code of Practice. The Act was 
created to afford protection to the disabled and in certain circumstances this 
was successful to the extent that there were groups of people who did not fall 
within the definition of disability, nevertheless they were deemed to have a 
physical or mental impairment but were not considered to be disabled under 
the Act. There were also certain conditions (drugs and alcohol addictions), 
which were and continue to be excluded4 by the amended Disability 
Discrimination Act 2006 and there were restrictions in both physical and 
mental illnesses. 5 Even though DDA 1995 was introduced as recently as 
1995, disabled people still saw themselves as being treated differently: 
segregated and separated from normal society, particularly in relation to the 
employment market, transport and public places. As the definition of disability 
did not cover some people with impairments it therefore failed in its' 
obligations to protect all people with disabilities or impairments. 
See Chapter 6 6.3 
See Chapters 4 & 5 
Silt 
Although this dissertation is concerned to critically analyse the definition of 
disability, a few words to describe how disabled people feel about being 
disabled are warranted. People with disabilities are often looked on with 
prejudiced attitudes, patronisation and pity, which are the main responses of 
able-bodied people towards disabled people. It also has to be said that it is 
often difficult for able-bodied people to understand the impact of these 
attitudes and their implications for disabled people. These effects are well 
described by Jenny Morris in her book Pride Against Prejudice." 6 Morris 
conducted several interviews with disabled people and among the comments 
she recorded are: 
. That we feel ugly, inadequate and ashamed of our disabilities. 
• That our lives are a burden to us, barely worth living. 
• That we crave to be normal' and' whole'. 
. That we suffer and that any suffering is nasty, unjust and to be feared 
and retreated from. 
• That we live naïve and sheltered lives. 
. That we should put up with any inconvenience, discomfort or indignity 
in order to participate in 'normal' activities and events - and that this will 
somehow 'do us good'. 
Morris also argued: 
6 Morris J. Pride Against Prejudice Transforming Attitudes to Disability. London Womens Press 1991 
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"That it does not take any expertise in psychology to recognise the 
strength of these assumptions in our society, or just how undermining 
they are". 
Being disabled can often lead to isolation and despair simply because a 
person cannot carry out certain functions because of their impairment. 
The DDA 1995 was supposedly designed to address discrimination and to 
give disabled people back their dignity and self-respect. This was a 
fundamental reason for the Disability Discrimination Act being developed to 
challenge social perceptions of disability. However, the weaknesses in areas 
of the Act such as defining who is disabled became the Achilles heel and 
weakened the Act around the question of legislation allowing for making 
reasonable adjustments to accommodate the disabled person. In other 
words, because the Act was so badly drafted, people who could not satisfy the 
definition of disability did not gain the protection of the Act. 
Each Chapter will critically analyse the definition of disability 7 and this 
dissertation will make its conclusions as to whether disabled people were 
getting the protection of the Act they deserved or whether the definition of 
disability8 caused hardship to some disabled people. This will be 
demonstrated by using primary legislation/secondary legislation, relevant case 
law, text books, Code of Practice, Guidance, Journals and accessing relevant 
Ibid footnote 2 
Op Cit footnote 7 
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information relating to different disabilities which can be found on various 
Charities/Support Groups websites. 
IWAE 
2 BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this Chapter is to give a general oversight and history of the 
problems that disabled people face in society, particularly in the employment 
area. Statistics on disability have been systematically available only relatively 
recently, but there have been disabled people for centuries. The main 
difference now is that society as a whole has increased its awareness of 
disability discrimination amongst disabled people. There are no longer 
institutions for people with disabilities. On the scale of fifty years ago, when a 
person, for example, with learning disabilities would have been 
institutionalised for years and forgotten about by society. Today, society has 
come a long way in recognising that disabled people have equal rights and 
liberties. Unfortunately, there are still a number of issues, which cause 
problems for disabled people. This chapter will deal with the general problems 
that disabled people still face in society. It will also look at the history of how 
the anti-disability discrimination developed and the present legislative 
framework. 
History tells us that disabled people, particularly those with mental health or 
learning difficulties, were often considered as the village idiots. Nevertheless 
these people were part of the community and were looked after generally by 
their families. All this changed in 1601 when the Poor Law Legislation 
dismantled this way of caring for disabled people and provided institutional 
care in workhouses which were set up to give residential care and training to 
people with physical or mental impairment. These asylums then developed 
- 22 - 
into mental hospitals, and patients with both mental and physical impairments 
were often locked up for years and forgotten about. By the middle of the 
twentieth century these hospitals were deemed to be a failure and gradually 
most of them closed down. Their patients were slowly returned to live in the 
community. 
After the Second World War the National Health Service was developed and 
set up in 1948, followed by the Welfare Services in Hospitals, which later 
became known as Social Services. In 1948 the National Assistance Act was 
set up and included disabled people over the age of eighteen. Additionally, 
disabled people became entitled to welfare benefits, and sheltered 
employment schemes were set up to develop training and employment 
prospects. Specialist officers were based in the Labour Exchanges, now 
known as Job Centres. For the next twenty-five years the only legislation 
dealing with employment of disabled people was the Disabled Person 
(Employment Act) 1944 which had very little effect in giving any protection to 
disabled people. In 1970 the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act was 
introduced. This Act stipulated that Local Authorities had to keep a record of 
disabled people living in the community and had to provide certain services to 
enable physically and sensory disabled people to live in their own homes. 
No real headway had been made to reintroduce disabled people back into 
society. They were still at a disadvantage, particularly in the employment field. 
Our population consists of a large number of disabled persons and according 
to an OPCS (Office of Public Censuses & Surveys) (now known as the Office 
- 23 - 
for National Statistics) survey there are over six million disabled people in 
Britain, and 14 per cent of the adult population have at least one impairment 
which causes disability. 9 The survey estimates there are one million blind and 
two million partially sighted people. There are also four million people with 
mobility problems, about five hundred thousand of whom are wheelchair 
users. There are also five hundred thousand people who have learning 
disabilities, and that is just the disabled people we know of as reported 
through the census. There are likely to be many more disabled people who 
have not been reported in the census or the survey statistics and it has been 
estimated that by the year 2031 in Britain, the size of the disabled population 
will have grown to 8.2 million adults, representing an increase of 34 per cent 
since 1986.10  There are 22 per cent of adults of working age who have a 
health problem or a disability, 11 representing 10/15 per cent of the general 
population. 12 
In particular, discrimination is widespread in the work place. 69 per cent of 
disabled people are unemployed; disabled people are more likely to be 
unemployed than non-disabled people. Furthermore, disabled people are 
more likely to be unemployed for longer periods. 13 Disabled people in 
employment are more likely to have lower paid, lower status jobs and less 
° OPCS Report 1 1988-1989 16-26 Disability in Great Britain HMSO 
10 Fowkes A, Oxley P and Heiser a, Cross Sector Benefits of Accessible Public Transport, Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, undated 4 5 
Prescott-Clarke, SCPR Survey 1990 p20 
12 Doyle B 1994 New Directions Towards Disabled Workers Rights, Institute for Employment Rights 
13 Rights for Disabled People, Now Right Now 1994 p7 
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secure jobs which they are more likely to leave before official retirement 
age. 14  There are fewer disabled people who have professional jobs compared 
with non-disabled people; 31 per cent of disabled people have low skilled 
manual jobs compared with 21 per cent of non-disabled people. 15 It has been 
stated by Barnes16 that under-representation of disabled people in 
employment is not caused by disability discrimination. This has been 
challenged by two separate studies conducted into hiring practices in the 
private sector. 17 These studies demonstrated that employers are six times 
more likely to turn down a disabled person for interview than a non-disabled 
Claimant with the same qualifications. 18 Schemes have also been set up, for 
example, a guaranteed interview policy for disabled people. This is 
supposedly to ensure that employers are practicing good equal opportunities, 
yet disabled people are still less likely to be successful in a job interview 
simply because they are disabled. 
There are currently around 3.1 million disabled people and only 12 per cent of 
them are in employment. When employed they are more likely to work part-
time or be self-employed. Employment rates vary greatly between types of 
disability. Some types of disability are associated with relatively high 
14 
 Barnes C.1991 Liberty 62-92 
15 Disability and Discrimination in Employment RADAR 1993 p 2 
18 Op Cit footnote 13 
"Fry E. 1986 An Equal Chance for Disabled People: A Study of Discrimination in Employment 
The Spastics Society & Graham, Jordan and Lamb: An Equal Chance or No Chance? 
The Spastics Society, 1990 
IS 
 Graham P. 1990 An Equal Chance? The Spastics Society 
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employment rates (such as diabetes, skin conditions and hearing problems) 
while other groups (such as those with mental illness and learning disabilities) 
have much lower employment rates. Around three-quarters of those who have 
a mental illness and two-thirds of those with learning difficulties are out of 
work and on state benefits. The lLO (International Labour Organisation) 
unemployment rates for long-term disabled people are nearly twice as high as 
those for non-disabled people, 10.1 per cent compared with 5.7 per cent. 
Their likelihood to be long-term unemployed is also higher: 38 per cent of 
unemployed disabled people have been unemployed for a year or more 
compared with 24 per cent of non-disabled unemployed. 19 
There is also overwhelming evidence that disabled people experience severe 
economic and social deprivation and are disadvantaged in a number of ways. 
There are higher rates of unemployment among disabled people and disabled 
people are likely to live in poor housing. Disabled people often have inferior 
segregated education by sending disabled children to 'special schools' simply 
because the Government funding is not always available to put disabled 
children through mainstream school. As a result disabled people often leave 
school with no or fewer academic qualifications and are therefore more likely 
to be forced to be dependent on welfare benefits such as Incapacity Benefit or 
Income Support and therefore likely to live in poverty. Discrimination prevents 
See Chapter 4 
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many disabled people from participating in the labour market and forces them 
into financial and social dependency on the State. 2° 
Disability discrimination not only costs disabled people their pride and self 
respect but it also costs the Government billions of pounds because disabled 
people cannot enter the mainstream workforce. As a result, disabled people 
are forced onto welfare benefits. If more disabled people were employed the 
Government would save money on welfare benefits and increase revenue 
from tax and national insurance. If just five hundred thousand disabled people 
were employed, the Government would save a staggering five billion pounds 21 
on welfare benefits. It was only when disabled people campaigned for equal 
rights that the Government had to be forced to move towards creating anti-
discrimination legislation. 
Most public transport and public places such as pubs, cinemas, restaurants, 
courts and churches are inaccessible. This restricts disabled people from 
having normal and non-discrimination lifestyles. In relation to public transport, 
only one in eight long distance National Express coaches were accessible to 
wheelchair users and only 130 British Rail stations were fully accessible. 
Wheelchair users wishing to use the London Underground were advised to 
give 24 hours notice of their intention to travel, to go with a non-disabled 
companion and to avoid the rush hour. There are 4 - 5 million people with 
20 
 Barnes C. 1999 Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination, Hurst and Calgary in association with 
BCODP 
21 
 Ibid footnote 20 
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mobility impairments but only 80,000 accessible houses. Public information is 
rarely given in ways that are accessible to people with sensory impairments 
and to people with learning difficulties. In addition, public meetings and 
television are rarely accessible to deaf people. At the last general election 88 
per cent of the polling stations were inaccessible to disabled people.. 
So, having established that there are barriers against disabled people in 
society, disabled people needed comprehensive anti-discrimination 
legislation, similar to laws, which ban discrimination on grounds of sex or race. 
The whole concept of a disabled person's lifestyle needs to be taken into 
account when considering anti-discriminatory law. It is all very well to have 
equal opportunity rights in the workplace, but if public transport is inaccessible 
to be able to take that disabled person to work, then the present disability 
discrimination law is not protecting the rights of the disabled person. There is 
evidence of discrimination in many walks of life and the failure of past 
legislation proves that piecemeal legislation does not work. Disabled people 
need comprehensive legislation banning all aspects of disability discrimination 
from every area of a disabled person's lifestyle. As a result the DDA 1995 
came into force on 2nd  December 1996. 
2.1 	 The Evolution of Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
It was probably as a result of two world wars, which rendered many 
servicemen disabled, that the first Act for disabled people was implemented, 
the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944. The Act provided a Quota 
Scheme whereby disabled people would be registered as disabled and 
required employers to employ a quota of disabled people within its workforce. 
This quota was set by the Act as 3 per cent. Many employers failed to comply 
with this provision and the Act was rarely enforced and there were only three 
prosecutions in the last thirty years. It therefore afforded little or no protections 
to disabled people. 
Disability discrimination was never taken seriously enough to warrant more 
enforceable disability discrimination legislation until the first anti-discrimination 
bill for disabled people was introduced by Jack Ashley MP (now Lord Ashley). 
He (who incidentally is deaf) had followed the recommendations of a 
committee on Restrictions against Disabled People. This was followed by a 
succession of backbench bills over the next ten years, with increasing cross-
party support, mobilised by the All Party Disablement Group. Because of 
strong extra-parliamentary activities campaign of voluntary organisations for 
anti-discrimination legislation were set up to put pressure on the Government, 
the issue of disability discrimination was on the political agenda. Disability 
discrimination could no longer be ignored and was given priority by the 
Government. 
The first major breakthrough came in the form of the Civil Rights (Disabled 
People) Bill. This was introduced as a Private Members Bill by Harry Barnes 
MP in 1994 and was the seventeenth attempt to introduce anti-discrimination 
legislation for disabled people. By 1994 the political momentum behind the 
Campaign, with support from their Back Bench Conservatives threatened to 
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overturn the Government's fragile majority support. This forced the 
Government to announce its own proposals to counter disability 
discrimination. In July 1994 the Government published a consultation paper 
setting out its alternative to the Civil Rights Bill. 22 
The Disability Discrimination Bill was introduced. Its parliamentary progress 
was hastened to ensure it took precedence over the Civil Rights Bill, re-
introduced by Harry Barnes MP in February 1995. The Government wanted 
at least to have control of the anti-discrimination legislation. Moving the third 
reading of the Disability Discrimination Act Bill in the House of Commons 23 Mr. 
William Hague, the then Minister for Social Security and Disabled People said: 
"It is a landmark Bill. It is the only comprehensive Bill for disabled 
people ever introduced by a British Government. It will mark the United 
Kingdom out as one of the world leaders and the leader in Europe in 
A Consultation on Government Measures to Tackle Discrimination in the workplace Against Disabled 
People, Department of Social Security 1994. 
23 
 The complete legislative history of the Bill is as follows: 
House of Commons: 1" Reading (12th  January 1995); 2nd  Reading (241h  January 1995: HO Deb vol 253, 
col 147-239); Committee (31st 
 January 1995 to 28th  February 1995: HO Deb, Standing Committee E); 
Report (27 and 281h 
 March 1995: HC Deb, vol 257,col 697-799 and col 640-904); V Reading (28 March 
1995: HO Deb, vol 257, col 904-928). 
House of Lords: 1 Reading (29th 
 March 1995); 2" Reading (22 May 1995: HL Deb, vo1564, col 800-815 
and 830-892); Committee 13, 15 and 27 June 1995: HL Deb, vol 564, col 1640-1718, 1723-1784, 1895-
1954 and 1975-2054; HL Deb, vol 565, col608-680 and 686-744); Report (18 and 20 July 1995: HL Deb, 
vol566, col 114-141, 168-186, 205-280 and 386-476); 3 Reading (20  1995: HL Deb, vo1566, col 969-
1080). 
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the move towards comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation for 
disabled people. It is a profound measure with significant implications, 
for every part of the economy.....it sets this country on a clear, 
workable and unambiguous course to ending discrimination against 
disabled people. It will make a genuine difference to the opportunities 
and lives of millions of our fellow citizens.... 24 
The Government was forced to take a long hard look at how to start tackling 
the widespread discrimination, which disabled people, suffered. The Disability 
Discrimination Bill received Royal Assent on 8 November 1995 and was the 
Government's response to an increasingly effective campaign for 
comprehensive and enforceable anti-discrimination legislation for disabled 
people. The DDA 1995 was introduced to abolish discrimination against 
disabled people in employment and in the provision of goods and services. 
The introduction of the DDA 1995 was a major victory for disabled people and 
at last the legislation would end disability discrimination against them. The 
DDA 1995 introduced, over a period of time, new laws and measures aimed at 
ending discrimination which many disabled people faced. The Act gave 
disabled people new rights in the areas of employment, access to goods and 
services, and buying or renting land or property. The Act also allowed the 
Government to set minimum standards for public transport. 
24 HG Deb, vol 257, col 904 and 928. See the similar comments made by the lead Minister in the House 
of Lords: HL Deb, vol 566, col 1070. 
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2.2 The Legislative Framework 
Protection against discrimination for disabled people is contained in three 
principal statutes, namely the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the Disability 
Rights Commission Act 1999, and the Human Rights Act 1998. There are 
various codes, guidance and secondary legislation. The main legislation is 
contained under the DDA 1995 and is divided into three parts. Additionally 
to the DDA 1995 the Government, through the Disability Rights Commission 
Act 1999 established a Government Body called the Disability Rights 
Commission (DRC) to further the rights of disabled people. This also modified 
the framework established by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Finally 
the Human Rights Act 1998 also made significant impact in that it protects the 
rights of disabled people, for example, the right to a fair hearing. 25 
2.3 	 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
The DDA 1995 provided a framework to provide redress for disabled peoe 
who were discriminated against in various spheres. 
Part I (with Schedule 1) established the criteria for determining who were 
disabled and afforded the protection of the Act. 
Part II was concerned with discrimination in the employment field by 
employers or prospective employers, with provision made to extend the ambit 
of discrimination protection to include contract workers and trade 
organisations, specific provisions dealing with leasehold premises, 
25 
 Article 6 Human Rights Act 1998 
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occupational pension schemes and insurance services. The Employment 
Tribunal is the forum for litigation arising out of these provisions. The Act 
made it unlawful for employers with 15 or more 26 staff to discriminate against 
current or prospective employees with disabilities because of a reason relating 
to their disability. This applied to all employment matters including recruitment 
and retention of employees, training and development, promotion and 
transfers and the dismissal process. Additionally, if their employment 
arrangements or workplace disadvantaged a disabled employee, employers 
were required to look at what changes they could make to the workplace or 
the way the work was done, and to make any changes that were 
reasonable. 27 However, employers were not expected to make any changes 
which breached the health and safety laws. 
Under the 1995 Act employers with fewer than 15 employees are 
excluded from the employment provisions of the Act. 28 The Act did not 
apply to certain operational staff employed by the Armed Forces, 
Police, Prison Service, Fire Service. 29 However, reforms have since 
remedied these exemptions and. registration as disabled under the 
Quota Scheme 3° ended when the employment provisions of the DDA 
1995 began on the 2nd  December 1996. It meant that disabled people 
no longer needed to register as being disabled. 
26 This provision is now repealed by the DDA 2005 
27 Section 6 DDA 1995 
28 DDA 1995 S 7—now repealed by DDA 2005 
29 ODA 1995 S 64— now repealed by DDA 2005 
3° The Disabled Persons Act 1944 
- 33 - 
Part Ill was concerned with providing remedies for discrimination against 
disabled members of the general public in the provision of goods and 
services. Claims arising from discrimination in this field are the subject of 
litigation in the County Court. This provision in the Act affects anybody who 
provides goods, facilities or services to members of the public whether paid or 
free. Private clubs are not included. This means that it is unlawful to refuse to 
serve someone who is disabled or to offer a disabled person a service, which 
is not as good as, the service being offered to other people. It is also deemed 
to be unlawful for someone to run a service or provide goods or facilities in a 
way which makes it impossible, unreasonable, or difficult for a disabled 
person to use the goods or services, unless the way in which the service is 
run is fundamental to the business, for example a darkened nightclub which 
may effect a visually impaired person, or lack of disabled toilets for wheelchair 
users. 
Parts IV and V were concerned with the provision of education for disabled 
people and with public transport use. The DDA 1995 did not provide for direct 
action to be taken against education providers or public transport providers, 
but rather was concerned to promote greater provision for disabled persons. 
The Act also ensured the recognition of the needs of disabled people wishing 
to study and the provisions of better information to parents, pupils and 
students. Schools have to explain their arrangements for disabled pupils and 
students and how they will help them to gain access to further and higher 
education. Institutions have to publish disability statements containing 
information about facilities for disabled people and must report to the 
Government on their progress and future plans. Local Education Authorities 
have to provide information on their future education facilities for disabled 
people. 
Part VI dealt with the establishment of the National Disability Council, now 
superseded by the Disability Rights Commission. 
2.4 The Disability Rights Commission Act 1999 
The National Disability Council established by the Disability Discrimination Act 
1995 was in no way comparable to the Equal Opportunities Commission or 
the Commission for Racial Equality. It was an advisory body only. As a result, 
the DDA 1995 lacked a motive force for its enforcement and the further 
development of disability discrimination law. The Disability Rights Commission 
was created by the DRC 1999 to remedy this deficiency and to ensure that 
disability rights remained on the agenda. 31 The Commission's duties are to 
work towards the elimination of discrimination against disabled persons; to 
promote the equalisation of opportunities for disabled persons: to take such 
steps as it considers appropriate with a view to encouraging good practice in 
the treatment of disabled persons, and to keep under review the working of 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Disability Rights Commission 
Act 1999. The DRC 1999 gives the Commission an extensive role and 
numerous powers. It can be anticipated that in the years to come one of the 
31 Section 2 (1) of the ORC 1999 
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key roles of the Commission will be the promotion of litigation, which will push 
forward the law on disability discrimination. 
2.5 The Human Rights Act 1998 
Firstly, the Human Rights Act 1998 was brought into force in October 2000. 
The Act brought the European Convention on Human Rights into the sphere 
of domestic law. The key provision of the Act is that all legislation must be 
interpreted and given effect, as far as is possible, in accordance with 
Convention rights. Secondly, it is unlawful for a public authority to act 
incompatibly with Convention Rights and a new statutory tort is created 
allowing a direct action to be brought on the right alleged to have been 
breached. Thirdly, UK Courts must take account of Convention Rights in all 
cases that come before them. The common law must be developed in 
accordance with the Convention, and decisions made by the European Court 
of Human Rights, whilst not binding, must be taken into account. 
Much has been written about the Human Rights Act 1998, but whilst debate 
has focused on such issues as to whether or not the Human Rights Act 1998 
has full "horizontal effect" between individuals or indirect effect through the 
mechanism of the Courts, relatively little has been written as to the practical 
actions which can be launched to obtain money and other remedies, which 
could not be undertaken prior to October 2000. The key provision of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 which will affect disabled people in regulating their 
relations. with the state and public authorities is the right to take proceedings 
against public authorities for damages or compensation, or other remedies to 
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protect their human rights which are being infringed or dealt with in a way that 
is discriminatory. Section 7 HRA 1998 provides: 
(1) A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) 
in a way which is made unlawful by Section 6(1) may- 
bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the 
appropriate Court or Tribunal 
or: 
rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal 
proceedings: 
but only if he/she is or would be a victim of the unlawful act. 
If a disabled person wishes to bring a claim for alleged infringement of a right, 
this Section enables a claim to be brought and potentially a remedy granted. A 
number of points should be borne in mind. Claims can be brought against 
public authorities and include Courts or Tribunals and any person who is 
employed by a public authority whose functions are of a public nature. This 
does not include private companies and if the nature of the act is private. 32 A 
person will only be a victim of the unlawful act, if they would satisfy the test 
applied by Article 34 of the ECHR on who is a victim for the purposes of 
proceedings in the European Court. 33 
32 Section 6, HRA 1998 
Section 6(7) NRA 1998. 
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Proceedings34 must be brought within either a year beginning with the date 
when the act took place, or a longer period if the Court considers that would 
be equitable in all the circumstances, but subject to any shorter limitation 
periods, such as the three month provision for Judicial Review 35 
2.6 The Secondary Legislation 
As a result of the DDA 1995 a wealth of secondary legislation has been 
generated, which either brings into effect the DDA 1995, or details the 
application of the provisions within the Act. This secondary legislation 
consists of the following: 
Disability Discrimination (Meaning of Disability) Regulations 1 996 ; 36 
Disability Discrimination (Questions and Replies) Order 1996; 
Disability Discrimination (Employment) Regulations 1 996; 
Disability Discrimination (Exemptions for Small Employers) Order 1998; 
(now repealed) 
Disability Discrimination (Services and Premises) Regulations 1996; 40 
Disability Discrimination (Sub-leases and Sub-tenancies) Regulations 1 996;41 
S 6(7) S (ii) (a) NRA 1998 
Section 7 (5) HRA 1998 
36 
 Section 11996/1455 
Section 11996 / 2793 
Section 11996 / 1456 
Section 11998/2618 
4° Sectionl 1996/1836 
IM 
These are the Regulations, which are most commonly relevant, but the reader 
should be aware there are other Regulations, including the various 
Commencement Orders, which are too exhaustive to mention here. 
2.7 The Codes of Practice 
Under the provisions of the DDA 199542 
 the Secretary of State had power to 
issue Codes of Practice which were intended to eliminate discrimination and 
41 Section 11996 / 1333 
42 Sections 51 and 53 
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encourage good practice. The emphasis of the Codes 43 was to provide 
practical guidance. The Codes had statutory admissibility 44 and had to be 
taken into account by an Employment Tribunal or Court, if its provisions were 
relevant. 
The Disability Rights Commission were allocated responsibility for the 
preparation of future codes, The Codes were of immense practical 
significance in the context of litigation as they established what an 
Employment Tribunal would normally find to be acceptable employment 
practice in the context of a disabled person. Little, if any use of the relevant 
Codes45 have been made in County Court litigation. 
2.8 The Statutory Guidance 
This document was issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to his power to 
do so under Section 3 of the DDA 1995 - The purpose of the document was to 
provide guidance to clarify the definition of disability contained in Section 1. It 
was also intended to provide examples from which an Employment Tribunal or 
Court could draw assistance in determining the issue of disability and it was 
Section 53 (3) 
"Section 53 (5) 
The code of Practice for the elimination of discrimination in the provision of employment against 
disabled persons who have or have had a disability; The code of Practice in relation to Rights of 
Access, Goods, Facilities, Services and Premises; The code of Practice relating to the duties of trade 
organisations to their disabled members and claimants. 
n 
mandatory. 46 Part I of the DDA 1995 was concerned with defining who is 
disabled and accordingly entitled to the protection of the Act. The criteria for 
establishing who was disabled are drawn from three sources. The first of 
these was Section 1 of the DDA 1995 . The second was the Disability 
Discrimination (Meaning of Disability) Regulations 1996 47  and the third was a 
document entitled Guidance on matters to be taken into account in 
determining questions relating to the definition of disability. 46 
Having given a brief history of the problems that disabled people face in 
society and an overview of the legislative framework this dissertation will now 
concentrate on Section 1 of the DDA 1995 which will be discussed in the 
following chapters. 
46 
 DDA 1995 S 3(3) 
S I 199611455 
48 
 Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining questions relating to the definition of 
disability. (ISBN: 01127009559). 
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3 THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
This chapter will analyse views put forward by academic critics, and will 
compare and contrast the concept of the medical model with the social model. 
The model of disability adopted by the DDA 1995 was a medical, rather than 
a social one. The "social" model of disability recognises "the close connection 
between the limitation experienced by individuals with disabilities, the design 
and structure of their environments and the attitude of the general 
population".49 The "medical model" by contrast locates the problem of 
disability in the disabled person, regarding disability as an individual 
impairment. 
Ann Beggs MP and the disability community had long criticised the medical 
approach to disability rights. Ms Begg expressed a common view in the House 
of Commons Second Reading debate on the Disability Rights Commission 
Act. 
'It's not my disability that stops me playing an equal part in society, it's 
the fact that some people put steps in buildings that I can't get into. I 
have no limitations in what I can do in a fully accessible building ........ .it 
See United Nations Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, 
para 5, cited by Doyle B. Disabled Workers Rights, the Disability Discrimination Act and the UN 
Standard Rules (1996)25 lt-J 1, 11. 
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is society that has built the physical barriers and it is people in society 
who have the attitudes that cause the problem - not the disability". 50 
The Government did not accept the social model concept that it was society 
that created the barriers against disabled people with regard to environmental 
issues such as the inability to access a building for wheelchair users. They 
were probably reluctant to accept the social model because it would mean 
that major changes would have to be made in society to accommodate 
disabled people and this meant spending vast amounts of money to make, for 
example, necessary changes to buildings. The Government preferred the 
medical model in that the problems that disabled people had in accessing 
buildings laid with them because it was their medical condition that caused the 
problems in accessing facilities within society. 
Margaret Hodge made this clear in an article for the Newcastle Journal. The 
newspaper had published criticism by a disability activist of a Government 
Disability Awareness Campaign. 
"Disability is not about victims, tragedy or understanding the person; 
feeling sorry for someone does not make public transport become 
magically accessible overnight. Being patronising towards people does 
not remove physical barriers to allow access to facilities, services or 
leisure activities. Understanding how difficult it must be and then 
moving away to get on with life does not ensure that housing providers 
° MeColgan A. 2000 Discrimination Law, Text Cases & Materials page 454 
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design and build with access in mind or grant access to mainstream 
education." 
and she went on to say 
"Wonder how men and women in the North East understand the 
accusation that disability is their problem. That the shopper in the 
Metro Centre is somehow responsible for oppressing disabled 
people."51 
What is increasingly apparent is the gulf between the disability movement's 
definitions of disability - the social model - and that of the policy makers - the 
medical model. The social model identifies social barriers and the 
infrastructure of society as the cause of disability; preventing participation on 
equal terms and denying equality of opportunity. The medical model refers 
solely to a physical condition or impairment. 
3.1 The Medical Model Approach 
In order to analyse the concept of the medical model in contrast to the social 
model the official definition of the medical model as stated in 1980 by the 
World Health Organisation is as following: 
51 Op Cit A McColgan at footnote 45 
n 
Impairment: a permanent or transitory psychological, physiological 
or anatomical loss of abnormality of structure or function. 
Disability: any restriction or prevention of the performance of an 
activity resulting from an impairment in the manner or within the 
range considered normal for a human being. 
Handicap: a disability that constitutes a disadvantage for a given 
individual in that it limits or prevents the fulfillment of a role that is 
normal depending on age, sex, social and cultural factors for the 
individual. 52 
Some academic activists have criticised the medical model of the statutory 
definition. Finkeistein, for example, argues that the concept of disability was 
focused on the impairment of individuals as the ultimate cause of disability. He 
criticised the narrow approach of the medical model but suggested that an 
alternative approach was emerging as follows: 
"The predominant focus of attitudes, help, and research and so on has, 
as a natural expression of one side of the disability relationship, been 
towards the disabled person. Nearly all references concerned with 
attitudes towards disability use the disabled person as the point of 
focus. The emergent approach is to focus on the behaviour, roles, 
52 Cooper J. Laws, Rights and Disability. Chapter 1 Working in Partnership with Disabled People by 
Pickin C. 
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perceptions and attitudes etc., of the helpers as representatives of a 
socially determined relationship." 53 
This emergent approach has developed largely as a consequence of disabled 
people organising to articulate their own definitions of disability. This leads to 
a second general criticism of research on the statutory definition of disability, 
in that it has failed to involve disabled people except as passive subjects. 
Davis makes this point 
"Much of the work which has already been done on definitions has 
been carried out by people who do not themselves experience the 
daily problems of disability. This has drastically affected the 
solutions, and in turn has often served to perpetrate discrimination 
against us, as well as wasting resources on an enormous scale." 54 
The research carried out around the medical model demonstrated clearly that 
it discriminated against disabled people. There are two aspects of this: first, 
much research on disability has utilised theoretical models so divorced from 
the everyday experience of disabled people that: 
Finkeistein V. 1980 Attitudes & Disabled People: Issues for Discussion. New York: World 
Rehabilitation Fund 
Davis K. 1986 Developing Our Own Definition: Draft for Discussion, British council of Organisations of 
Disabled People, London 
n 
"They have felt victimised by professionals who write articles about the 
reactions to disability that are based more upon theory than fact.' 55 
A second aspect concerns the fact that much research on disability has 
contributed little or nothing to improving the quality of life of disabled people. 
As a consequence of this situation, more and more disabled people are 
refusing to participate in research designed, controlled and published by able-
bodied researchers who are either unaware or lack an understanding of the 
research issues involved in the social causation of disability and who fail to 
involve disabled people in the research process. 
Caroline Gooding 56 argued in her book that although the 1995 Act established 
a new definition of disabled person it did not reflect fundamentally a new 
understanding of disability. The Act's definition of disability was precisely for 
this reason one of the most contentious issues during its passage through 
Parliament. Like the definition contained in previous legislation it focused 
solely on the inability to perform certain physical or mental functions caused 
directly by "impairment" of an individual. Gooding went on to explain that the 
Disability Lobby and their supporters in Parliament criticised the narrowness 
of the definition of disability under the DDA 1995 and said it was a flawed 
concept of disability. They argued for a broader definition of disability 
modelled on that contained in the USA ADA 1990. Disabled supporters 
Trieschmann RB. 1980 Spinal Cord Injuries, Pergarnon Press, Oxford 
Gooding C. 2000 DDA From Statute to Practice. Critical Social Policy (4) 533.549 
See Appendix 1 
MYRI 
would have preferred the definition of disability to have included people who 
were perceived to be disabled and who faced the issues of social 
discrimination which comes from misconception and stereotype of the 
discriminator rather than from any intrinsic characteristic of the individual who 
had experienced discrimination. Gooding went on to state that the DDA 1995 
basic definition cannot address the situation of people with no actual physical 
or mental impairment who nevertheless experience strong social restrictions 
because of prejudice. An example of this is a person with a severe 
disfigurement. 58 
 This will be deemed to have a substantial adverse effect on 
their ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, thus bringing them within 
the definition of the Act59 She also gave examples of people who were 
excluded from the Act's definition of disability, and these included people who 
had been diagnosed as HIV positive, having Cancer or MS and would not be 
protected by the Act. 60 
In summary Gooding pointed out that the DDA 1995 reinforced the medical 
model by linking the disabled person's physical or mental impairment with the 
ability to carry out day-to-day activities rather than the social or the 
environmental issues of society. Furthermore, proof of disability as required 
by the definition of disability relied on the measurement, assessment and 
medical treatment or medical evidence of functional activities as they related 
directly to the impairment. 
58 See chapter 6 Section 6.2.2 
DDA 1995 Schedule 1 para 3 
60 Now amended by new legislation October 2004 
The academics that criticised the medical model said that it assumed a lack of 
ability in any functional area, which had arisen as a result of an impairment 
stemming from the limitation of the individual to adapt to their condition. This 
meant that the definition of disability became individualised as a personal 
incident that had happened to a disabled individual and resulted in "personal 
tragedy".61 Under the medical model, Oliver stated, the "impairment" or 
"abnormality" assumes dominance over the concept of disability and therefore 
the person with the impairment remains subservient to the terms of 'disabled 
experts' who may be patronising disabled people. It meant that disabled 
people were kept as an oppressed and powerless group. Writers argued that 
disabled people preferred to look at disability as a situation caused by the 
unsympathetic society who placed the physical barriers to stop them from 
having an equal right or place within society itself. The medical model, it was 
argued, reflected society's attitude to disabled people. The medical model 
also attracted criticism from disabled supporters. 
Shearer, for example, captures the need for changes to be made with regard 
to the medical model in her criticism of the International Year of Disabled 
People. The official aim of the International Year of Disabled People in 1981 
was: helping disabled people in their physical and psychological adjustment in 
society. The real question she argued is a different one. 
Oliver M.1990 The Politics of Disablement. Basingstoke & Macmillan 
n 
"How far is society willing to adjust its patterns and expectations to 
include its members who have disabilities and to remove the handicaps 
that are now imposed on their inevitable limitations?" 62 
3.2 Formation of The Social Model Approach 
As a consequence of these criticisms, a group known as the Union of the 
Physical Impaired Against Segregation was formed The group pioneered a 
concept which they called a social model, which has become the nucleus of 
the disability movement. They stated, 
"In our view it is society which disabled physically impaired people. 
Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way 
we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in 
society" 63 
To understand this it is necessary to grasp the distinction between the 
physical or mental impairment and the social situation, called 'disability of 
people with such impairment. Thus, we define impairment as lacking part of 
or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, organism or mechanism of the 
body; and disability as the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a 
contemporary social organisation which takes no or little account of people 
62 Shearer 1981 as quoted by Oliver M. & Sapey B. Social Work with Disabled People 2nd  Edition, 
Practical Social Work BASW 
63 Ibid page 22 
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who have physical impairments and thus excludes them in the mainstream of 
social activities. Physical or mental disability is therefore a particular form of 
social oppression. 
Oliver analysed both Shearer's and the UPIAS views with regard to 
advocating a social model of disability. He distinguished differences in their 
views, arguing that Shearer was asking society "that is able-bodied society" to 
remove the disabilities imposed upon the impaired individuals, whereas the 
UPIAS argued that such disabilities will only be removed by disabled people 
themselves engaged in active 'struggles'. Oliver went on to explain that 
Shearer's view sees the reduction or removal of disability as something, which 
may be given, whereas the UPIAS view sees them as having to be fought for. 
Oliver argued that the two different views had implications for professional 
practice, which could be analysed by asking the professionals whether they 
wished to work for disabled people or with them. 
Disabled people and academic critics rejected the medical model, which 
followed the World Health Organisation definition. They preferred a definition 
of social model, which replaced responsibility for the disabled people's 
problems firmly with society as follows: 
Impairment: lacking part or all of a limb, having a defective limb, 
organism or mechanism of the body. 
64 
 Ibid page 22 
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Disability: the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a 
contemporary social organisation which takes no or little account of 
people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them 
from the mainstream of society. 
The definition given by the social model of disability is based on the 
relationship between the person with the impairment and the social and 
physical environment of society. 65 This means that the concept of disability 
rests on the social and economic consequences of being different from the 
majority of society and that it is society that is to blame - that is, the 
environment rather than the person with the impairment. Oliver gave an 
example of housing for disabled people. He explained that the individual 
model focuses on the problems that disabled people face in terms of getting in 
and out, bathing, access to the kitchen, the bedroom and so forth. He stated 
that this approach focuses on the functional limitations of individual attempting 
to use their own environments. The social model, however, sees disability as 
being created by the way housing is unsuitable to the needs of particular 
individuals. 
Although Oliver initially said that the definition of disability was a medical 
model which implies that disability is some "terrible chance event" which 
occurs at random to unfortunate individuals who have to adapt themselves in 
society. He pointed to the way charities approach fundraising using strong 
images of pathos to bear this out. He also stated that the use of emotive 
65 Oliver M,1963 Social Work with Disabled People. Basingstoke & Macmillan 
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language also demonstrates this theory when describing people as "victims" 
or "sufferers" of a particular condition. 66 He now argues for the use of the term 
'individual model'. The two fundamental aspects of the individual model are: 
1. That it locates the 'problem' of disability within the individual, 
and 
2. It sees the causes of this problem as stemming from the 
functional limitations or psychological losses, which are assumed to 
arise from disability. 67 
With this quotation he moved somewhat away from the medical model 
approach of his previous description, which implies that all disabled people 
have medical problems and that medical experts are the best people to help 
them65. His new individual model goes on to identify society's failure to 
'provide appropriate services' and to ensure that the needs of the disabled 
person are fully taken into account in social associations, such as access to 
public buildings, unusable transport, segregated education and work 
arrangements. 69 
Oliver also applied this principle to the employment market. The social model 
of disability provides equally valuable insights, 
66 Op cit footnote 57 
67 Oliver M. 1996 Understanding Disability from Theory to Practice. Basingstolce & Macmillan 
68 Op Cit footnote 57 
69 Ibid footnote 63 
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"The world of work (buildings, plant, machinery, processes and jobs, 
practices, rules, even social hierarchies) is geared to able-bodied 
people, with the objective of maximising profits. The growth of large-
scale industry has isolated and excluded disabled people from the 
processes of production in a society which is work centred." 7° 
Oliver explained that in a capitalist society individuals were judged by what 
they could do and what society could do to help them. Society's perception of 
disabled people was that they were seen as "dependent" and that this stems 
not from their inability to work but from the way in which work is organised in 
modern industrial society. Examples are the inability of a blind person to use 
the software on a computer or a deaf person being unable to access 
telephones in an office environment, or the inability of a person in a 
wheelchair to work on a factory floor because he/she is unable to access 
machinery that an able-bodied person could do. 
Other writers while agreeing that disability should not be linked entirely with 
illness, and who also state that many disabled people are fit and healthy, are 
nevertheless convinced that for some people, symptoms do have a disabling 
effect and that certain medical aspects of disability should be retained within 
the social model. 71 Yet others state that the social model can be used 
70 
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effectively only once a person is medically stable. 72 According to Finkelstein 73 
the social model of disability may be most appropriately applied to physical 
impairments, but it can also include sensory impairments. Examples are deaf 
people who may be disabled by the increasing use of the telephone, which 
restricts people who can communicate perfectly adequately at a face-to-face 
level, or else meetings which may be held in badly lit rooms so that they 
cannot adequately see other participants and follow their lips. Visually 
impaired people are also at a disadvantage, for example, the increased use of 
computers without adapted software to accommodate visually impaired 
people. Harris 74 suggests that deaf people who use British Sign Language 
suffer disadvantages from linguistic isolation in employment situations where 
the majority of workers are hearing. In fact, pressure is exerted upon deaf 
workers to behave as much like hearing workers as possible - in effect to 
'deny' and make invisible their deafness. She argues that many deaf people 
work in situations where there is a complete lack of meaningful 
communication between themselves and colleagues. The disadvantages 
suffered by deaf people stem from a lack of tolerance and respect for linguistic 
difference by management and co-workers and as such, become 
individualised by being seen as problems for deaf workers to solve, rather 
than for hearing people to view as a challenge. 75 She also suggests that such 
a change in attitudes by hearing people and a willingness to learn British Sign 
72 French S. (eds) Disabling Barriers, Enabling Environments, London Sage Publications 
Finkelstein V, 1980 Attitudes & Disabled People. Issues for Discussion, New York World 
Rehabilitation Fund 
Harris J 1995 The cultural Meaning of Deafness Aldershot: Avebury 
Harris J 1997 Deafness & The Hearing, Birmingham Venture Press 
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Language could radically alter the patterns of disadvantage and provide an 
empowering environment for deaf people. 
The definition of disability under the DDA 1995 reinforced the medical model 
by linking impairments with the ability to carry out day-to-day activities without 
allowing for social or environmental variables that may have hindered or 
exacerbated the effects of the disability. Furthermore, proof of disability was 
required by the definitions of disability and medical proof was required to show 
that there was a substantial effect on a disabled person's ability to carry out 
functional activities as they related directly to the impairment. 76 
The DDA 1995 definition of disability was complicated and put the burden of 
proof on an individual to prove that their ability to carry out 'normal day-to-day 
activities' was "substantially" restricted. There is also a complicated section in 
the DDA 1995 which says that some people who do not come within the 
definition will nevertheless be considered as disabled, for example some 
people with progressive illnesses will be covered as soon as symptoms start 
to appear. Progressive illnesses such as HIV, Cancer and MS are now 
considered from the date of diagnosis as amended. 77 The definition will not 
cover people who have been shown to have a genetic predisposition to an 
illness. 
76 Gooding C 1996 Blackstones Guide to the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. London Blackstone 
Press 	 - 
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It could be said that the rationale for the social model based on disability 
originally lies with the rationale that women and ethnic minorities are protected 
currently by the sex and race discrimination laws. A straightforward definition 
of sex or race based on the issues such as what ethnic group or what sex a 
person was born with at birth. The emphasis is on the person's sex or skin 
colour, and society's attitude towards them, but when applying the same 
principle to disabled people it is the individual disabled person that has the 
problem and that some how their disability has to meet the criteria of Section 
1 of the DDA 1995,. It can be argued that the present definition of disability 
under the DDA 1995 is still narrow, unlike the definition of disability in other 
legislation in other countries, such as Australia, USA and Ireland. 
In my view, whilst the medical model sees disability as functional impairment, 
this had three main effects in relation to the DDA 1995 framework. Firstly, the 
tendency of Tribunals and Courts to rely upon medical issues relating to the 
nature or the diagnosis of the condition limited the number of individuals who 
might have been able to claim protection under the DDA 1 99578•  The medical 
model's interpretation often given to the DDA 1995 excluded individuals who 
might have been very susceptible to disability discrimination because they 
failed to establish that they had an impairment or to establish the severity or 
degree of the disability. The complexity of the procedure due to the medical 
model might also have deterred potential Claimants from pursuing any 
potential discrimination claims 79 
78 See Appendix 2 
See chapter 4 at 4.2. 
57 - 
Secondly, the medical model has wider negative implications for disabled 
people within, the workplace. Placing the focus on the substantial medical 
impairment and requiring extensive medical evidence of a particular nature of 
the condition may lead to disabled people being labelled and therefore their 
disability to act as a stigma. This in turn may have influenced potential 
employers to believe an individual was less capable of working because 
he/she was perceived as being different in some way from the majority of the 
work force who were fully able-bodied or had no mental health issues. It was 
therefore more likely that the employer might discriminate against that 
individual. In order for an individual to have benefitted from the DDA 1995 
he/she must have firstly spelt out the nature of their condition and then proved 
that this condition resulted in a level of impaired functioning. Consequently, 
the focus was on what was wrong with the individual and what that individual 
could not do. The mechanisms of the DDA 1995 forced Claimants to prove 
these issues and this often caused unnecessary hardships and distress. 
Further, such an approach was unlikely to encourage equal consideration of 
disabled people and individuals who have no physical or mental impairment, 
rather it reinforces the line between normal and disabled and therefore 
enforcing segregation for disabled people. 
Thirdly, the use of a medical model of disability within the legislative 
framework failed to address a number of issues where disability discrimination 
might arise, because the law did not protect individuals from discrimination 
where they themselves did not suffer from an impairment. The focus of the 
law was on substantial impairment rather than on the phenomenon of 
discrimination itself. Therefore, the DDA 1995 did not cover individuals who 
suffered from discriminatory treatment as a result of a false perception of 
disability, for example an individual with a minor hearing problem or a person 
with sight in only one eye might be discriminated against despite that 
condition having no substantial effect on their ability to carry out day-to-day 
functions. 
While the definition of disability continues to be based on a medical model, 
there will continue to be a number of consequences arising out of Court and 
Tribunal cases, the public and the workplace, which will cause hardship to 
disabled people simply because the present definition of disability is far too 
narrow. An ideal solution would be to model the definition of disability on 
other international laws for instance USA and Australia which have a wider 
approach with regard to the definition of disability. The USA and Australian 
wider approach to the definition of disability protects disabled people so long 
as they can establish they have an impairment regardless of the degree or the 
severity of that impairment unlike the British approach to the definition of 
disability which establishes it had to have an adverse and/or substantial effect 
in their ability to carry out daily activities. 
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3.3 	 Nothing Is Perfect! 
Since its development there have been criticisms of the social model. Morris 80 
raised the concern that the social model may be just as oppressive as the 
individual model if it is imposed in such a way as to deny the experience of 
individuals. She suggests that the danger lies in attempting to 
compartmentalise the personal feelings and experiences of people rather than 
grounding the political analysis in them. Crow 81 supports this theory and calls 
for the inclusion of impairment in the theorising of the social model. 
Some disabled people do experience the onset of impairment as a personal 
tragedy probably because of the way they have been treated in the past, for 
example bullying at school, inability to secure a job, inability to attend public 
events because they are inaccessible. All these factors have contributed to 
some disabled people feeling that it is their fault that they are not included or 
able to take part in society. However, while not invalidating the argument that 
they are being excluded from a range of activities by a disabling environment, 
it does mean it would be inappropriate to deny that impairment can be 
experienced in this way. While such reactions themselves may be due to the 
extent to which the norms and values attached to the individual model have 
embedded themselves within our psyche, the values of the social model have 
eo 	 Cit footnote 5  Op 
81 Crow L 1996 Including All of Our Lives: Renewing A Need. A Feminist Reappraisal. Critical Social 
Policy Issue 16 pages 23/39 
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been shown to be effective in combating them. Tate 82 reported on a study 
which showed that people with spinal injuries who were put on an 
'independent living program' at the time of their acute rehabilitation were able 
to adjust to their new circumstances with less negative psychological effects 
than those who received a more traditional, medically-orientated service. 
Individual disabled people have borne testament to the value of the social 
model to them personally. 
It appears that the Disability Rights Commission and other disability 
movement groups83 have taken a fresh look at the social model of disability 
and looked at new ways integrate all its complexities. It is important that we 
recognise the ways in which disability and impairment work together. The 
social model has never suggested that disability represents the total 
explanation or that impairment doesn't count - that has simply been the 
impression we have given by keeping our experiences of impairment private 
and failing to incorporate them into our public political analysis. TM 
Overall, the social model is the preferable model. The recent legislative 
changes85 have given many disabled people hope and clarity to know that 
they will be treated as equally and fairly as all able bodied people in society 
and that due to the recent changes in the laws that disabled people will now 
82Tate D G,, Maynard F,, & Forchheimer M, 1992 Evaluation of a Medical Rehabilitation & Independent 
Living Programme for Persons with Spinal cord Injury. Journal of Rehabilitation vol 58 pages 25/8 
83 See Chapter 7 at 7.2 The way Forward 
84 L Crow 1996 Exploring the Divide: Illness & Disability. Leeds: The Disability Press 
85 	 Cit footnote 78  Op 
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have a major say in decision making to implement changes in society to 
combat discrimination. 86 
Crows statement expresses this succinctly: 
"My life has two phases: before the social model of disability and after 
it. Discovering the way of thinking about my experiences was the 
proverbial raft in stormy seas. It gave me an understanding of my life, 
shared with thousands, even millions of other people around the world, 
and I clung to it." 87 
86 DDA 2005 
87 Op cit footnote 79 
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4 PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT 
This chapter will demonstrate how Section 1 of the DDA 1995 has caused 
difficulties through the passage of time. To be able to demonstrate this, the 
three segments of Section 1 will be analysed closely using past case law. The 
three segments to be examined are as follows: 
. Substantial adverse effect 
Ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities 
Long-term effect 
There is no definition of 'physical impairment within the Act and this has been 
the cause of much confusion with Courts and Tribunals. Further complications 
have arisen where there may be a physical impairment but it does not qualify 
under the definition of disability because the impairment is not serious enough 
to gain the protection of the Act. Each segment will now be considered in 
detail. 
4.1 	 Substantial Adverse Effect 
The first segment covers substantial adverse effect. The Guidance states that 
to qualify for protection under the DDA 1995 the impairment must have a 
substantial adverse effect on a person's ability to carry out day-to-day 
activities. 
- 63 - 
The Guidance accompanying the Act states the requirement that an adverse 
effect be substantial reflects the general understanding of "disability" as a 
limitation going beyond the normal differences in ability, which may exist 
among people. A "substantial" effect is more than would be produced by the 
sort of physical or mental conditions experienced by many people who 
experience only minor effects. A substantial effect is one, which is more than 
"minor" or "trivial. 
The aim of this segment is to rule out minor or trivial conditions. These may 
include temporary conditions such as sprains or minor back injuries or any 
other form of conditions that have not lasted for more than twelve months. It 
can be argued, however, that people with physical or mental impairments who 
do not come under the above list are still being penalised because their 
condition does not come under the DDA 1995. For example, in the case of 
colour blindness a person who confuses red with green would be barred from 
becoming an airline pilot. The Guidance makes clear that it would not be 
reasonable to regard an inability to distinguish between red and green as 
having a substantial adverse effect on a person's ability to carry out day-to-
day activities although it would be reasonable in the case of a total inability to 
distinguish colours. The Guidance does not cover people with poor 
educational records who have a low intelligence level nor does it cover people 
who are left-handed when they are unable to operate machinery designed for 
right-handed people. A typical example of a person not covered by Section 1 
is a person with a minor visual impairment such as 20/40 vision who may find 
n 
it difficult to show that their impairment is substantial enough to have an 
adverse effect as stated in the Act. 
The Guidance89 , also states that account should be taken of how a person 
might reasonably be expected to modify his/her behaviour to prevent or 
reduce the adverse effect of an impairment or disability on normal day-to-day 
activities. An example given is where a person has a condition, which 
manifests itself as an allergic reaction to certain substances. An example 
would be a person with such a condition might reasonably be expected to take 
steps to avoid these substances. However, it is not always possible to adhere 
to the Guidance regulations and this can be demonstrated in the following 
scenario. 
A trainee nurse who is allergic to latex has to use latex rubber gloves to 
perform most aspects of her job. The Guidance states she has to avoid the 
substance that causes her to have an allergic reaction. In this case it is 
impossible because she is expected to wear the protective gloves as part of 
her job. If she does not wear the gloves she would be in breach of health and 
safety regulations. As a consequence this person has to give up her nursing 
career as her 'impairment' would not be considered to have an adverse effect, 
88 
 Doyle B. Disability Discrimination Law & Practice Jordn 5th 
 Edition. 
Guidance Part 2 para A7-A9 
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because outside the work place her condition was controlled because she had 
little or no contact with the latex substance. 9° 
The Guidance is based on the test of reasonableness, but what is 
reasonable?• It could be argued that this concept is too wide. An example 
would be to take two disabled people with similar disabilities, similar jobs and 
similar environmental issues. One person could perform better than the other 
because they have a better coping strategy or it simply could be because of a 
persons' particular personality, for example, one person could be of a nervous 
disposition and the other person robust. Originally, Courts and Tribunals took 
the concept of reasonableness and thought that if a person was able to carry 
out normal day-to-day activities then their impairment could not have a 
substantial adverse effect. However, this was challenged in the case of 
Goodwin —v- the Patent Office 91 
In this case the EAT reversed its findings that the Claimant, who was a 
paranoid schizophrenic was not disabled. The Employment Tribunal had 
thought that the effect of his impairment was not "substantial". The EAT 
decided otherwise. They took into consideration that the Claimant was unable 
to carry on normal conversations with his work colleagues and that he had 
such bizarre behaviour he was considered disabled. 
90 This was an actual case which took place in my workplace and the potential claimant in this case had 
to leave her nursing career to work in the hospital admin office. (Not reported) 
91 
 Goodwin v The Patent Office (1999) IRLR 4 EAT Although this chapter covers the issue regarding 
physical impairment this case involves mental impairment and a more comprehensive background of the 
case is illustrated in chapter 5 entitled Mental Impairment. Also see Appendix 3 (7) (a) & (b) 
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The EAT set out their explanation as follows: 
"What the Act is concerned with is an impairment of the person's 
ability to carry out normal activities. The fact that a person can 
carry out such activities does not mean that his/her ability to carry 
them out has not been impaired. Thus, for example, a person may 
be able to cook, but only with the greatest difficulty. In order to 
constitute an adverse effect it is not the not doing of the acts which 
is the focus of attention but rather the ability to do (or not to do) the 
acts." 
Experience shows that disabled people often adjust and adapt their lives and 
circumstances to enable them to cope for themselves. Thus, if a person 
whose capacity to communicate through normal speech was obviously 
impaired, they might well voluntarily choose to live on their own. If one asked 
such a person whether they managed to carry on their daily lives without 
undue problems, the answer might well be yes, yet their ability to lead a 
normal life had obviously been impaired. Such a person would be unable to 
communicate through speech, and the ability to communicate through speech 
is a capacity, which is needed to carry out normal day-to-day activities 
whether at work or at home. If asked whether they could use the telephone or 
ask directions, or which bus to take the answer would be no. Those might be 
regarded as day-to-day activities contemplated by the legislation, and a 
person's ability to carry them out would clearly be regarded as adversely 
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affected. 92 The reasoning behind their decision was that the disability must 
have an adverse affect on a person's day-to-day activities regardless of 
whether the affected activities were tasks carried out at work or home. Indeed, 
it can be said that if the disability affects the person's home life then it is likely 
to affect their work life. 
A person can still have an impairment but it may not have a substantial 
adverse effect and therefore the impairment will not be classed as a disability. 
This can be demonstrated in the cases of Foster v Hampshire Fire and 
Rescue Servic& 93 in which a woman suffered from both asthma and migraine 
and Foord v J A Johnson & Sons 94 which held that the Claimant did not have 
a disability which had a substantial effect. 
It can, however, be argued that in both of these cases the Claimants have 
conditions which affect their ability to carry out tasks. It is questionable in the 
case of Foord v J A Johnson & Son95 whether, had the Claimant worked full 
time, for example, 8.00 am to 4.00 pm, the Act would have afforded her the 
protection she sought. Indeed, her ability to do her job would have been 
affected, and so it could have been argued that the employer would have then 
had to make reasonable adjustments by way of providing reduced hours and 
frequent breaks. Many people with physical impairments can only work part- 
92 bid footnote 85 
EAT/i 303/97 (23 06 98) Harveys. See Appendix 3(1) 
El case No S1200300/97 Appendix 3 (2) 
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time and even if they worked full-time the Act would suggest that their 
disabilities had a substantial adverse effect and therefore would meet Section 
1 of the Act. The reasonable adjustment mechanism 96 would apply and the 
disabled person could ask for reduced hours, hence making them part-time. 
The effect of the impairment still has the same impact whether a disabled 
person works part-time or full-time. What is contentious is whether they should 
then be excluded from the protection of the DDA 1995 because they have 
chosen to work part-time since their impairments prevent them from working 
full-time. 
The Guidance states that consideration should be given in respect of a 
persons' disability that has a substantial adverse effect and to also take into 
consideration how long a disabled person takes to carry out day-to-day 
activities. 97 The Guidance also states consideration should be given to 
environmental issues affecting a disabled persons' disability, for example, 
temperature, humidity, time of the day, how tired the person is or how much 
stress he/she is under as in the case of Ekpe —v- Commissioner of the 
Metropolis Police 98 this Claimant suffered from a muscle wasting condition in 
her right hand. The employer may be expected to make adjustments to work 
systems to reduce the impact on the employee's disability if the environmental 
factors affect an employee's ability to do their work. 
DDA 1995 S 6 
Guidance Part II para A2-A3 
98 2001 ICR 1084 EAT See Appendix 3 (3)(a) 
There has been much case law involving cases where the Claimant was 
perceived to have disabilities but their impairments did not meet the 
requirement as having a substantial adverse effect. 
In the cases of Cook v Kitchen Range Foods, 99 Thorpe v-Royal Hospitals 
NHS Trust10° and Alexander —v- Driving Standards Agency101  these cases 
involved allegations that Claimants had been discriminated against on the 
basis, respectively, of a back injury, having sight only in one eye, and having 
an epileptic fit. In all three cases, Tribunals ruled that the Claimants' medical 
conditions did not have a substantial adverse effect on their ability to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities as required by Section 1. 
4.2 Ability to Carry Out Normal Day-To--Day Activities 
This second segment involves the ability to carry out 'normal day-to-
activities'. The DDA 1995 only protected people whose abilities to carry out 
'normal day-to-day activities' were impaired. The Act did not define 'normal 
day-to-day activities' but paragraph 4 (1) of Schedule 1 states that an 
impairment is to be treated as affecting a person's ability to carry out normal 
day-to-day activities only if it affects one of the following: mobility; manual 
dexterity; physical co-ordination; continence; ability to lift, carry or otherwise 
"36 EORDCLD pg 4 see Appendix 3(4) 
10036 EORDCLD pgs 11-12 See Appendix 3(5) 
9336 E0RDcLD pg 4 See Appendix 9(6) 
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move everyday objects; speech, hearing or eyesight; memory, or ability to 
concentrate, learn or understand or perception of the risk of physical danger. 
4.3 The Meanincj of 'Normal' 
The Guidance provides that the term normal day-to-day activities does not 
include activities which are normal only for a particular person or a group of 
people. Therefore, only activities which are normal for most people and 
carried out by most people on a daily or frequent regular basis can be 
considered. 102 The test is an objective one whereby, for example, shopping, 
cleaning and cooking are all considered to be normal day-to-day activities. In 
the landmark case of Goodwin —v- The Patent Office 103 the EAT set out the 
Guidelines to determine whether a person is "disabled" within the meaning of 
the Act. 
The Guidance 104 also states that the direct effect of an impairment must also 
be taken into consideration when assessing whether the impairment falls 
within the statutory definition. An example of this would be where a person 
has been advised by his/her GP to change his daily routine or to refrain from 
doing a normal day-to-day activity on account of his/her impairment, or where 
an impairment can cause pain or fatigue so that while the normal day-to-day 
activities will be performed the person may not be able to repeat the tasks 
102 Guidance Para C2 
103 Op Cit footnote 85 
Guidance Para C6 
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over a substantial period of time, or indeed might avoid lifting or carrying 
heavy objects such as a vacuum cleaner. Often this rule can cause hardship 
on individuals who suffer mental health illnesses such as depression. People 
suffering from mental illnesses such as depression most commonly complain 
of difficulties with concentration. Other areas may also be affected such as 
physical co-ordination, perception of the risk of danger, speech, hearing or 
eyesight. In addition, the Guidance 105 will also look at how stress and fatigue 
may take their toll on physical areas such as mobility, or the ability to lift or 
carry every day objects. The Guidance 106 makes it clear that the effects of 
fatigue generally must be taken into account. However, interestingly stress in 
itself is not classed as a disability) 07 Additionally, for people with mental 
health illness, the Guidance 108 states that: 
"Account should also be taken of whether, although the person can 
physically perform a task, he/she is unable in practice or sustain this 
over a period of time", 
The above guidelines have caused difficulties and confusion in early case law 
as demonstrated in the case of Leonard —v- Southern Derbyshire Chamber of 
Commerc&09 where the Claimant suffered from clinical depression. The 
Tribunal concluded that despite the Claimant's problems she was still 
105 Guidance Para 4(1) 
106 Guidance Para c6 
107 See chapter 5 
108 Guidance Para c7 
'° IRLR 19 EAT 1 See Appendix 3(8) 
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managing to carry out day-to-day activities and they held that she did not have 
a disability under the DDA 1995. Thisdecision was appealed and the EAT 
stated that: 
"The Tribunal's findings clearly stated that the Claimant was unable to 
sustain an activity over a period of time." 
In the EAT's view they stated that: 
"The Tribunal had failed to take proper account of the affect of the 
tiredness on the Claimant's ability and that they found it difficult to see 
how the Tribunal could have concluded on the evidence that there was 
no substantial affect on her ability to carry out day-to-day activities". 
The Guidance also makes it clear that work related activities do not come 
under this heading, in that it makes it clear that the term 'normal day-to-day 
activities' does not include work of any particular form because no particular 
work is 'normal' for most people. 110 This therefore, means the inability to 
perform a particular task at work would not bring a person within the definition 
of a disabled person, unless there was also an adverse impact on the 
person's normal day-to-day activities and this is illustrated in the cases of 
Hudson -v- The Post Oft7ce 1" where the Claimant was a driver and Quinlan - 
ItO Guidance Para c3 
'" El Case No 3100773/98 See Appendix 3(9) 
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v- B & 0112 where the Claimant had underwent heart surgery. These.may 
have been borderline cases in which the Claimant may have gained some 
redress from the Act. Questions to ask would be with regard to the effect on 
the field of vision and whether there is a correlation in the number of accidents 
to the individual or peers and/or any anxiety caused by the lack of sight 
Undoubtedly, there is an effect that partial sight has on a person's life, 
whether in the home or in the workplace, that needs to be taken into 
consideration. There is evidence that many people with sight in one eye lead 
full social and working lives - equally there are many others for whom it can 
have a debilitating effect. Unfortunately, there is the age factor involved in this 
process: whether the sight loss was sudden, or of a gradual nature and 
whether any rehabilitation services had been received by the individual, 
through either Local Authorities or Voluntary Organisations, or through 
Company Insurance Schemes. The latter case returns to the issue of 
reasonable adjustments 113 being made through the DDA 1995. Therefore, it 
could be said that the Tribunal had failed to consider the above issues and to 
consider whether the employer could have made any attempts to make any 
adjustments, such as to find alternative work for that person. Clearly, this is a 
failure on the part of the DDA 1995 to consider the environmental impact on 
the physical and mental impairment of that person. In the case of Quinlan v 
8&Q plc 114  the Tribunal stood by its decision that the Claimants were not 
disabled and the EAT upheld that decision. 
112 EAT case No: 1386/97 See Appendix 3(10) 
113 DDA 1995 S 6 
114 Op Cit footnote 106 
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In relation to gender focused activities such as applying make up and nail 
varnish for example which are performed by females rather than by males, the 
Tribunal held in the Ekge —v- The Metropolitan Police Commissioner 2001 115 
that putting make up on or putting rollers in hair were not normal day-to-day 
activities, because they were carried out almost exclusively by women. 
However, the EAT said that this was plainly wrong because it would exclude 
anything done by women rather than men, or vice-versa as not being normal. 
In the case of Coca Cola Enterprise Ltd v Shergill' 16 the Tribunal had relied on 
the part of the Guidance, which states that the playing of games and sports 
does not constitute normal day-to-day activities for the purpose of S 1(1) of 
the Act. The EAT set aside an Employment Tribunal's decision that an 
employee who was unable to cycle or play snooker or football because of his 
physical impairment was not a disability within the meaning of the Act. 117 It 
may have been advantageous had the EAT expanded its view on what it 
meant when it stated that if a person suffers from an impairment of mobility 
such that a person is unable to engage in 'normal endeavours at fitness', then 
that person is likely to be disabled. The question that needs to be asked here 
is, "what are normal endeavours of fitness?" The phrase could cover such 
activities as going for a brisk walk or swim for fifteen minutes, or light 
gardening, which are the kind of activities that the Government has promoted 
115 
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116 EAT003/02 See Appendix 3 (11) 
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in advertising and on television campaigns designed to promote fitness 
among the population. Such a view is consistent with the examples of 
adverse effect given in the Guidance 118 , for example the inability to travel a 
short journey as a passenger in a vehicle; inability to walk other than at a slow 
pace or with unsteady or jerky movements; difficulty in going up and down 
stairs; inability to use one or more forms of public transport, and the inability to 
go out of doors unaccompanied. 
In its final report in December 1999 the Disability Rights Tasks Force made a 
number of recommendations for future reform of the definition of disability in 
the DDA 1995.119  In commenting on the exclusion of work activities from 
"normal day-to-day activities", the Disability Rights Tasks Force explained 
that: 
"We considered whether the reasons for not including work as a normal day-
to-day activity had been clearly explained in Statutory Guidance and was 
understood by legal advisers and Employment Tribunals. The reasons were, 
firstly, that there was no single occupational role that is common for most 
people and secondly many activities carried out as part of particular 
occupations, were exceptional and not normal. 120 
118 Para C 14 
119 Disability Rights Tasks Force From Exclusion to Inclusion A Report of the Disability Rights Task 
Force For Disabled People (1999 London Df EE) Chapter 3 
120 op cit footnote 112 
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The Task Force continued: 
"We therefore felt the exclusion of exceptional activities was 
acceptable. However, many of the activities carried out in employment 
are not exceptional and would be quite normal outside the work place." 
For example, if a person with Repetitive Strain Injury cannot operate a 
keyboard in the workplace and does not use a keyboard at home, this does 
imply that he/she is not covered by the Act. Operating a keyboard outside the 
workplace is a normal day-to-day activity for very many people, even if it is not 
for the potential Claimant he/she is likely to be covered by the DDA 1995 
definition. 121 
The above quotation still leaves the rationale for the exclusion unclear. 
Employees, who are, on a substantial and long-term basis unable to perform 
tasks at work by reason of physical or mental impairment, would seem to be 
among those who most needed the protection of the DDA 1995. This 
exclusion makes their civil rights at work depend upon whether the activities 
affected happen also to be "normal day-to-day activities", or whether they 
happen to be other such activities also affected. The activities covered in 
Schedule 1 of the Act 122 form an arbitrary list which are: 
mobility, 
121 Ibid footnote 114 
122 DDA1995 para 4 
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. manual dexterity 
physical co-ordination 
. continence 
ability to lift, carry, or otherwise move every day objects 
speech, hearing or eye sight 
memory, or ability to concentration, learn, or understand 
perception of the risk of physical danger 
Many practitioners, including myself as a Solicitor, and advisors will have 
found themselves trying to squeeze conditions into one or other category. 
Those with mental impairments 123 as the Disability Rights Tasks Force 
recognised, are at particular risk of finding themselves excluded (e.g. 
agoraphobics and those with impairments to social interaction and feeling.) 
4.4 Long Term Effects 
A further criteria which had to be met under Section 1 of the DDA 1995 was 
that the substantial adverse effect of an impairment had to be long-term. This 
requirement ensured that temporary or short-term conditions did not come 
under the protection of the DDA 1995.124  The definition of long-term is that a 
condition qualifies if it lasted at least 12 months, or is likely to last 12 months, 
or is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected 
123 See chapter 5 Mental Health Impairments 
124 Schedule I Para 20(1) 
EWE 
The criteria listed above have always been problematic and uncertain. A 
typical scenario would be an employee suffered a sudden onset of mild 
depression and is dismissed within six months of his employment. This 
person would have no redress under the current employment law and 
depending on their service 125 they would only have a claim for unfair 
dismissal. However, if that person has less than twelve months service, then 
they have no claim for unfair dismissal or disability discrimination. Even if they 
do meet the twelve months qualifying period to make a claim for unfair 
dismissal, this may still fail on the grounds of capability due to the inability to 
do their job. Another example would be a person with a broken leg in plaster, 
who may be refused entry into a public house or a restaurant. This person 
does not qualify for protection because he/she does not satisfy the criteria of 
long-term effect - it is merely an illness or an injury.' 26 
The aim of the twelve-month qualifying time period is to exclude people with 
impairments that are short-term or temporary. The Tribunal takes the view 
that with current impairments that have not lasted twelve months; they will 
have to decide if the substantial adverse effect of the impairment is likely to 
last twelve months. When deciding how long an impairment has lasted, or is 
likely to last, or more likely to last, the Guidance states it is to be determined 
at the date of the Tribunal hearing and not at the date of the discriminatory 
125 In order to make a claim for Unfair Dismissal a Claimant must have 12 months continuous service 
126 Doyle B. Disability, Discrimination, Law & Practice. Jordan's 5th  edition 
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act. 127 The Guidance also states that a Tribunal should take into account the 
total period for which the effect of the impairment exists including any time 
before the discriminatory act as well as time afterwards 128 
This approach was confirmed by the EAT in the case of Greenwood v British 
Airways plc19 in which the Claimant suffered from nervous tension. The 
Tribunal took the incorrect approach when they decided that the Claimant's 
depression was not long-term because at the date of the alleged 
discriminatory act he was fit and well and the depression was not likely to 
recur. The EAT held that the wording of the Guidance 13° which makes it clear 
that in assessing the effect of an impairment it is right to take account of the 
total period for which the effect exists, provides sufficient authority for 
requiring a Tribunal to have regard to the adverse effect of an impairment up 
to and including the date of the hearing. It was not correct to consider the 
adverse affects only at the moment in time when the alleged discrimination 
took place. 
The wording of the Guidance 131 also protects those people who may, for 
example, have a sudden onset of deafness or blindness. They could rely on 
the protection of the DDA 1995 if they were dismissed within say six months 
127 Para b7 
128 Para bS 
' ICR 969 EAT See Appendix 3(12) 
130 Para b8 
131 Para B 8 
of their impairment. All that person needs is to show that the impairment is 
likely to last more than twelve months. 
The requirement that an impairment is long-term clearly applies to all 
impairments, but in practice seems to have been problematic and relevant in 
the cases of depression. The following three cases have been used to 
illustrate the complexity and hardship caused around people who suffer from 
depression 132 
In Farrell —v- The Hammersmith Hospital NHS Trust & ors 133 the Claimant 
suffered from bouts of depression in 1994 and again in 1996. To comment on 
this case, it has to be said that the restricted time limits under the DDA 1995 
caused hardship to pregnant women during and after pregnancy and in 
particular in relation to post-natal depression issues. As the current law 
stands maternity leave is only granted up to nine months paid leave and 
thereafter the remaining three months unpaid. Nevertheless most women, for 
the purposes of financial reasons have to return to work after six months. If 
she was suffering from post-natal depression and then consequently went off 
sick with this depression she would be deemed not to have any protection 
under the DDA 1995 because it would be very difficult to prove that the post-
natal depression would be likely to last more than twelve months. 
132 See also Chapter 5 Mental Impairment 
133 ET Case No: 2200918197 See Appendix 3(13) 
In the cases of Butler —v- Eastleigh Housing Association Ltd 134 the Claimant 
became depressed following incidents at work and Jobling —v- Corporate 
Medical Management Ltd., 135 in which the Claimant suffered from depression 
the Tribunals found that the Claimants were not deemed disabled for the 
purposes of the DDA 1995. The last two cases show that each of the 
Claimants impairments could have had fluctuating effects, in that the effects of 
an impairment, for example depression, does not have to remain the same 
during the twelve month period. The Guidance confirms that provided the 
impairment continues to have or is likely to have a substantial adverse effect 
on the person's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities throughout a 
period of less than twelve months, there is a long-term effect for these 
purposes. In other words, even if an Claimant who suffers from depression 
was able to prove that his/her depression was likely to last more than twelve 
months he/she would still have to prove that his depression has an adverse 
effect on his/her ability to carry out day-to-day activities. 
4.5 	 Recurring Conditions 
The DDA 1995 also provided that if a person had a disability which had a 
substantial adverse affect on his/her ability to carry out normal day-to-day 
activities, but which subsequently ceased to have that affect, it would be 
treated as continuing to have such a substantial adverse affect. For example, 
a person who had an illness or disability which was in remission, or if they are 
134 ET Case No: 3101121/97 See Appendix 9(14). 
135 ET Case No:703101/2001 See Appendix 9(15) 
in good health, would still have the protection of the Act if it could be 
established that the affect of the disability was likely to recur. This provision 
covered impairment such as epilepsy and multiple sclerosis, or someone who 
was asthmatic. However, seasonal allergies, such as hay-fever, were 
specifically excluded, but it could be argued that for a person who suffers from 
severe hay-fever the effects are recurring and can be substantial for a brief 
time, therefore can also be said to have an adverse affect on that person's 
ability to carry out their day-to-day activities. Nevertheless hay-fever and 
seasonal conditions are specifically excluded from the regulations." 6 
The Guidelines state that an impairment 'with recurring effects' in a person 
whose condition is likely to recur, means that it is more likely than not that the 
effect will recur. If the effects are likely to recur beyond twelve months after 
the first recurrence then the condition should be treated as long-term. The 
Guidelines go on to state that judging likelihood of recurrence, account should 
be taken of all the circumstances, including any reasonable expectations that 
the person concerned should take steps to prevent the recurrence. 
The likelihood of recurrence can be an issue in cases involving epilepsy 
where, except in the most severe cases, the condition is symptom-less 
between seizures and this can often cause confusion and hardship to people 
who suffer from epilepsy as in the case of Alexander —v- Driving Standards 
Agency. 137  The Claimant in this case lost her job. She was unable to continue 
136 Disability Discrimination (Meaning of Disability Regulation) 1196 Section 11996/1455 
0p cit footnote 95 
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to work as a driving test examiner and could not rely on the protection of 
Section 1 of the DDA 1995 because she could not prove that she had a 
recurring condition in that she could not establish that her impairment would 
recur or be likely to recur. In addition to this the DVLA guidelines 135 also state, 
"it is possible to apply or re-apply for a Category A B or P licence as 
long as you have been free from seizures completely for one year or 
only experienced sleep seizures for a period of at least three years and 
the DVLA/DVLNI is satisfied that as a driver you are not likely to be a 
source of danger to the public" 
and under these Guidelines she was not allowed to continue to drive. 
Consequently her employers dismissed her, but were not deemed to be 
disabled for the purpose of the Act. 
4.6 Progressive Conditions 
There is also a special provision made for persons with progressive 
conditions. If a person has a progressive condition such as Cancer, Multiple 
Sclerosis, Muscular Dystrophy or HIV and has had an impairment affecting 
normal day-to-day activities, but which has not yet had a substantial adverse 
affect, he/she is deemed to have an impairment with a substantial adverse 
affect if the condition is likely to result in such an impairment. 
138 
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In order for persons with impairments such as HIV, Cancer and MS to have 
gained the protection of the DDA 1995 the Guidance pointed out that for the 
rule to operate. Medical diagnosis of the condition is not in itself enough, there 
had to be some effect on the persons ability to carry out day-to-day 
activities. 139 
The following cases illustrate this rule: In Ayes —v- Bournemouth International 
Airport LtcP4° the Claimant was diagnosed as HIV positive and in Cox —v-
Careeragent Ltd., tia Bell Toyota Ltd. 141 the Claimant was diagnosed as 
having a malignant tumour. It was held that both Claimants could rely on the 
fact that their disabilities had a substantial effect on their ability to carry out 
day-to-day activities 
However, In the case of O'Donnell —v- the Ministry of Defence 142 the Claimant 
suffered from Ankylosing Spondylitis. He did not qualify as being disabled 
because his condition had already occurred or did not have a progressive 
condition.. Therefore, accordingly the Employment Tribunal held that the 
Claimant did not have a disability. 
Therefore the Guidance 143 will only apply where "the condition is likely to 
result" in the person having an impairment which has a substantial adverse 
139 The Guidance para 8(1) (a) 
140 ET case No: 3101789/98 See Appendix 3(16) 
141 ET Case No: 1700896/98 See Appendix 3(17) 
142 ET Case No: 3101421/97 See Appendix 3(18) 
143 Para 8 
effect. This was reinforced in the case of Mowat—Brown —v- the University of 
SurreV44 where the Claimant had MS. The EAT in this case found that the 
Claimant's MS was not a progressive condition. They based their decision on 
a medical expert's report which stated that it was difficult to give an accurate 
prognosis for an individual with MS and accordingly the EAT found no error on 
the Employment Tribunal's decision and dismissed the Appeal. This rule has 
obviously caused hardship to the Claimants in the above cases because both 
had impairments which affected their daily living and were conditions which 
were not likely to improve. However, in the case of Diamond —v- Fagnani145 
where the Claimant also had MS, the Employment Tribunal found that the 
Claimant's MS was a progressive condition for the purpose of the Act and this 
therefore conflicts with the Mowatt-Brown —v- University of Surrey 146  case. 
As previously illustrated the first two cases involving MS clearly show there 
was confusion and conflict with regard to progressive illness. As a result the 
criteria for progressive illness has now been amended 147 which occurred in 
October 2004. The amendment states that once a progressive condition is 
diagnosed, in particular for Cancer, HIV and MS then it will be deemed to be a 
disability at the date of the diagnosis or the prognosis. The amendment was 
made in particular to protect people with Cancer, HIV or MS, whose condition 
would not immediately have an adverse effect on their ability to carry out day- 
'"IRLR 235 EAT See Appendix 3(19) 
145 ET Case No:6004314/99 
146 Op Cit footnote 138 
147 Disability Discrimination Act 1994 as amended by the DDA 2004 
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to-day activities, but later as the condition got worse it would then have an 
adverse effect on their ability to carry out day-to-day activities. 
4.7 The Effects of Medical Treatment and/or Disability Aids 
A disabled person may have a disability, which is controlled by medication or 
the use of aids, such as a motorised wheelchair or a hearing aid. It would 
seem that once the medication or the aid take effect, then that person would 
no longer be deemed to be disabled as their disability would not have any 
adverse effect on their ability to carry out day-to-day activities. Yet, if the 
medication or the aid were to be removed, they would then be deemed to be 
disabled. Nevertheless, the person with the aid, such as the motorised 
wheelchair or the hearing aid may still be treated unfairly and be seen as 
being disabled simply because they use these aids to cope with their 
disability. However, protection is given to people in such circumstances. 148 
The Guidance provides that an impairment which would be likely to have a 
substantial adverse effect on the ability of the person concerned to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities, but for the fact that medication or aids are being 
taken to treat or correct the impairment, would still be deemed to be treated as 
a continuing impairment amounting to a disability. Measures can include, but 
are not limited to, medical treatment and the use of prosthesis. The DDA 
1995 Act does not define what is meant by an 'aid' but in the case of Vicar,'- 
148 Para 6 (2) 
v- British Telecommunications 149 in which the Claimant suffered from an 
upper arm condition, the EAT took the view that aids were things such as 
Zimmer frames, sticks or wheelchairs and not household objects such as 
automatic can-openers. 
The DDA 1995 also does not have a clear definition of medical treatment. In 
the case of Kapadia v London Borough of LambetlY 5° the Claimant suffered 
from reactive depression. The EAT stated that counselling sessions with a 
Consultant Psychologist constituted such treatment. However, if a disabled 
person is advised by a medical consultant to behave in a certain way in order 
to reduce the impact of a disability they might, after treatment be disregarded 
under this provision of the DDA 1995. A typical such impairment would 
include diabetes being treated by taking or injecting Insulin. 
The provision does not apply to vision, which can be corrected by spectacles 
or contact lenses. 151 
 The term correctable, by spectacles or lenses under the 
Act seems to say that a person who has a sight impairment but does not use 
spectacles or contact lenses that might otherwise correct the sight loss would 
not qualify as a disabled person. Therefore, it has to be said that this provision 
only applies to a person who has a sight impairment, which is deemed to be 
an involuntary disability. If a person with sight impairment chooses not to have 
corrective surgery to rectify the sight impairment, they would be excluded from 
149 1999 IRLR 680 EAT See Appendix 3(20) (a) 
150 2000 IRLR 14 EAT See Appendix 3(21) 
151 Para6(1) 6(3)(a) 
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the protection of the DDA 1995. The Guidance continues, however, by stating 
that the only effects on the ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities to 
be considered are those, which remain when the spectacles or contact lenses 
are used or would remain if they were used. This provision itself seems to 
cause confusion because on one hand this provision is stating that it does not 
apply to vision which can be corrected by spectacles or contact lenses, but on 
the other hand the provision goes on to state that the only effects on the 
ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities to be considered are those 
which remain when spectacles or contact lenses are used. So, in effect this is 
contradictory because the Guidance states that people with vision impairment 
using spectacles or contact lenses are not protected by the Act, but then goes 
on to say that with the effects on the ability to carry out day-to-day activities by 
a person using spectacles or contact lenses, the remaining effects and the 
ability to carry out day-to-day activities can be taken into consideration when 
looking to the protection of the Act. 
Having demonstrated through some relevant case law how the DDA 1995 was 
ineffective and piecemeal the definition of disability is such that it causes 
confusion and conflict. The definition has caused hardship to both people with 
both physical and mental impairments. The Government needs to consider 
the definition of disability with that of the Americans With Disabilities Act 152 
(ADA). Using the Americans definition of disability would ensure that disabled 
people receive the protection of the Act that they deserve. All that is required 
112 See Appendix 1 
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under the ADA is that a person has a disability regardless of what degree or 
severity the disability is. Under Section 1 of the DDA 1995 this has, through 
the passage of time caused conflicting case law as demonstrated in this 
Chapter and hence making the process of fairness and justice piecemeal and 
gives little or no protection if a person with an impairment cannot satisfy the 
criteria under Section 1 of the DDA.. 
n 
5 MENTAL IMPAIRMENT 
This Chapter deals with the issues of mental impairment and in particular the 
problems that people with mental impairments face both in society and in 
particular, trying to establish they have a mental impairment which fulfils 
Section 1 of the DDA 1995. Not so long ago, perhaps 50 years ago, people 
with mental health problems and learning difficulties would be corisidered to 
be a burden and a risk to society. Subsequently they would be institutionalised 
and forgotten about. The attitude of people both nationally and worldwide 
would be that people with mental health issues served no purpose in society. 
Today, one in four people suffer with some mental health problem at some 
time in their lives. 154 Examples of mental illness range from mild depression to 
conditions such as schizophrenia and bi-polar depression, agoraphobia, 
eating disorders, anxiety, sexual deviation, stress, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, headache, paranoia, psychopathy, stammering and transsexualism. 
One of the major difficulties is that a mental health problem may be invisible 
and many people did not satisfy Section 1 of the DDA 1995. Whilst a physical 
impairment can be seen, for example, a person with a mobility issue may be a 
wheelchair user or a deaf person may wear a hearing aid or a blind person 
may use a white cane, there is nothing to indicate that a person with mental 
health issues may have a mental impairment other than their erratic or 
unusual behaviour. For example, a person may be seen as being eccentric or 
Department of Health Press Release October 1998 
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be a loner but this does not necessarily mean they have a mental impairment. 
As previously discussed 155 the notion of physical disability is problematic and 
a psychiatrically diagnosed illness can also be problematic. There is still no 
agreement about what a mental impairment is or what mental illnesses are. 
An American commentator, Szasz 156 said: 
"Psychiatry is a house of cards held up by nothing more or less than 
mass belief in the truth of its principles and the goodness of its 
practices. If this is so, then psychiatry is a religion, not a science, a 
system of social controls, not a system of treating illness". 
Those who do believe that 'mental illness' is a physical or psychological 
disease, disagree about its causes. Some think that mental illness is caused 
by chemical hormonal or other physiological disorders, others that it is caused 
by genetic defects, others that it is caused by environmental factors such as 
early childhood problems and traumas and still others that it is caused by a 
combination of factors. With no agreement about what mental ill health is, it is 
not surprising that there is no consensus on how those with a psychiatric 
illness should be treated - whether the treatment is by doctors or other 
professionals such as counsellors. 
155 See chapter 4 
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The current edition of the International Classification of Mental and 
Behavioural Disorders 157 published by the World Health Organisation, uses 
the term 'disorder' to define mental impairment. The term 'disorder' is used 
throughout the classification so as to avoid even greater problems inherent in 
the use of terms such as disease' and 'illness'. 'Disorder' is not an exact term, 
but it is used here simply to imply the existence of a clinically recognisable set 
of symptoms or behaviour associated in most cases with distress and with 
interference with personal functions. Social deviance alone, without personal 
dysfunction, should not be included in mental disorder as defined here. The 
last sentence is a reminder that diagnosis, hospitalisation and forced 
treatment should not rest on social disapproval alone. It is not so long since 
the days when women were found to be insane and committed to mental 
institutions with no symptoms of mental illness other than producing an 
illegitimate child. 
Today, conditions in society for people with mental health issues have vastly 
improved but still need further improvements. The introduction of the DDA 
1995 was to address the exclusion that people with mental health issues 
faced, but this failed in this objective. This failure will be discussed at length 
later in this chapter. 
157 See Appendix 4 
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5.1 	 An Overview of the Definition Of Mental Health Impairment 
There is no definition of mental impairment in the DDA 1995, but the 
Guidance158 states that the term includes a wide range of impairments relating 
to mental impairment, including learning disabilities. However, Schedule 1159 
also contained a limitation on the protection of mental health disorders by the 
Act to a person by providing that an impairment resulting or consisting of a 
mental illness was only included if the mental illness was "clinically well 
recognised". 160 Therefore, if a Claimant with a mental impairment wanted to 
pursue a claim for disability discrimination, a Tribunal would have to look at 
whether the mental illness or impairment that the Claimant was suffering from 
was an illness that was clinically well recognised. 
The definition of mental impairment under the DDA 1995 caused problems 
and conflict especially for the Medical Profession and Tribunals and caused 
hardship to Claimants trying to pursue a claim for disability discrimination on 
the grounds of a mental impairment. To the majority of Doctors and 
Psychiatrists the term mental illness means a mental illness under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 and this would include illnesses such as schizophrenia and 
manic depression which are also often called psychosis illnesses. The 
present definition of a mental impairment does not include many of the 
conditions listed in the World Health Organisation International Classification 
Guidance para 13 
159 Schedule 1 para 1 
160 Op cit footnote 149 
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of Diseases. 161 This does not cover conditions such as those arising from 
emotional distress, for example anxiety and depression which most people 
experience at some point in their lives. 
The Government proposed to replace the Mental Health Act 1983 with a new 
Act and published a draft Mental Health Bill in 2002. The Government made a 
formal announcement on 23 March 2006 that Ministers had decided to 
abandon the controversial draft Mental Health Bill. Two versions of the Bill 
had been published in 2002 and 2004. Both provided strong resistance from 
everyone involved in the mental health system. MIND is glad that the 
Government has responded to this widespread criticism by withdrawing the 
Bill. Instead, different legislation will be put forward that will leave the current 
Mental Health Act 1983 in place, but make some important changes. 162 
Under the previous Bill the focus was on "mental disorder" and the new 
definition of the term is: 
"an impairment of or a disturbance in the functioning of the mind or 
brain resulting from any disability or disorder of the mind or brain". 
This attracted widespread criticism. It had been said that critics say the new 
definition could cover epilepsy; alcoholism and drug abuse and make people 
suffering from one of those diseases vulnerable to compulsion. The new 
Ibid footnote 149 
162 
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definition in the Bill was extremely broad and it may have also covered 
someone who has sustained traumatic damage to a fully developed brain, for 
example, a brain injury caused by a road traffic accident. 163 
Under the current Mental Health Act 1983 and in particular, if the previous 
Mental Health Bill had passed as law, it would have caused confusion 
because by Section 68 (1) of the DDA 1995 it made clear that the definition of 
a mental impairment used in the DDA 1995 was not the same as that used in 
the Mental Health Act 1983, although Section 68 (1) went on to add that the 
fact that a mental impairment is covered by the Mental Health Act 1983 did 
not prevent it from being a mental impairment under the DDA 1995. 
Nevertheless, confusion would have arisen if the new Bill was implemented 
which covers alcoholism or drug abuse which make people vulnerable and 
therefore would only have been covered by the Mental Health Act. However, 
drug abuse and alcoholism are excluded from the protection of the DDA 1995 
Act. 164 Effectively, the issues of drug abuse and alcoholism conflict with that 
of the Mental Health Bill and with Section 68 (1) of the ODA 1995 1995.The 
Mental Health Bill would have allowed anybody suffering from alcoholism or 
drug abuse to be recognised as having a mental health illness. This would 
have conflicted with the DDA 1995 definition of mental impairment which 
specifically excluded alcoholism and drug abuse. The DDA 1995 exclusions 
stated that drug addictions and alcohol abuse were covered by the DDA 
163 Hewitt D, Reading Between the Lines. New Law Journal 5.11.04 
164 See chapter 6 
n 
1995165 therefore, if the new Mental Health Bill has been passed this would 
have clearly caused a conflict of laws and cause widespread confusion and 
criticism. 
To claim protection under Section 1 of the DDA 1995 a person firstly had to 
establish that they were disabled. The starting point was to establish whether 
the impairment was properly classed as a mental impairment or in fact it 
should have been treated as a physical impairment. In order to establish 
whether a mental illness falls under the Act it had to be recognised as a 
clinically well-recognised illness 166 and the Code of Practice gave practical 
guidance in relation to mental illness. 167 It has been established from previous 
cases and decisions that the mental illnesses claimed under the DDA 1995 
were likely to require much medical evidence, possibly from a specialist 
medical report. The types of cases that required careful consideration are 
those in which a person experienced physical symptoms, which had no 
underlying physical cause. Impairment may not have been regarded as a 
physical impairment if it had a mental cause rather than a physical one. In 
Rugarner v Sony Music Entertainment UK Ltd and McNicol v Balfour Beatty 
Rail Maintenance Ltd16° it was held that employees suffering from "functional" 
or "psychiatric overlay - a mental condition in which a person claims or 
believes he/she is suffering from a physical injury, but the medical expert is 
165 Disability Discrimination (Meaning of Disability) Regulations 1996 Section 1199611455 
166 Op cit footnote 149 
167 Para 14 states that a clinicafly well-recognised illness is likely those specifically mentioned in the 
World Health Organization Intemational classifiâation of Diseases. 
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satisfied that there is no organic cause for the symptoms and believes that the 
person's symptoms result from their mental state. In both cases the Tribunal 
found that the Claimants did not have a physical impairment. It is arguable 
that if a person's mental condition, for example in the previous two cases, 
cannot be shown to be a clinically well recognised illness, the Claimants will 
have no redress or protection under the Act either for a physical or mental 
impairment. 
However, in the case of Hobbs —v- College of Ripen & York St Johns 169 
another division of the EAT held that a physical impairment does not involve a 
rigid distinction between an underlying defect of or in the body or on the 
evidence of the manifestation or effect on the other. It was therefore decided 
that impairment could be something that results from an illness rather than 
being the illness itself. In this case the EAT decided that the Claimant 
symptoms could be described as a physical disability, and in the absence of a 
medical report stating that her symptoms were either a physical or mental 
impairment, the Tribunal had been entitled to infer she had a physical 
impairment. The McNicol case was appealed and the Disability Rights 
Commission intervened as an interested party arguing that the correct 
approach to adopt in such cases was that taken in the Hobbs case. The 
Court of Appeal dismissed the case but approved the approach of Mr Justice 
Lindsay in the Hobbs case. From these cases useful precedent case law has 
been laid down to assess the effects of impairment rather than its cause. 
169 IRLR 185 EAT 
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In a case where the impairment is properly categorised as mental impairment 
the next question to ask is "is it clinically well recognised' as stated in the 
Guidance17° 
A clinically well recognised illness is a mental illness which is 
recognised by a respected body of medical opinion and these 
would include organisations such as the World Health 
Organisation's International Classification of Diseases" 
It is interesting to note that the Guidance does not require that an illness 
should be included in ICD-10 to be clinically well recognised. Tribunals and 
Courts have, however, been reluctant to conclude that a mental illness is 
clinically well recognised unless there is expert medical evidence such as a 
medical report. 
5.2 	 Problematic Issues Involving Mental Impairment 
5.2.1 Conflicting Case Law on establishing a Mental Impairment 
To gain the protection of the Act a person with a mental impairment had to 
prove that they had a disability under the DDA 1995.171  A clinically well 
recognised illness is a mental illness which is recognised by a respected body 
170 Para 13 
171 Op Cit footnote 1 
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of medical opinion and these would include organisations such as the World 
Health Organisation's International Classification of Diseases" 172 
It must affect one or more of the group of activities contained in the DDA 
1995. This list of day-to-day activities inadequately captures the effects of 
many forms of psychiatric impairments. These can be for example, 
impairments typically which have an impact on thinking, feeling or social 
interactions, which are not, specified capacities under the DDA 1995 
definitiOn. 
Since the establishment of the DDA 1995, case law has shown that meeting 
the requirements to satisfy Section 1 of the Act with regard to a mental 
impairment have been problematic if not confusing. This will be demonstrated 
by using relevant case law and a starting point is the landmark case of 
Goodwin v The Patent Office 173 The Claimant, a paranoid schizophrenic was 
dismissed because of his bizarre behaviour. The Claimant issued proceedings 
for disability discrimination. The Tribunal held in this case that the Claimant 
did not have a disability because the effects of his mental illness on his ability 
to carry out normal day-to-day activities were not "a substantial effect". The 
Claimant's representatives appealed and the EAT overruled the Tribunal's 
previous decision stating that the evidence presented led to the conclusion 
that an employee who had paranoid schizophrenia had a disability within the 
meaning of the DDA 1995. In the above case Mr Justice Morrison quoted: 
172 Op cit footnote 149 
173 
op cit footnote 85 Appendix 3 (7) (b) 
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"It seems to us most surprising that any Tribunal should conclude that 
a person, admittedly diagnosed as suffering from paranoid 
schizophrenia and who has been dismissed partly because of what one 
might call bizarre behaviour consistent with that diagnosis, fell outside 
the definition of disability." 174 
He also advised Tribunals to exercise their inquisitorial powers under Rule 
11175 when determining whether an individual has a physical or mental 
impairment. 
In the Ru gamer and McNicol176 cases the EAT had to consider whether either 
Tribunal, having decided to analyse whether the Claimant suffered from a 
mental impairment even though he had not made such a claim, had erred in 
failing to undertake an in-depth inquiry into the question before finding against 
the Claimant. While noting the comments of Morison J in the Goodwin 
case 177 that the role of the Employment Tribunal includes an 'inquisitorial 
element' the EAT said in the cases of Rugamer and McNicoP 78 that: 
"The role of the Tribunal is not thereby extended so as to place on it 
the duty to conduct a free-standing inquiry of its own or to require it to 
174 Op cit footnote 85 
175 Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2001 
176 Op cit footnote 160 
177 Op cit footnote 85 
171 Op cit footnote 160 
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attempt to obtain further evidence beyond that placed in front of it on 
the issues raised by the parties". 
Accordingly, the EAT held that the Tribunals had acted appropriately in 
considering the issue of the Claimants' possible mental impairments without 
first requiring further medical evident. This view was further endorsed by Mr 
Justice Lindsay in Morgan —v- Staffordshire UniversitV 79 where the Claimant 
was assaulted by her supervisor and consequently her GP signed her off 
work. Mr J Lindsay he stated, 
Tribunals are not inquisitorial bodies charged with a duty to see to the 
procurement of adequate medical evidence.....but that is not to say 
that the Tribunal does not have its normal discretion to consider 
adjustment in an appropriate case. 
The approach in the Morgan —v- Staffordshire University 180  case is that 
Tribunals are not inquisitorial bodies, clearly conflicts with the Goodwin 
case 181 which previously stated they should exercise their inquisitorial powers. 
It is interesting to note in the Goodwin case that if the EAT had not ruled that 
the Tribunal should have used its' inquisitorial powers then the Claimant may 
not have succeeded in his disability claim. This new approach clearly causes 
hardship to Claimants because people with mental impairments may be 
179 2002 IRLR 190 See Appendix 3(22) 
'° Ibid footnote 171 
181 Ibid footnote 171 
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unable to conduct their own affairs, let alone represent themselves or make 
an application to the Employment Tribunals on the grounds of disability. 
Therefore, it is arguable that Tribunals and Courts should be seen to exercise 
their powers to investigate issues around mental impairment to ensure that 
people with mental impairments have access to justice and a fair hearing. 
Failure to do so will result in a fundamental breach of Article 6 of the Human 
Rights Act182 
Below, consideration is given to five conditions, which have given rise to a 
number of cases on the question of mental impairment: stress, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, depression, dyslexia and eating disorders. 
Employees who are absent from work suffering from 'stress' may not 
necessarily be deemed to be disabled for the purpose of the Act. A person 
must demonstrate that they have a physical or mental impairment and in 
particular in the latter case that they have an illness which is clinically well 
recognised. In the following two cases Tribunals have held that stress alone is 
not a clinically well recognised illness within the meaning of Section 1183  of the 
Act and cannot therefore be considered disabled. In the case of Nay/or —v-
Newsguest (Wj/tsh ire) Lid 184 and Taylor —v- The Planning lnspectorate 185 it 
was held that stress was not a mental impairment as it was not a clinically well 
182 Human Rights Act 1998 Article 6 
183 Schedule 1 para 1(1) 
184 ET Case No 1402404/97 
185 ET Case No 5302523/00 See Appendix 9 (24) 
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recognised illness. In particular, in the landmark case of Morgan —v-
Staffordshire University' 186 Mr Justice Lindsay made it clear that loose terms 
such as anxiety, stress or depression alone will not be proof to amount to a 
mental impairment and he stipulated that more detailed medical evidence 
would be required. However, it has to be said that employees complaining of 
stress may also be suffering from a stress-related illness, such as clinical 
depression, which had been triggered or exacerbated by the levels of stress, 
which they have to cope with. In addition to this, high stress levels may also 
exacerbate physical conditions such as diabetes or high blood pressure 
Walton v Mascot 187 
 the Claimant had diabetes and sufferers may therefore 
have a claim under the Act. 
As stress itself does not constitute a disability, a failure to recruit or a 
dismissal based on a person's propensity to suffer from stress will not amount 
to unlawful discrimination. In order for a Claimant to succeed in such a 
disability claim they must show that the stress is related to a disability and this 
can be difficult to prove as illustrated in the case of Taylor —v- The Planning 
Inspectorate 188 where the Claimant had IBS, migraine and stress. The 
Tribunal held that the employer's concern about the Claimant's propensity to 
suffer from stress was the sole reason for their decision to withdraw the job 
offer and that reason was not related to a disability, the discrimination claim 
Op cit footnote 171 
187 ET Case No 2305250/00 See Appendix 9 (23) 
ET Case no 5302523/00 See Appendix 9 (24) 
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could not succeed. it is interesting to note that the above case might have 
been decided differently if the Tribunal had found that the Claimant's 
propensity to suffer stress related to a disability for example, her diabetes or 
migraine, and providing that the circumstances satisfied the conditions of 
being defined as a disability. If this had been the case then the employers 
would have subjected her to a detriment for a reason related to her disability. 
Although stress is not a clinically well-recognised illness, a severe stress 
reaction such as post-traumatic stress disorder is potentially capable of 
constituting a disability. In the cases of Delamaine —v- Abbey National fg189  in 
which the Claimant was subject to a robbery at work and Abadeh —v- British 
Telecommunications plc 190  in which the Claimant whilst at work suffered a 
sudden blast of high pitched noise. These cases, which at first glance appear 
to satisfy the definition of post-traumatic stress failed to gain the protection of 
the DDA 1995 
The Tribunal accepted that the post-traumatic stress disorder amounted to a 
mental impairment, but held that it did not amount to a disability in the 
Claimants' case because it did not have a substantial affect on their ability to 
carry out normal day-to-day activities. In the previous two cases although the 
Claimants were considered to have post-traumatic stress the Claimants still 
failed to gain the protection of the Act because their condition was not severe 
enough. These cases illustrate that post-traumatic stress disorder has to be 
189 El Case No 2305204197 See Appendix 9 (25) 
190 ICR 156 EAT See Appendix 9 (26) 
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more than substantial to gain the protection of the Act. The argument is how 
traumatised does a person have to be to qualify for protection. 
In relation to depression, Tribunals and the EAT have had difficulties in 
holding that depression is potentially capable of constituting a disability. Whilst 
most people suffer from mild depression at some point in their lives, some 
people suffer such severe depression that their condition constitutes a 
clinically well recognised illness. When looking at depression it is a question of 
the degree of depression that the Claimant suffers from for a Tribunal or Court 
to determine. In the cases of Kapadia —v- London Borough of Lambeth 191  the 
Claimant suffered from reactive depression and in Jones —v- The Se/care 
Trust192 the Claimant discovered a lump in her breast. Both the Claimants had 
a long history of serious medical problems and depression and were deemed 
to be disabled for the purposes of the Act. In the case of Ward v Signs by 
Morrell Ltd193 the Claimant complained he was dismissed because he had 
suffered from depression for 12 months and in the case Cockhi/I —v- The 
Insolvency Service 194 the Claimant suffered from clinical depression between 
1990 and 1994 at which time the depression ceased. The Tribunals had to 
consider the degree of depression that the Claimants suffered from. It was 
held that the Claimants did suffer from a depressive illness. But in the case of 
191 Op Cit footnote 144 
192 ET Case 2404641/97 See Appendix 9(27) 
ET Case No 2106342/97 (See Appendix 9(28) 
194 ET Case No 2200168/908 See Appendix 9(29) 
- 106 - 
Cassidy —v- The Benefits Agency 195  where the Claimant also suffered from 
depression, it was held that the Claimant did not have a disabihty. 
There are no clear guidelines to determine whether depression can be 
classified as a mental impairment. It depends on the degree of the 
depression, whether it is severe enough to gain the protection of the DDA 
1995. As there are no clear guidelines when measuring depression, a medical 
expert's report will normally be required to determine whether the depression 
is severe enough to qualify as a disability. This can cause hardship to the 
Claimant because the general rule is that the Claimant must fund the medical 
report themselves and this could cost several hundreds of pounds - the 
burden of proof is on the Claimant to prove that they are disabled. 
Further problems have arisen in relation to time factors of when to take into 
account when a disability started. In Cruickshank v VAW Motorcast Ltd 196  It 
was held that the time in which to assess a disability as whether it has a 
substantial effect on normal day to day activities is at the date of the alleged 
discriminatory act. The EAT also stated that any evidence that an impairment 
has recurred since that date should not be taken into account. This is a 
departure from the earlier case of Greenwood v British Airways p/& 97 in 
which the EAT held that the Tribunal had erred by considering the question of 
disability only at the date of the alleged discriminatory act. Under the 
195 ET Case No 1900624/97 See Appendix 9 (30) 
196 IRLR 24 EAT See Appendix 9(31) 
197 Op Cit footnote 123 
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Guidance198 it is made clear that the Tribunal should consider the adverse 
effects of the Claimant's condition up to and including the Tribunal hearing. 
The Tribunal had failed to consider the actual recurrence of Greenwood's 
depression from August 1997 to the date of the Tribunal hearing. The EAT 
concluded that the Tribunal's decision was wrong and the EAT decided that 
Greenwood had a past disability within the meaning of Act 199 and on that 
basis it was unnecessary for them to express a view on whether the 
substantial adverse effect of his impairment was likely to last 12 months for 
the purpose of Section 1 of the Act. 
Overall cases involving depression have been considered as piecemeal if not 
confusing and unless the Claimants can establish that their depression is 
clinically well recognised their claim will fail. It could be argued that if a person 
who suffers from depression qualifies for disability benefits 20° then they could 
be deemed to be disabled as the Department of Work & Pensions will have 
conducted a thorough investigation of their mental impairments by way of 
independent medical expert's reports and have trained case workers to 
assess that person's mental impairment but nevertheless even if a person 
suffering from depression qualifies for disability benefits, they may still not be 
protected under the DDA because their depression is not severe enough. 
198 
code of Practice 
199 DDAS2 
200 
such as Disability Living Allowance and Incapacity Benefit 
SRO 
According to the British Dyslexia Association, dyslexia is often referred to as a 
specific learning difficulty and can affect reading, spelling, writing, memory 
and concentration. The Association estimate that around four per cent of the 
population are severely dyslexic and a further six per cent have mild to 
moderate problems. Dyslexia is listed in the lCD-i 0201  and it is potentially 
capable of constituting a mental impairment under the DDA 1995. This was 
confirmed in the case of Holmes —v- Bolton Metropolitan Council 202  where the 
Claimant had dyslexia. It could be argued that dismissing a dyslexic 
employee may be justified if the employer had tried, but if unable to make any 
further adjustments that will enable the employee to perform his tasks 
satisfactorily. 203 Furthermore, it could also be argued the Claimant who has 
only got mild to moderate dyslexia will not come under the protection of the 
DDA 1995. Again it is a question of degree of their condition. Factors are not 
taken into account that just because a person suffering from dyslexia cannot, 
for example, complete a job application form may nevertheless be intelligent 
people, but will still not be defined as disabled. 
People with eating disorders such as Anorexia and Bulimia Nervosa, although 
these are recognised as mental impairments under lCD-1 204 they may not 
always gain the protection of the DDA 1996 as illustrated in the case of Gittins 
201 See Appendix 4 
202 El Case No 2403516 See Appendix 9(32) 
203 Henderson -v-Scottish Widows Fund and Life Assurance Society ET Case No S1400692197 
204 See Appendix 4 
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-v- Oxford Radcliffe NI-IS Trust205 the Claimant had bulimia nervosa (an 
eating condition). Eating disorders can be life threatening and serious in their 
nature but yet would not be deemed to be a disability. 
Having looked at various mental health illnesses and case laws, it clearly 
shows that conflicting case laws and the DDA 1995 was a piecemeal 
legislation and there were no clear guidelines to guide Tribunals and Courts to 
decide who is or not disabled within the meaning of Section 1 of the Act. It is 
traumatic for Claimants with mental health impairments to be subjected to and 
questioned about their impairment even before considering the discrimination 
issues. 
5.2.3 Problems Involving Medical Evidence And Procedures 
In order to establish that a Claimant has a mental impairment, medical 
evidence plays an important role in Tribunal or Court proceedings involving 
disability discrimination claims, particularly around mental impairment. It was 
established by the Department for Work and Pensions in 2001 that in over 40 
per cent of cases that reach the Employment Tribunal in relation to a 
preliminary and/or main hearing, the Tribunal considered medical evidence. 206 
Employment Tribunals frequently have to consider medical evidence, not only 
in relation to the nature of the impairment suffered by the Claimant, but also 
as to the effect and, if the condition has not lasted twelve months, whether it is 
205 EAT 1220/00 See Appendix 9(33) 
206 DWP In-house Report 1991 
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likely to last that long. One of the problematic areas involving medical 
evidence is that there may be conflicting medical reports presented by either 
side. Sometimes the medical report might simply reflect different views within 
the medical profession itself. A typical example of this is the doctors' opinions 
which can be divided as to whether, for example, ME or Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome is an illness and if it is, whether the cause is physical, mental or a 
combination of both. In addition to this, conflict can also be created where the 
legal concept of impairment and disability for the purpose of the DDA 1995 
are different from the accepted medical concept of those terms. It is important 
therefore, that Employment Tribunals attach the correct weight to medical 
evidence and that they know what they should accept and what to reject 
unless they have good reason to do so. It. is important for Employment 
Tribunals to realise that they are not medical experts and should not reject un-
contradicted medical evidence. In the case of kapadia —v- London Borough of 
Lambeth 207  of the EAT found that the Employment Tribunal had erred in 
holding that there was no evidence that the Claimant's impairment had a 
substantial adverse effect. The Respondent's medical report stated that: 
"The Claimant's symptoms of anxiety and depression contributed a 
mental impairment of sufficient duration and severity to have had a 
substantial and long term effect on is ability to carry out normal day-to-
day activities". 
207 Op cit footnote 144 
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The Claimant's doctor's report stated that the Claimant had considerable 
difficulties in concentrating, that his sleeping patterns were affected and that 
he experience degrees of agoraphobia. None of this evidence had been 
contradicted by the employers. The EAT stated that: 
"Although they could foresee situations where an Employment 
Tribunal may for a good reason reject un-contradicted medical 
evidence, this was not such a case. The Employment Tribunal had 
simply disregarded the medical evidence, which the EAT said was a 
wholly impermissible approach for a Tribunal to take". 
Similarly, in Edwards —v- Mid-Suffolk District Council 208 
 the EAT held that 
Tribunals are required to analyse all the medical evidence themselves and not 
rely on medical experts to make the decision that the Claimant is disabled. 
The Employment Tribunal cannot reject that evidence without explaining why. 
The EAT concluded that the Tribunal's failure to consider the Claimant's 
doctor's evidence independently rendered the rest of the Tribunal's findings in 
relation to his ability to carry out his duties to be flawed. This seems to be a 
bizarre concept, on one hand Tribunals must be expected to be impartial 
when considering medical evidence, but it also has to be said that medical 
experts are more qualified to comment on the effect of a disability and on a 
person's ability to carry out daily activities. 
208 cR616 EAT 
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Additionally while Tribunals must consider all the medical evidence presented 
to them they must not delegate to doctors their responsibility for determining 
whether a Claimant is disabled or not as in the case of .Vicarv —v- British 
Telecommunications plc 209  It was also stated the Tribunal must make their 
own assessment of the evidence and not be overawed by the opinion of a 
medical expert as to whether the Claimant's condition falls within the statutory 
definition. Typically, there are two scenarios here to consider. In the case of 
Kapadia —v- London Borough of Lambeth21° Tribunals are expected to take 
the medical expert's opinion into consideration, but in the case of Vicarv —v-
British Telecommunications plc 211  Tribunals are told not to delegate their 
responsibilities to medical experts - the question to ask is who are the 
medical experts here, the judicial system or the mental experts? Clearly there 
are no clear guidelines when assessing medical evidence and this again can 
cause confusion, if not hardship to any Claimants trying to pursue a claim for 
disability discrimination. Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunals should 
take the approach that County Court/High Courts take and let the medical 
experts analyse the medical evidence to decide whether an impairment is 
deemed to be a disability for the purpose of the present disability legisation. 
209 1999 IRLR 680 EAT See Appendix 3(20) (b) 
210 Op ctt footnote 144 
211 Op Cit footnote 143 
-113- 
The onus of producing the medical report lies with the Claimant. In a research 
study, "Monitoring the DDA 1995' 212 
 this research report shows that the 
nature of the cost and the process for obtaining and examining medical 
evidence in relation to the definition of disability was raised as a major barrier 
for potential Claimants making a claim at an Employment Tribunal, It shows 
that even if the Claimant successfully produced evidence that they met the 
definition of disability, it puts the Claimant under tremendous stress and 
uncertainty, leaving Claimants to settle or withdraw the claim. In addition, the 
cost of obtaining medical evidence and still is a major barrier, particularly as 
the cost has to be met by the Claimant and their representative(s) who are 
likely to be from a "Not For Profit" organisation. It should also be noted that 
there is no Legal Services Commission funding for employmer'it cases to 
obtain a medical report, therefore the cost of obtaining a report must be met 
by the Claimant who may well to be on welfare benefits and therefore unable 
to afford such a report. Furthermore, obtaining medical evidence can entail 
huge and very stressful delays and Claimants may feel that they have been 
discriminated against and have to begin their case by describing all the 
functional restrictions created by their physical or mental impairment in 
relation to the things that they cannot do. This had the effect of putting or 
making the Claimant feel as if they are on trial and not the Respondent who 
has discriminated against them. Problems arise where an unrepresented 
Claimant, particularly one who has a mental impairment, will have to show 
that they have a mental impairment, that it results from a mental illness and 
212 Meager N, Doyle B, Evans C, Kersley B, Williams M, O'Regan Sand Tackey N (1998) Monitoring the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995, London Department for Education and Employment 
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that it is clinically well recognised. Clearly the Claimants with a mental 
impairment may find it difficult to prove these issues because of the nature of 
their illness and may never pursue their claim for discrimination because they 
do not have the mental capacity or the will to do so. 
Difficulties may arise where the mental illness is controlled by medication. The 
mental impairment must have a substantial and long- term adverse effect but 
it may only be substantial for short periods of time due to the Claimant taking 
medication to control the mental impairment. The only way the definition can 
be met is if it can be established that the effect is one which is recurrent 3 
and meets the requirements of the Guidance. 214 On a physical impairment a 
person may well be able to control their impairment by for example, avoiding 
substances to which a person is allergic which could trigger their physical 
impairment. In the case of a mental impairment this could be difficult for a 
person with mental impairment to do as often they may be irrational in their 
behaviour and for example, refuse to take or forget to take their medication 
due to side effects of their illness, for example, lack of concentration or 
tiredness. 
When disabled people make a claim for a disability benefit they have to 
undergo a medical examination to qualify for the benefits. It would therefore 
213 See Chapter 4 Physical Impairment at 4.5 
214 
Para b 5 "the likelihood of recurrence should be considered taking all the circumstances of the case 
into consideration including what a person could be reasonably be expected to do to prevent the 
recurrence.' 
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be sensible to use the fact that people on disability benefits should 
automatically be deemed as disabled. This was recommended by the 
Disability Rights Commission in their Response Paper. It recommended that 
people who are in receipt of certain State Benefits, such as Disability Living 
Allowance or Incapacity Benefit should automatically be allowed to be 
deemed disabled, the reason being that they have gone through a strict 
process of medical assessment to obtain state benefits. 215 
The Disability Rights Commission also recommended in their Response 
Paper216 that alterations should be made to be Tribunal procedures to allow, 
in particular where the issue of definition of disability is in dispute that both 
parties must agree, or the Tribunal must consider it necessary that medical 
evidence should be obtained in order to assess whether the Claimant meets 
the criteria of Schedule 1 of the DDA 1995 and that Tribunals should order 
and fund a joint medical report. Tribunals have now amended their procedure 
rules so that they now have the power to authorise payment for medical 
reports. However, according to the Disability Rights Commission Casework 
Team217 this procedure is not used because many Claimants are reluctant to 
pay for the expensive medical evidence required because they have to pay for 
the report first. They then have to apply to the Tribunal for the cost to be 
reimbursed. Payment for the report is of course at the discretion of the 
Tribunal as an administration matter and the Claimant may not necessarily be 
215 Disability Rights Commission (DRC) Mental Health Advisory Group 
216 Ibid at footnote 208 
211 Op Cit footnote 206 
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given back the monies they are owed for the medical report. Some reports 
can be quite expensive and Claimant may not have the money to fund this 
upfront and are often wary that the Employment Tribunal will not reimburse 
them. 
5.2.3 Conflicting Medical Procedures 
According to the Guidance 218 a mental impairment includes a mental illness 
only if it is a 'clinically well recognised illness' and that the illness' is one that 
is recognised by a respected body of the medical profession. The Guidance 219 
states it is very likely that this would include those specifically mentioned in 
publications such as the World Health Organisation International Classification 
of Diseases, commonly referred to as the lCD-1 . 220 The lCD-b 0 is one of the 
two main diagnostic classification systems used by the psychiatric professions 
and the other is called the DSM-IV. 22" Both manuals are used to identify 
mental disorders. The lCD-la manual is used in the UK whereas the DSM-IV 
is used in the USA. 
218 Paras 13 and 14 
219 Para 14 
220 This is a reference which is to the World Health Organisation International classificathn of Diseases 
and Related Health Problems, 10th  Revision, Vol 1 1998, although the World Health Organisation does 
also publish a manual of clinical descriptions and diagnostic guidelines called 'The ICD-10 classification 
of Mental & Behavioural Disorders' reprinted in 1998 also see Appendix 4 
221 The American Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 41h  Edition, 1994 also see 
Appendix 4 
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These manual procedures are not identical and may have different diagnostic 
procedures for a particular condition. The application of both ICD-10 and 
DSM-IV can therefore produce different results according to which medical 
manual is used. This is clearly illustrated in the case of Black/edge v London 
Genera/ Transport Services Ltd., 222 in which the Claimant claimed he was 
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. The Tribunal when considering 
the case, had applied the two difference medical classifications contained in 
the ICD-10 and the DSM-IV of post-traumatic stress disorder to determine 
whether the Claimant had a mental impairment. Both classifications have a 
number of similar criteria for example both required the witnessing of any 
exposures to an exceptional catastrophic event, but there are important 
differences between the two classifications. Firstly, the DSM-IV requires the 
disturbance to cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational or other important areas of functioning, whereas the criteria lCD-
10 does not. Secondly, under the criteria of ICD-10 this generally requires the 
disorder to arrive within six months of the traumatic event, whereas under the 
criteria of DSM-lV there is no time limit but the medical reviewer is expected to 
specify if the onset of symptoms is at least six months after the stress or the 
event. 
After considering evidence from two different medical experts the Tribunal 
found that the Claimant was not suffering from any mental health impairment 
with the result that it was unnecessary for them to consider the further 
222 EAT 1073/00 See Appendix 9 (34) 
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questions under Section 1 (1) of the DDA 1995, namely whether his condition 
had a substantial and long term effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-
day activities. The Claimant appealed to the EAT, who found that the 
Tribunals had applied the different aspects of both classifications and the EAT 
also held that the Tribunal should have used the ICD-10 because this is the 
classification that is recognised by the National Health Service. In reaching 
this view the EAT added that the additional requirement in the DVM-IV of 
determining that the person suffered clinically significant distress or 
impairment in functioning seemed to be more relevant to deciding the effect 
on functions which a mental impairment has than to deciding whether a 
mental impairment exists under Section 1 of the DDA 1995. 
So, technically the DVM-IV would have been more appropriate in deciding 
what or was not a mental health impairment as opposed to the ICD-10 manual 
which is silent on this, but has to be considered because it has been approved 
under the National Health Service. 
5.3 	 Procedure/Guidelines to Establish Mental Impairment 
In Morgan v Staffordshire University223  the EAT set out guidelines for parties 
seeking to establish the existence of a mental impairment. 
These are: 
2230p Cit footnote 171 
MELON 
• That it is for the Claimant to identify how they will establish that their 
illness is clinically well recognised and to adduce the necessary 
evidence. 
• That the Claimant should clearly identify what their mental impairment 
is and the Respondents should indicate whether that impairment is an 
issue and if so, why. 
The parties should then be clear as to what has to be proved or 
rebutted. 
. Proof of a mental illness specifically mentioned in a publication such as 
lCD-b, which is a very wide professional acceptance for example the 
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM - IV). 
• An ICD-10 illness such as depression, anxiety or stress will not of 
themselves suffice unless there is credible medical evidence from a 
medial expert such as a Consultant or Psychiatrist. 
• If a GP's letter is used with regard to a mental impairment this evidence 
is likely to be disputed because it would be deemed to be generalist 
medical evidence, therefore further medical evidence from a Specialist 
Consultant will also be required to establish a mental impairment. 
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The present Guidelines in Morgan —v- Staffordshire Universit 24 have 
addressed some of the difficulties in establishing an impairment, but it has to 
be said they are still considered as being unjust and unfair to people suffering 
from mental health issues. The difference is that people with physical 
impairments are able to represent themselves as opposed to people with 
mental impairments will find it difficult to represent themselves simply because 
their disability effects their brain or mind. 
5.4 Proposed Reform, A Recommendation For Establishing People 
With Mental Impairment 
5.4.1 Introduction 
As previously demonstrated people with mental health issues are clearly 
experiencing particular difficulties establishing the protection from the DDA 
1995. The expectation of social exclusion in particular people with mental 
health issues can lead to observed differences, isolation, discrimination and 
exclusion which in turn activate mental health problems in an endless vicious 
circle. As a result, people with mental impairments face social exclusion. To 
try and address this project in the form of the Social Exclusion Unit 
Consultation 2003 (SEU) was set up by the Disability Rights Commission 
(DRC). The DRC were invited to submit its recommendations on improving 
224 Op Cit footnote 171 
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the protection for people with mental health issues. The Disability Rights 
Commission recommended that the SEU do the following: 
Support key reforms of the Disability Discrimination Act proposed by 
the DRC, 
give evidence that the key civil rights law serves mental health service 
users least effectively. In particular: 
• The DDA 1995 definition of disability needs to be amended and the 
Statutory Guidance to be revised to better reflect the actual impact of 
psychiatric disability on people's lives. 
The DDA 1995 is proving inadequate in addressing recruitment problems in 
particular for people with mental health issues. The aim should be to reduce 
the actual incidence of discrimination in recruitment. The DRC stated that the 
law should be changed so that disability related enquiries before a job is 
offered should be permitted only in very limited circumstances. 
The Project also aimed to promote wider social participation through: 
• Removing antiquated discriminatory policies, such as the bar on jury 
service to people receiving psychiatric treatment. 
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• Promoting equality in public services - including health and education. 
This means taking substantial action to reduce inequalities in health 
and active preparation for a Public Sector Duty. 225 It is also essential to 
address the rights of people with mental health problems plus other 
impairments since 75 per cent of disabled people have at least two 
impairments. 226 
Implementing Independent Living for mental health service users, 
through access to independent advocacy and direct payments. Mental 
health service users need access to Advocates to support them in 
securing rights and services, just as people with physical impairments 
need 'personal assistants' to support them with physical tasks of daily 
living. 
5.4.2 Mental Health and Social Exclusion 
Mental health issues lead to observed differences, isolation, discrimination 
and exclusion, which in turn exacerbate mental health problems in an endless 
vicious circle. A critical question here is how to best break the cycle and it is 
therefore vital to rely on evidence. 
225 Duty To Promote Equality Among Disabled People DDA 2006 
226DWP (2002) Disabled for Life? 
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The most powerful conceptual overview and analysis of best evidence is in 
Link & Phelan. They argue that 'stigma' 227 operates through four processes: 
Distinguishing between and labelling human differences; 
Linking the labelled persons to undesirable characteristics' 
Separating 'them' (the labelled persons) from 'us', culminating in 
. Status loss and discrimination that lead to unequal outcomes or life 
chances. 
They also argue, 
"It is entirely dependent on social, economic and political power. It 
follows that the process cannot be disrupted without addressing 
power imbalances; education and positive promotion, whilst important, 
are not enough on their own". 228 
The usefulness of different conceptual terms such as stigma, discrimination 
and social exclusion has been analysed elsewhere. 229 
227 The usefulness of different conceptual terms such as stigma, discrimination and social exclusion has 
been analysed elsewhere eg. See Sayce 1998 Stigma. Discrimination and Social Exclusion, What's in a 
word? Journal of Mental Health 7,4: 331-344 
228 Link & Phelan (2001) 
229 Sayce 1996 Stigma: Discrimination & Social Exclusion, What's in a Word? Joumal of Mental Health 
7,4: 3310344 
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The DRC went on to quote in their response to the Social Exclusion Unit 
Consultation Paper 2003 230 , 
"We believe that certainly in the case of people with mental health 
problems, the DDA 1995 has failed to fight stigma. With its exceptions, 
exemptions and complex definitions, the DDA 1995 has embroiled 
disability people in complex legal arguments and stressful Tribunal 
cases, with outcomes which have in some cases seemed an affront to 
common sense". 
The DRC also stated with regard to employment issues that by September 
2000231 8,908 cases have been brought under Part II of the DDA 1995 
1995.232 In their analysis of Tribunal decisions it revealed the nature of the 
disability of those people whose cases proceeded to a hearing. The DRC 
commented with the following analysis: 
"In comparison with the labour force as a whole, Claimants in DDA 
1995 cases are substantially more likely to have depression or anxiety". 
People with mental health problem issues were amongst the least likely to win 
their DDA 1995 claims. 233 
230 Disability Rights Commission (DRC) Mental Health Advisory Group 
231 See Appendix 2 
232 Part II of the DDA deals with discrimination in the work place 
233 See Appendix 2 
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The DRC constrUcted tables illustrating these statements. 234 The table clearly 
shows that people with mental health problems are likely to lose at an 
Employment Tribunal. They only have a success rate of 18 per cent compared 
for example, with people with diabetes who had a success rate of 39 per cent 
or people with hearing difficulties who had a success rate of nearly 29.8 per 
cent. 235 
This survey236 clearly demonstrates that people with mental health 
impairments are put at a disadvantage and are more likely to lose their 
Tribunal case because they are unable to meet the requirement, for example, 
of the impairment being "clinically well recognised". Even if they do meet this 
requirement it is still unlikely that they will be able to represent themselves 
and therefore this could be considered to be a breach of their Human Rights 
Act 1995 Article 6 - the right to a fair hearing. 
The DRC responses to the Social Exclusion Unit Consultation Paper 237 made 
various recommendations on improving the protection for people with mental 
health impairment. They proposed the following recommendations: 
234 Ibid footnote 223 
235 Ibid footnote 223 See Appendix 2 for a more comprehensive comparison in relation to success rates 
with other forms of disabilities 
236 See Appendix 2 
237 Op Cit footnote 221 
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The requirement that the mental illness be clinically well recognised should be 
removed. Under the DDA 1995 it stated that a mental illness must be clinically 
well recognised to satisfy the definition of disability under Section 1 of the Act. 
There is no such requirement to other forms of mental or physical impairment. 
The Advisory Group in this paper recommended that this provision should be 
reviewed and consulted on commenting: 
"We appreciate the policy desire behind the inclusion of clinically well 
recognised conditions to prevent abuse through people claiming non-
existent or unproven conditions, but we receive no evidence that a 
removal of the term would bring into coverage any such condition". 
The Advisory Group went onto say that there is no evidence from case law 
that the restriction had fulfilled its declared role of excluding absurd conditions 
unrecognised by reputable clinicians or moods or minor eccentricities? 38 
Additionally reported cases show that the requirement to prove that a 
condition is clinically well recognised is disadvantaging some people with 
genuine mental health conditions. This was a major concern for Claimants' 
representatives' interviewed in monitoring the DDA 1995.239  A common 
problem was that many people with quite a rare mental illness may not have 
had a clear diagnosis or may have had different diagnosis at different times 
238 Hague W, The Minister for Disabled People Hansard HCdeb Finding comminee Ecol 
239 Doyle B. Monitoring the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 London Dept. for Education Employment. 
Prescott H Clarke SCPR Survey 1990 
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which would have made it difficult to satisfy this element of the definition. 
Therefore, the need to prove that a mental health impairment is clinically 
recognised caused hardship to Claimants if they could not pigeonhole their 
mental health impairment such as depression, anxiety or panic attacks into 
one of the criteria lists under the Guidelines of the World Health Organisation 
International Classification of Diseases. A person suffering from depression 
would no more be likely to fabricate his/her symptoms than an individual with 
unexplained but disabling physical conditions 
The Advisory Group also recommended that for people suffering from 
depression, 240 whose depression had a substantial adverse effect on their 
day-to-day activities, the requirement that the effects last twelve months 
should be reduced to six months. Previously, to qualify as a disability, a 
mental impairment had to have a substantial adverse effect it must either have 
lasted for or be likely to last for twelve months; if the effect was shorter it must 
be have shown to be likely to re-occur and last for twelve months. 241 
Therefore the Advisory Group recommended a reduction in the time limit 
targeted at people with depression because it was found that many cases 
were lost because the Claimants failed to satisfy the time requirement that 
their depression had lasted or was likely to last for more than twelve months. 
240 See Chapter 5 
241 Disability Discrimination Act Schedule 1 Para 2 
243 Disability Discrimination Act Schedule 1 Para 2 
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In this Chapter it has been demonstrated how people with mental health 
impairments can face exclusion simply because the mechanisms of Section 1 
of the DDA 1995 do not allow those people to bring a claim because their 
mental health problems cannot be defined as a disability. Even if they do 
succeed in bringing a claim under Section 1 of the DDA 1995 they still face 
the hurdle of having to represent themselves at a Court, and in particular at a 
Tribunal where so few solicitors or legal representatives will take the case on 
because they are not guaranteed their legal costs. Additionally there is no 
legal aid to pursue an employment claim. Further complications are added 
when there is conflicting medical evidence or rather lack of medical evidence 
because the Claimant is unable to pay for a medical report. 
Although some proposals have been implemented under the "New Duty to 
Promote Equality' as (amended by the DDA 2005)243  such as the removal that 
a mental health impairment be "clinically well recognised )244  the Claimant still 
has to satisfy Section 1 of the DDA 1995 in that his/her mental health 
impairment has a substantial and adverse effect on his/her ability to carryout 
daily activities. An ideal solution would be that if a person was on disability 
benefits such as Disability Living Allowance or Incapacity Benefit then they 
should automatically be deemed as being disabled. The disability laws 245 are 
still failing to protect people with mental health issues and unless major 
changes are made to the legislation, people will still face social exclusion 
within society. It could be argued that this particular group of people are no 
244 Chapter 7 page 127 
245 DDA 1995 & 2005 
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better off than they were fifty years ago because they integrate into society 
rather than be institutionalised; they still face segregation and exclusion within 
society because of their mental illness. 
- 130 - 
6 INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS 
6.1 	 Inclusions 
Having demonstrated in the previous Chapters 246 the definition of disability is 
not as straight forward as it seems, this Chapter is focused on other areas of 
disability which are either limited or excluded from the protection of the Act. As 
previously stated247 the Act's definition of disability was one of the most 
contentious issues during its passage through Parliament. It focused solely 
on inability to perform certain physical or mental functions caused directly by 
impairments of an individual. This approach was criticised as overly restrictive 
and stemming from a flawed conceptualisation of disability. The disability 
lobby argued for a broader definition of disability modeled on that contained in 
the ADA whose definition would have included those people perceived to be 
disabled.24° Such an approach would have focused on the issue of social 
discrimination - which stems from the misconceptions and stereotypes of the 
discriminator rather than any intrinsic characteristic of the individual who has 
experienced discrimination 
Furthermore, for the avoidance of doubt the following areas of disability will be 
discussed, however, there any many other disabilities that cannot be covered 
because of limitations on this piece of research 
246 See chapters 4 & 5 on definition of physical and mental health impairments 
247 See chapter 1 
241 See chapter 2 
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The findings of discussing the following list of disabilities 
HIV 
'MS 
• Cancer 
Deformity and disfigurement 
. Restricted Growth 
Albinism 
Stammering 
. Autism 
Aspergers Syndrome 
demonstrate the further problems that disabled people face in trying to 
establish that they meet the criteria of the DDA. 
6.2 	 Limitations 
6.2.1 Limitations on HIV, Cancer & MS 
There were limitations on HIV, Cancer and Multiple Sclerosis until very 
recently when the DDA 1996 was amended in October 2004. People suffering 
from these conditions have encountered difficulties in meeting the criteria 
under Section 1 of the DDA 1995 . Prior to the amendments to the DDA 1995 
the situation was for example, that an HIV sufferer was only deemed to be 
disabled once his ability to carry out normal daily activities was affected and 
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this is illustrated in the case of Ayes -.v- Bournemouth International Airport 
Ltd. 249 
Before the recent reforms cancer sufferers would not be deemed to be 
disabled if the cancer has no present affects or is in remission as illustrated In 
the case of Cox -v- Careeragent Ltd., Va Bells Toyota. 250 .Although the 
Tribunal found that he was not suffering from a substantial adverse affect, the 
condition was deemed to be a progressive condition and that he had some 
pain which was sufficient for the Employment Tribunal to find that he was 
deemed to be disabled under the Act. Nevertheless, this deliberation must 
have had a traumatic effect on the Claimant simply because Sectioni did not 
address the issues surrounding people suffering from cancer. What if this 
scenario would have been different whereby the tumour would not have been 
found to have an substantial adverse affect on his ability to carry out his day-
to-day activities? What if the Claimant did not suffer from any pain, in order to 
satisfy the progressive conditions. 251 The Guidance points out for this rule to 
operate, a medical diagnosis in not by itself enough, there has to be some 
other affects on the persons ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. 252 
Therefore, if a person is suffering from HIV, MS or the early stages of cancer 
then previously they were not covered by the Act because their impairment 
249 op cit footnote 134 
250 0p cit footnote 135 
251 Statutory Guidance para 8 in that as soon as a person with a progressive condition experiences 
symptoms which have any affects on his/her normal day4o-day activities he/she will be deemed to be as 
having a disability" 
212 Statutory Guidance para A 15 
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would be deemed to be an illness, which may not have had an adverse affect 
on their ability to carry out day-to-day activities and therefore could not be 
deemed to be a disability. 
These restrictions have caused unnecessary hardships and discrimination to 
these groups of people, as they still need to take time off work to attend 
hospital for medical treatment or medical tests. The employer can simply 
dismiss that person for having time off work, and if he has less then 12 
months continuous employment he will not be able to bring a claim for unfair 
dismissal or disability discrimination because he does not satisfy Section 1 of 
the ODA 1995 as being disabled. In December 2003 the Government took 
the welcome and long waited step of publishing a Draft Disability 
Discrimination Bill for pre-legislative scrutiny. As a result of that Bill the DDA 
1995 was amended to extend the definition of disability to include people with 
HIV, cancer and multiple sclerosis to be deemed as disabled from the point of 
diagnosis. The previous guidelines did not guarantee protection under the 
DDA 1995. The provision to extend the definition of disability to cover cancer 
suffers has now been implemented by the DDA 1995 (amended by DDA 
2004) 
6.2.2 Limitations On Deformity And Disfigurement 
The DDA 1995 was ambiguous with regard to the social and legal aspects of 
disfigurement and deformity. The DDA 1995 basic definition could not address 
the situation of people with no actual physical or mental limitations who 
nevertheless experienced strong social restrictions because of prejudice. 
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Thus people who are highly stigmatised because of severe disfigurements did 
not fall within the Acts core definition and had to be brought in as an 
exceptional group. The Department of Health statistics indicate that over one 
million people in the United Kingdom suffer a facial injury every year and this 
is a serious and significant social problem 253 . Under the Act an impairment 
which consists of a 'severe disfigurement was deemed to have a substantial 
adverse effect on the ability of the person concerned to carry out normal day-
to-day activities. 254 
The Act255 made it clear that severe disfigurement was to be treated as having 
a substantial adverse affect on a person's ability to carry out normal day-to-
day activities. Disfigurement alone was not sufficient to quality for the 
protection of the Act. In addition to this, deformity did not form any part of the 
definition of disability in the Act, nor does the word appear in the Act. The 
word deformity appears in the Children's Act 1989.256  A child is recognised to 
be disabled if he is blind, deaf, dumb or suffers from mental disorders of any 
kind or is substantially and permanently handicapped by illness, injury or 
congenital deformity. Therefore, under the Children's Act the word congenital 
deformity is sufficient to amount to a disability, but disfigurement is not even 
253 New Law Journal 1527061 (1925) 20 Dec2002 
254 Schedule 1 para 3(1) 
255 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
151 Section 17 
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mentioned. When the DDA 1995 came into force it recognised severe 
disfigurement as a disability but deformity is not mentioned nor recognised. 257 
It is not enough just to be ugly for example, to suffer from a hare-lip or some 
minor facial deformity. The Disability Discrimination Guidance does not even 
define what a disfigurement is, or how severe a disfigurement has to be. The 
Act fails to protect and limits the Protection offered by the Act in relation to 
deformity and disfigurement. To demonstrate this, in the first scenario a young 
man is injured riding a motorbike and is not wearing a helmet. He suffers a 
severe disfigurement and is therefore within the protection of the Act. 
However, for the second scenario, a young girl suffers from a mild congenital 
deformity. She applied for a job as an airhostess or a fashion model but is 
turned down on account of her appearance. She would be deemed not to be 
within the protection of the DDA 1995. Both of these examples show that a 
person has been discriminated against because of their appearance. 
Unfortunately, only the young man involved in the motorbike accident will gain 
the protection of the Act. 
Unfortunately, when the Act was drafted in 1995 the criteria for disability were 
based on physical or mental impairments and based on the medical model 
rather than the social model, which reflects cultural or environmental factors 
and therefore would not reflect society's attitude or prejudice. 258 
257 Enright 5, Deformity, Disfigurement & Disability New Law Journal 20.12.02. 
211 See chapter 3 on medical model —v- social model 
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Sean Enright259 explained in relation to deformity and disfigurement that they 
are similar in meaning, but are subtly different concepts which may overlap 
and may on occasion be used interchangeably, not always appropriately. 
Generally a disfigurement affects personal appearance and it may be 
congenital, for example birthmarks or a hair-lip, or it can be acquired by 
scarring, palsy or burns. A deformity, however, is a condition of abnormal 
anatomy. It is on the body's structure rather than the appearance and it may 
have certain forms of disfigurement, but it also affects the bodily functions. 
Deformity may also be congenital or acquired. It can consist of dwarfism, 
clubfoot, curving of the spine or some other structural or bone deformity and it 
can be external or internal affecting one or more of the body's organs. 26° So, 
a person can have a deformity but may not be disfigured or severely 
disfigured and therefore comes outside the protection of the Act unless he can 
bring himself within Schedule 1261 
 of the Act. This means that for deformity to 
come within the Act it must affect the ability to carry out normal day-to-day 
activities, 
"and it must affect one of the following: mobility, dexterity, co-
ordination, continence, ability to lift, carry, move every day objects, 
speech, hearing or eye sight, memory, concentration, ability to learn, to 
understand or perceive" 
259 Op Cit footnote 245 
260 Ibid footnote 247 
261 Para 4 
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Therefore, a person may have a deformed spine but would still be able to 
carry out daily activities but would not come under the protection of the Act. 
However, if the person with the deformed spine was so deformed that his 
ability to carry or lift or walk properly, then this would be deemed to be a 
disability because their daily activities are substantially effected and therefore 
would be deemed to be a physical disability. From a social point of view 
people's attitudes to this person would be patronising or offensive. The Act did 
not recognise these problems around deformity and caused undue hardships 
to people who had deformities. 
Three conclusions can be drawn here. Firstly, a deformity may include 
disfigurement but that it is by no means always the case. Secondly, a person 
may have a deformity but may not be disfigured or severely disfigured and 
therefore outside the protection of the Act unless he could bring him/herself 
within one of the criteria in Schedule 1 to the Act as described above. Thirdly, 
a disfigurement was not categorised under the DDA 1995 by their disability 
unless it amounted to a severe disfigurement. 
This suggests that the DDA 1995 was too restricted and narrow and the best 
way forward would be that if any disfigurement or deformity that had a 
significant adverse impact on 'personal appearance', should have been 
sufficient to gain the protection of the Act. The mere fact that a person suffers 
from disfigurement or deformity in itself should have allowed them the 
protection of the DDA 1995 in order to ensure that people were not denied 
services, jobs or education simply because of their appearance. 
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6.2.3 Restricted Growth 
The Act also appeared to be silent with regards to people with restricted 
growth (Dwarfism). People with restricted growth may not have been deemed 
to be disabled under Section 1 of the Act because they are able to carry out 
the majority of daily activities. Yet it can be argued that people with restricted 
growth can encounter difficulties in their daily life such as not being able to 
reach an item on a high shelf in a supermarket or being unable to climb a high 
step on to a bus or train. In addition to the physical features they also have to 
face prejudice from society and are often ridiculed by name calling such as 
'midget'. 
There is no case law with regard to restricted growth, but it was highlighted in 
a ABC Radio 4 broadcast that people with restricted growth were constantly 
being discriminated against because of their size, but were unable to seek the 
protection of the DDA 1995 because their impairment did not have a 
substantial adverse effect. 262 
The psychosocial disadvantages may be more distressing than physical 
symptoms, especially in adolescence. In adult life people have to face social 
prejudices, which reduce social and marital opportunities, reduced 
262 BBC Radio 4 broadcast entitled "Discrimination Against People with Restricted Growth" November 
2005 
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employment opportunities, low self-esteem and interference with ordinary 
activities of daily living such as driving. 
6.2.4 Albinism 
Society's attitudes about albinism have a tremendous effect on the people 
with the condition. There is very little case law with regard to who people who 
have this condition. Neither the disability campaigners nor those with the 
condition agree about whether albinism is defined as a disability. Albinism is 
a unique condition in that it segregates that group of people as looking 
different. However, under the DDA 1995 people with albinism did not gain the 
protection of the Act because they were still able to carry out normal day-to-
day activities, though they may still have been able to gain protection under 
the DDA 1995 if they had a sight impairment. 263 Not all people with Albinism 
would be protected because although they look different they will be subjected 
to name calling and discrimination simply because they look different. 
However, in the USA under the ADA 264 some people with albinism are 
protected as being someone who has a physical impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of one of the major life activities and therefore needs 
protection from discrimination. 
263 Sight impairment might also meet the requirement that it must be substantial. 
264 	 NOAH 	 (The 	 National 	 Organisation 	 for 	 Albinism 	 and 	 Hypopigmentation) 
www.albinisrn.org/publications/social.html . See Appendix 5 
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6.2.5 Stammering 
Protection with regard to stammering or stuttering was restricted by the Act. A 
stammer can be a disability that is defined as a physical or mental impairment, 
which has a substantial and long-term adverse affect on a person's ability to 
carry out day10-day activities. The less obvious speech disabilities are dealt 
with under the Guidance. 265 
People with a severe stammer are deemed to be disabled and are protected 
by the Act. 266 A question that may be asked is about the level of stammering 
that a person has to have to fall within the protection of the Act? The 
Guidance267 says that both clarity of speech and how normal the rhythm of 
speech is relevant. It also says that the inability to articulate fluently due to a 
minor stammer or stutter or speech impediment is not a disability. People with 
minor stammers were therefore not protected by the Act. Moreover, the Act 
did not extend to people who are mistakenly believed to be disabled, for 
example a person who has a slight speech impediment, who is mistakenly 
assumed to have a learning disability, or a person who has a lisp. 
The Act, therefore, failed to cover people with minor stammers or stutters and 
unfortunately, the DDA 1995 and Guidance were silent on this issue. The 
2e5 
"Account should be taken of how far a person is able to speak clearly at a normal pace and rhythm 
and to understand someone else speaking normally in the persons native language. It is necessary to 
consider any effects in speech, patterns or which impede the acquisition or processing of ones native 
language, for example by someone who has had a stroke." 
266 Para C12 	 - 
267 Para C12 
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legal question for the Court or Tribunals to consider is whether the adverse 
effect of the stammer on the ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities is 
a 'substantial one'. 
There are certain issues concerning stammering that arise when considering 
whether or not it would come under the definition of disability. It may take a 
person with a stammer longer than average to say things or it may be that the 
environment exacerbates the stammer, for example, a person going for a job 
interview may stammer more, but still would not have been covered by the Act 
because under normal circumstances they only have a minor stammer. The 
ideal solution would be that all people with stammers, regardless of whether 
their stammer is minor or not it should be defined as disabled and therefore 
protected. Unfortunately, there is as yet little case law around this area. In the 
case of Shaughnessy v The Lord Advocate 268 where the Claimant was a 
lawyer with a stammer was turned down for a job and he complained under 
the DDA 1995. There are various grounds on which the decision could be 
disputed but probably the most serious is that the Tribunal looked at what the 
Claimant did rather than what he was able to do. This seems contrary to the 
EAT decision in the Goodwin case269 and indeed to the wording of Sectioni of 
the Act. The numerous situations that the Claimant avoided wherever possible 
(as acknowledged even in the employer's medical report) were therefore 
taken into account by the Tribunal only to the limited extent that the Claimant 
could not avoid them. On the basis of this decision, a person who, with the 
268 ET Sf401513199 2000 Appendix 3(35) 
211 See Appendix 3(7(b) 
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encouragement of his speech therapist starts going into talking situations 
which he would normally avoid, he now stammers more because he is doing 
this would be more likely to be "disabled' after the therapy than before it. 
One of the main weaknesses of the Act in relation to stammering was within 
the definition of stammering. The Guidance27° states that the requirement that 
an adverse effect be substantial reflects the general understanding of 
"disability" as a limitation going beyond the normal differences in ability, which 
may exist among people. A "substantial" effect is more than would be 
produced by the sort of physical or mental conditions experienced by many 
people which have only "minor" effects. A "substantial" effect is one, which is 
more than 'minor' or 'trivial'. This sets out the principle of what is meant by 
"substantial": Therefore it could be argued that a stammer that goes beyond 
the normal differences in fluency, which may exist, between people. 
Stammering is characterised by sometimes simply not being able to get the 
word out, or sometimes having to use some special speech technique to get 
the word out. This is not the kind of dysfluency, which non-stammers have - 
for example when a person is unsure of how to say what he wants and maybe 
stumbles while trying to sort it out. Therefore if any effect of a stammer is 
substantial, any stammer will be a disability unless it simply has no effect in 
normal day-to-day situations. This is inconsistent.with the Guidance notes. 271 
270 Part II Para A 1 
271 Para c 19 These say that it is not reasonable to see a minor stutter as a 'disability'. However, the 
notes are not law, and one might argue that the nature of stuttering seems not to have been fully 
considered in the light of the general principle 271 and that accordingly the general principle should be 
followed rather than the faulty application of the principle to stuttering. 
SOCII 
6.2.6 Autism and Asperger's Syndrome 
People with Autism and Asperger's Syndrome are also limited to the 
protection of Section 1 of the Act. This can be demonstrated in a case 272 
which was challenged by the DCR when the Employment Tribunal concluded 
that the Claimant who suffered from Aspergers Syndrome did not qualify for 
the protection of Section 1 of the Act. The reason given was that his condition 
did not impair his ability to carry out day-to-day activities. This decision was 
appealed and the EAT held that the condition fits within the ability to 
understand, which covers understanding of broad human social interaction. 
The case had been remitted back to the original Employment Tribunal to 
consider whether the adverse affect of the condition on the Claimant's ability 
to understand is adversely affected to a substantial extent. 
6.3 	 Exclusions 
Certain conditions273 , such as alcoholism and drug abuse, are specifically 
excluded from the scope of the Disability Discrimination Act. Although the 
Guidance has no legal status in itself Tribunals must take account of any 
272 
case unnamed - the Disability Rights commission www.drc-gb.orq/. 
273 
Disability Discrimination ( Meaning of disability ) Regulations 1996 1995 states that 'addiction to 
alcohol, nicotine or any other substance is to be treated as not amounting to an impairment for the 
purposes of the Act' unless the addiction was 'originally the result of administration of medically 
prescribed drugs or other medical treatment'. 
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matter it contains relevant to the issue to be determined. 274 The Guidance275 
confirms that it is not necessary to consider how an impairment was caused, 
so, for example, people with liver damage following alcoholism would have a 
disability within the meaning of the Act. 
In the case of Power v Panasonic UK Ltd. ,276  the Claimant appealed against 
the ET decision in that she was deemed not to be disabled. The EAT 
considered the Tribunal's finding that the Claimant's phobic anxiety was not a 
disability within the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Before the EAT, the 
Claimant argued that the Tribunal's decision in this regard was perverse. The 
EAT, however, held that although there may have been some errors in the 
Tribunal's conclusions, its findings could not be said to be perverse. The EAT 
allowed the appeal on the first point only and remitted the case. 
It could be argued that the use of alcohol or drugs which excludes a person 
from seeking protection from the Disability Discrimination Act can cause 
hardships simply because their impairment does not come under the definition 
of disability, even though specialist health and social services are provided to 
these groups and are described for life as 'recovering alcoholics' or 
recovering drug users'. This means that they can go into regression at 
274 S.3 (3) Disability Discrimination Act 1995. The list is unlimited but for the purpose of this dissertation 
only conditions such as drug and alcohol addiction are discussed. 
275 Para 11 
276 IRLR 151 EAT See Appendix 3(36) 
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anytime for the rest of their lives - thus a life long disability. Yet in today's 
society alcohol or drug abuse is becoming more problematic and is not 
recognised as an illness. People, who are affected by their own personal 
problems such as stress or bereavement, may often turn to alcohol or drugs 
for comfort, with the result that they become socially excluded from society if 
they become addicted to these substances. Their addiction will be seen by the 
Act as being a social or self-inflicted issue rather than a disability one. It is 
interesting to note that a person with a drug or alcohol addiction can make a 
claim for a welfare benefit called Disability Living Allowance and under the 
regulations the Claimant can claim this benefit if they have a drug or alcohol 
dependency problem.277 
The above-mentioned disabilities are by no means exhaustive. It has been 
demonstrates in this chapter that people who are perceived as having a 
disability may not automatically be covered by the DDA 1995. It has to be 
argued that unlike the sex and race discrimination laws where both women 
and men are protected under the Sex Discrimination Act and all ethnic 
minorities are protected under the Race Relations Act, unlike the DDA where 
a person has to meet the definition of disability under Section 1 of the Act 
1995 even before tackling the discriminatory act. Overall, the limitations and 
the exclusions of the Act can cause real hardships and social exclusions to 
these people who cannot meet the definition of disability under the Act. Unlike 
277 Disability Living Allowance - reg. cDLAI778I2000 (32101) Alcohol dependency is capable in itself of 
being a physical or a mental disability. Account should be taken of the response to treatment and 
awards should be made for limited periods to allow for automatic review. 
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the Australian and American Disability Laws all that is required is to show that 
a person has a disability whereas under British legislation people who are 
perceived to be disabled may not always b able to rely on the protection of the 
Act. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 What Is The Preferred Approach? 
The definition of disability within the DDA 1995 is not a fair approach because 
if an individual cannot prove they have a disability, which comes under the 
definition, they will not be protected. It is contended that a discrimination law 
should focus on discrimination: not how impaired or functionally limited a 
person is but how much they are discriminated against. What the law asks is 
"are you disabled enough by an impairment to deserve fair treatment" - not 
"are you disabled by discrimination?" 
Previously the Government argued that a definition based on the social model 
would be too wide and would cover the whole population. However, this is not 
the case of other equality laws - the Sex Discrimination Act makes 
discrimination on the basis of gender illegal for men and women, the Race 
Relations Act protects anyone, black or white from racial prejudice. All 
discrimination laws should be based on the same principle, the right to fair 
treatment and equality. The DDA 1995 cannot be excluded from this principle 
simply because the problems faced by a disabled person do not happen 
because of their impairment, but because of social attitudes and social 
exclusion barriers. 
Having discussed some points of comparison between Australian and 
American disability laws278 this conclusion will now focus on what the best 
approach to a more effective disability law will be 
Under the British approach, disabled people have been framed by an 
altogether paternalistic, charitable approach, keeping disabled people 
dependent. There have been many studies proving disabled people suffer 
discrimination and segregation. 279 
In this dissertation it has been argued that the DDA 1995 failed to 
acknowledge or protect disabled people. This has been demonstrated by 
looking closely at physica1 280 and mental impairments, 281 and its limitations 
and exclusions. 282 It has also looked closely at how the definition of disability 
is modelled. 283 
The findings of this research overview of the DDA comes to the same 
conclusions as Lord Lester, a prominent civil liberties lawyer, who has 
described the law as 
278 See Appendix 1 
279 See chapter 2 on Definition of Disability 
280 See Chapter 4 
281 See Chapter 5 
282 See Chapter 6 
113 See Chapter 2 
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"Riddled with vague, slippery and elusive exceptions, making it so full 
of holes that it is more like a colander than a binding code". 2 
It has been demonstrated that the definition of disability 285 contained in the 
Act was fundamentally flawed and although it offered protection to some 
disabled people it failed to protect a large percentage of disabled people 286 
who did not meet the requirement of the definition of disability. This is 
primarily because the definition of disability was predicated on the medical 
model, that the disability is a medical condition individualised for that disabled 
person. The concept of the medical mode1 287 has shown that disabled people 
are often isolated, segregated and discriminated against. The ideal approach 
would be to base the definition of disability on the social model, 288 the focus 
being on a society that has created the barriers - the difference between the 
two models is that the medical model cannot be rectified or amended to 
address the fundamental flaws of definition of disability, but the social model 
can be amended and changed through society itself and can continue to be 
changed through the passage of time. The research has also looked at other 
international laws 289 
284 Hansard 22/5/94, 813 
265 Section 1 of the DDA 1995 
286 See Appendix 2 
287 See Chapter 2 
288 See Chapter 2 
211 See Appendix 1 
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The Australian approach 29° proves that Civil Rights based disability 
discrimination legislation can work in Commonwealth systems like ours. The 
American approach 291 has shown that their legislation is the quickest, fairest 
and most effective methods ensuring disabled people have a right to 
employment and education. It also persuades society to open its doors to 
disabled people and to include these people in the community. If society is 
responsible for excluding disabled people then ending that exclusion can only 
be achieved through social and political changes. By not introducing Civil 
Rights legislation or adopting other examples of international laws such as the 
Australian or American legislation, the British Government has ignored this 
responsibility and challenge, however pressure from campaigners have forced 
the Government to consider the present DDA 1995 definition of disability as it 
is fundamentally flawed. 
7.2 The Way Forward 
Due to pressure from campaigners and the inability of the Government to 
change the definition of disability under the DDA 1995 - because the 
definition was based on a medical model. 292 The Government worked with the 
DRC and has now introduced new amendments to the disability legislation. 
290 See Appendix 1 
291 See Appendix I 
212 See chapter 3 
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The DDA 2005 came into force in December 2006, and made some significant 
changes to the DDA 1995, such as: 
• Increased responsibilities on Local Authorities. 
• Protection for people who have HIV, Multiple Sclerosis and cancer from 
the date of diagnosis. 
• Removal of the requirement that a "mental illness" be "clinically well-
recognised". 
The present Government has now tried to rectify the DDA 1995 definition of 
disability after pressure from disabled movement groups. The social model 
which is the preferred model adopted by disability groups is modelled on the 
concept that it is society that creates the 'barriers' against disabled people and 
is now more widely accepted. The present Government accepts this concept 
to the extent that it has now amended the DDA 1995 in the direction of the 
social model. The current trend shows that disability awareness in the UK are 
now moving disability laws from the medical model towards the social model. 
The implementation of the DDA 2005 holds much promise in overcoming the 
limitations of the individual complaints approach taken under the DDA 1995. 
The new approach under the DDA 2005 does not allow for individuals to make 
complaints of discrimination, but rather acts like a prevention of discrimination 
in the first place, thus avoiding the need to litigate. This may show some 
positive outcomes, such as implementing policies, services, selling targets 
and performance measures that are monitored by Inspecting bodies such as 
Disability Rights Commission who will monitor delivery. The main 
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amendments made to the DDA 1995 by the DDA 2005293  place a duty on all 
public authorities294 when carrying out their functions to have due regard to 
the needs of disabled people and to consider the following: 
. Promote equality of opportunity between disabled persons and other 
persons; 
• Eliminate discrimination that is unlawful under Disability Discrimination 
Legislation; 
• Eliminate harassment of disabled persons that is related to their 
disabilities; 
. Promote positive attitudes towards disabled persons; 
Encourage participation by disabled persons in public life; Take steps 
to take account of disabled persons' disabilities, even when that 
involves treating disabled persons more favourably than other 
persons. 295 
The Disability Rights Commission, in its "The Duty to Promote Disability 
Equality: Statutory Code of Practice" 296  quotes a report, "Improving the Life 
Chances of Disabled People", in which the Government set out its vision of 
disability equality such that: 
293 549A DDA 2005 
294 Disability Rights Commission The Duty to Promote Disability Equality, Statutory Code of Practice 
295 Op Cit footnote 294 
296 Op Cit footnote 294 
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"By 2025 disabled people in Britain should have full opportunities and 
choices to improve their quality of life and will be respected and 
included as equal members of society." 297 
The Disability Rights Commission went on to state: 
"That disabled people do not have the same opportunities or choices 
as non-disabled people. Nor do they enjoy equal respect or full 
inclusion in society on an equal basis. The poverty, disadvantage and 
social exclusion experienced by many disabled people are not the 
inevitable result of their impairments or medical conditions, but rather 
stems from attitudinal and environmental barriers." 298 
The new amended legislation is now based on 'the social model of disability' 
and hopefully provides a basis for the successful implementation of the duty to 
promote disability equality. 
There has been increased protection for people who have HIV, Multiple 
Sclerosis and Cancer from the date of diagnosis. The DDA 1995 Act already 
contained special provisions in relation to progressive conditions; where 
someone has a progressive condition, he/she was treated as having an 
impairment which had a substantial adverse effect from the moment any 
impairment resulting from that condition first had some effect on the person's 
Op cit footnote 294 
296 0p cit footnote 294 
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ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. However under the DDA 2005: 
protection for people who have HIV, multiple sclerosis and all types of cancer 
will now be extended, so that from the date of diagnosis they will be deemed 
to be disabled. People who have been diagnosed with one of these three 
conditions will therefore be deemed to have a disability even if they have no 
symptoms that effect their day-to-day activities.. Other progressive conditions 
will continue to be dealt with as previously under the DDA 1995. 
The Government had considered excluding certain cancers such as skin 
cancer that would not attract protection from the point of diagnosis but 
decided not to do so. Therefore, even nominally "minor" cancers will be 
protected from the date of diagnosis. The rational for the changes is that HIV, 
Multiple Sclerosis and Cancer all attract considerable stigma and have a 
personal impact from the point of diagnosis, for example an employer may 
dismiss a person because he knows that person will need time off work for 
treatment/medical check-ups and therefore it is felt that sufferers should be 
protected from that date. 
There is the removal of the requirement that a "mental illness" be "clinically 
well-recognised"299. The position under the DDA 1995 was that in order to 
satisfy the definition of disabled within the DDA 1995, it was necessary for an 
individual to demonstrate that a mental impairment is a "clinically well-
recognised" disease, 30° as well as showing it had a substantial and long-term 
299 Mental Health chapter 5 
300 See Appendix 4 
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adverse affect on his/her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. 
Therefore if, for example, a person was signed off work by a GP suffering 
from depression which, for example, he/she stated was caused by work 
related stress, that person needed to show that he/she was suffering from a 
!!clinically well-recognised" condition to gain protection under the DDA 1995. 
As with all clinical conditions, there are guidelines 301 for doctors to consider 
when diagnosing a patient with clinical depression. The requirements 
therefore meant that mental conditions must have fulfilled certain specific 
guidelines, and thus fit into a recognised clinical condition, in order to be 
classified as a 'disability' for protection under the DDA 1995. This has in the 
past provided employers with a certain level of comfort that mental conditions, 
which can by their nature appear nebulous and hard to substantiate, must fit a 
specified clinical basis before sufferers can claim the protections of the DDA 
1995. 
Changes under the DDA 2005 requirement that a "mental illness" be "clinically 
well-recognised" 302 will be removed, bringing the definition of a mental 
impairment into line under the definition of disability with the requirements to 
prove a physical disability. The rationale for this amendment results from 
lobbying by the Disability Rights Commission and mental health groups such 
as Mind, who have argued that there are a variety of barriers to formal 
diagnosis of mental health conditions - for example, reluctance by sufferers 
themselves to receive a diagnosis that is perceived as a label leading to 
301 See Chapter 5 
302 See Appendix 4 
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stigma. It has been argued by these groups that this has meant that significant 
numbers of people suffering from acute mental health conditions that have not 
been formally diagnosed were unfairly denied protection under the DDA 1995. 
This amendment is likely to make it easier for individuals to succeed in 
disability discrimination claims in relation to mental illnesses such as 
depression. While evidential issues as to whether a mental condition amounts 
to a disability are likely to become more difficult with this change, employers 
can take comfort from the fact that a mental impairment must still have a 
substantial, adverse effect on the individual's ability to carry out normal day-
to-day activities and must have lasted, or be likely to last, for 12 months or 
more. Whilst Claimants may try to argue that less specific diagnoses, such as 
anxiety and stress, are 'disabilities', if these are claimed over a particular 
incident and can be shown to be short-term, they will still not qualify as a 
disability. 
Personality disorders are another potential effect of this change to the law and 
could be in relation to dismissals as a result of 'personality' problems. In the 
recent case of Perkins v St Georges Health Care NHS Trust 303  the Court of 
Appeal confirmed that a dismissal for unacceptable behaviour flowing from an 
employee's personality could be fair. Could Mr Perkins, under the new 
provisions of the DDA 2005 of defining a mental health impairment have 
claimed that he had a 'personality disorder', and therefore should have had 
protection on grounds of having a disability? A 'personality disorder' is 
generally diagnosed where a person is rigid and tends to respond 
303 ICR 617 CA 12/10105 IRLR 934 See Appendix 3(37) 
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inappropriately to problems, to the point where relationships with family, 
friends and employers are adversely affected. Difficulties arise because these 
symptoms are exacerbated forms of personality traits that most people exhibit 
to some extent - so where along the line does a normal personality become 
eccentric, and thence a 'personality disorder'? Even the medical profession 
itself seems unsure, with some sectors refusing to classify personality 
disorders as mental illnesses. The change to the DDA 1995 removing the 
requirement that a mental condition be clinically well-recognised does appear 
to open the door for Claimants who have been dismissed due to personality 
issues, to argue that reasonable adjustments should have been made due to 
their 'personality disorder'. Case law will determine exactly how the Courts 
interpret the new provisions relating to mental conditions, and it seems likely 
we will see some interesting cases in this area. 
The Disability Rights Commission recognises that whilst many people have 
positive attitudes towards disabled people, some people express pity, fear, 
lack of respect and sometimes even contempt. These attitudes are often 
hurtful and can lead to discrimination and also place unnecessary restrictions 
on disabled people. The Disability Rights Commission state, that for many 
disabled people the environmental barriers play an even more important role 
in restricting opportunities than attitudes. They go on to explain that although 
these barriers can be unintentional, this does not make their impact upon 
disabled people any less significant. When buildings, services and 
employment practices are designed in ways that fail to take into account the 
particular circumstances of disabled people, this excludes and disadvantages 
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them. The same applies when budgets are set out for a programme without 
considering the additional needs of disabled people. 
These issues have been addressed by the new DDA 2005, which amends the 
DDA 1995. The Duty to Promote Disability Equality addresses the duties of 
public authorities to tackle disability discrimination in a practical way, by 
introducing policies that actively promote opportunities and so prevent 
discrimination taking place and having to resort to litigation. The rationale 
behind the new amendments is that Public Authorities can also make a huge 
contribution towards equal opportunities for disabled people. They are able to 
do this by addressing the way in which they run their own services and 
employ people, and by exerting their influence in the community, for example 
the way in which they regulate the activities of others by granting licenses 
and/or planning permission, by providing education in schools and colleges, 
by inspecting the performance of these and other organisations. All these 
functions of public authorities are subject to the duty to promote disability 
equality. 
The new Act states that public authorities are required to have due regard to 
the need to take steps to take account of disabled peoples disabilities, even 
when that involves treating the disabled person more favourably than able 
bodied people. This underlines that equality of opportunity cannot be achieved 
simply by treating disabled and able bodied people alike. 
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An example of this is where a disabled student may need special car parking 
space as he/she is unable to use public transport. Able bodied people may 
also want a parking space, but they will not have the same degree of 
disadvantage if they do not have one. The disabled student will be prevented 
from attending the course at college if they do not have a parking space, the 
able bodied person will simply be inconvenienced. Therefore, morefavourable 
treatment is necessary to provide equality to that disabled person to access 
the course at college. 
This principle has always been recognised in the Act, particularly through the 
duty to provide reasonable adjustments. The educational establishment in this 
example will have a duty under the new legislation to provide such a parking 
space if, in all the circumstances, it is a 'reasonable' adjustment to make. So, 
instead of a disabled person asking for a reasonable adjustment to be made, 
public authorities will now have to ensure thee are now sufficient disabled 
parking spaces in their car parks. This clearly is a more positive step to take 
because public authorities are now have to be pro-active in their decisions to 
ensure disabled people are treated fairly and not excluded. No longer will a 
disabled person have to ask for a reasonable adjustment to be made - it will 
be expected that disabled people will be able to access services and 
provisions within society. 
It clearly shows that the trend is moving from the medical model to a social 
model and that the Government are accepting the social model more 
favourably than the medical model and trying to tackle the social exclusion 
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that is faced by many disabled people as a result of attitudes and barriers 
being placed against them in society. 
It is hoped that this is a major move forward to combating social exclusion by 
implementing the Duty to Promote Disability Equality. 304 Public Authorities, 
under specific duties, have to involve disabled people. The specific duties 
require a Public Authority to involve disabled people who appear to the 
authority to have an interest in the way it carries out its functions in the 
development of the Disability Equality Scheme. Additionally, the Disability 
Equality Scheme must include a statement of the way in which disabled 
people have been involved in its development. These requirements reflect the 
fact that public authorities will not be able to identify and prioritise equality 
initiatives effectively unless they consider the views of disabled people. It was 
predominantly able-bodied researchers who helped to draft the DDA 1995 
Section 1 definition of disability and probably part of the reason why the 
definition of disability is so ineffective - the original drafting of the DDA 1995 
had no input from disabled people. The new Statutory Codes state that 
disabled people should be involved in all key aspects of the development of 
the scheme such as identifying the barriers faced by disabled people and 
highlighting unsatisfactory outcomes; setting priorities for action plans, and 
assisting planning activity. 
304 0p cit footnote 294 
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The new amendments to the DDA 1995 will hopefully make major changes 
within society for disabled people. Public Authorities 305 such as local 
authorities, hospitals, universities and schools will be expected to implement 
the new statutory duty, thus making major changes to provide equality among 
disabled people. It means finally that the UK is now moving towards 
accepting the social model and rejecting the medical model and. that the 
medical model was too narrow a definition of disability. This time, disabled 
people will be able to voice their views and opinions on how best to 
accommodate disabled people within society; disabled people are of course 
the group best able to do this because of the personal experiences of being 
disabled. 
The overriding importance of the social model of disability is that it no longer 
sees disabled people as having something wrong with them - it rejects the 
individual pathology model. This means that when disabled people are no 
longer able to perform certain tasks the reasons are seen as poor design of 
buildings and unrealistic expectations of other people, unsuitable housing or 
work environments. Hopefully, in the future this will be addressed by the 
legislation just passed and the Duty to Promote Disability Equality will make a 
real difference to the lives of disabled people. 
The aim of the new duty imposed on public authorities is for them to make 
more substantial changes and therefore hopefully have a greater impact on 
the lives of disabled people rather than for example, litigate against a 
305 See Appendix 7 
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company or an employer for disability discrimination. The purpose of the new 
duty is to avoid such litigation in the first place, thus giving public authorities 
the responsibility of implementing major changes to protect disabled people. 
Although the new legislation does not create any new individual rights for 
disabled people, it does provide restitution when a disabled person has been 
subjected to discrimination. The duty provides a framework for public 
authorities to carry out their functions more effectively and tackle 
discrimination and its causes in a proactive way. The duty therefore reinforces 
the pre-existing duties under the DDA 1995. 
In my view the new amended DDA 2005 may hold much promise in 
overcoming the limitations and restrictions of the DDA 1995 definition of 
disability. However, the new duties under DDA 2005 have not led some public 
bodies to review their practices and implement reforms in the way Parliament 
intended. Implementation of the disability equality duty has demonstrated that 
the positive duty can become an exercise in procedure and a high amount of 
paperwork, rather than in institutional change. It merely becomes a paper 
exercise according to the consultation paper 306 on the proposed disability 
duty, the general view of the disability duty is that it is "overly bureaucratic, 
process-driven and resource intensive" 307 . 
306 Equal Opportunities Review (EOR 154) July 2006 
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At the time of writing the conclusion of this dissertation there now appears to 
be a fundamental flaw to the implementation of the new duty on public 
authorities. As a Disability Rights Solicitor and a member of the Liverpool 
Disability Steering Group I have encountered difficulties in accessing disability 
equality both for clients and people that I represent within the network of the 
Steering Groups. I submit two scenarios, which highlight the difficulties. 
The first offender, involved, is the Legal Services Commission who are 
deemed to be a Public Authority. A client who is in the latter stages of MS 
cannot walk and wishes to make an application for LSC funding (Legal Aid) to 
challenge the failure of Social Services to implement a care package for his 
needs. An application is made for LSC funding and the decision made by the 
LSC is that the client has to access the initial Legal Help and Assistance 308 at 
the nearest Citizens Advice Bureau or Law Centre rather than grant the client 
a full LSC Funding Certificate. Bearing in mind the client cannot walk to his 
nearest CAB/Law Centre to access legal advice. This was challenged by 
myself309 and the Appeal was submitted before the LSC Area Committee, 
challenging this decision and citing the new duty under the DDA 2005. The 
LSC to this end granted full LSC funding and the client is now in receipt of 
LSC funding. To date it is known that the LSC still expect disabled people to 
308 Legal Help and Assistance is the old form of the Green Form Scheme which offers initial legal help 
and advice at an initial stage. All CABs and Law centres and some law firms offer this initial advice, but 
if a client chooses to instruct a law firm which does not offer this initial advice, they will be expected to 
obtain the initial advice elsewhere and be expected to travel to their nearest CAB/LAW centre to access 
advice. 
301 See Appendix 8 
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access their nearest CAB/Law Centre to obtain advice under the Legal Help 
and Assistance Scheme 31° at their nearest Citizens Advice Bureau or Law 
Centre 
The second scenario is highlighted by the findings of the Liverpool Disability 
Steering Group membership 311 . To date there are numerous public bodies in 
Liverpool that have not fulfilled their obligations under the new duty. 312 The 
Steering Group contacted the DRC who are the monitoring body of the new 
duty under the DDA 2005 and the group were duly informed by an advisor at 
the DRC that they are endeavouring to do their best, but they still have 
approximately 50,000 bodies to check. Meanwhile, although the new 
legislation has been passed there still are public bodies who have not even 
completed their final draft to their Equality Policy, such as Liverpool City 
Council. 
In my opinion a new duty on public bodies to promote disability equality 
should be action-based and goal-oriented but should allow those bodies 
greater autonomy in how they deliver equality. The reason is that a public 
body must pay due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination and 
promote equality of opportunity. The goal, therefore, is equality of opportunity 
whilst the duty is to pay due regard. I argue that both the goal and the duty 
are potentially problematic under the DDA 2005. "Equal opportunity" is too 
310 Ibid 
311 Liverpool Disability Network 
312 DDA 2005 
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vague a definition and too limited to function as a workable target. The duty to 
pay "due regard" merely requires a body to consider the need to promote 
equality, not to take any action. This viewpoint is also supported by both 
Sandra Fredman and Sarah Spencer in the article in Equality: Towards an 
Outcome-Focused Duty" 313 They propose that the new duty should specify the 
equality goals, moving beyond equality of opportunity, and specify a clearer 
duty, moving beyond due regard. They propose a goal-oriented, action-based 
and progressive duty. They quoted equality of opportunity is a broad concept: 
"Equality of opportunity is a broader concept than the formal version of 
equality, which requires only that similarly situated people be treated equally. 
Recognising that the same treatment might perpetuate disadvantage by failing 
to address existing discrimination and disadvantage, equality of opportunity 
aims to equalise the starting point. However, equality of opportunity can have 
a range of applications." 314 
They further question this "equality of opportunity" with the query about the 
"responsibility gaps" where a public body cannot be responsible for aspects of 
disability discrimination over which it has no control. For example, a public 
employer might need to draw the attention of transport authorities to the 
needs to address transport difficulties that affect the ability of potential 
employees to get to work. Therefore clearer guidelines are required for 
313 Fredman S. at at: "Equahty: towards an outcome-focused duty' EOR 156 September 2006 
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policymakers to ensure that the DDA 2005 works because of its impact across 
public sectors. 
Although the new amended DDA 2005 may have opened doors to excluded 
groups, in my view this does not mean that they have the resources to 
progress through the doors, for example, many public authorities when 
challenged about their failure to implement their new "Duty to Promote 
Equality Policy" they simply state that it will be completed when they receive 
finances from their new financial year budget. 
My view on the new amendment is that there are some positive outcomes 
such as removing the requirement that a mental impairment should be 
clinically well-recognised be removed, and that HIV MS and cancer suffers be 
deemed as disabled from the point of diagnosis are positive moves. However, 
having encountered difficulties with the new amended DDA 2005 both in a 
professional and personal capacity, I feel that there is still very little difference 
between the DDA 1995 and the DDA 2005 with regards to accessing justice 
for disabled people. All that the new duty under the DDA 2005 has done is to 
put the responsibility on public authorities to make new policies and 
regulations to combat discrimination - but if public authorities cannot even 
implement their new "Duty to Promote Equality Amongst Disabled People 
Statement' I am not convinced that the new amended legislation will make any 
real difference to the lives of disabled people, but with the passage of time will 
tell whether it has been successful or not. 
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Hence, this research has highlighted important issues and made several 
criticisms of its findings around Section 1 of the DDA 1995 and the DDA 2005 
in its failure to protect disabled people. This document aims to contribute to 
the raising of awareness in society of the discrimination and exclusion 
disabled people face because of their disabilities. A failure to address these 
issues surrounding the flawed definition of disability faced by disabled people 
only further contributes to their continuing exclusion. The way ahead is for 
disabled people, researchers and the Government to work together to 
construct a more appropriate definition of disability within the legislation, 
borrowing from other legislation such as the ADA 315 to protect those disabled 
people who deserve to be protected. 
Although the Government has not taken the ADA approach they have decided 
to take the social model approach 316 and this hopefully will address some 
difficulties disabled people face in society. It is too early to establish whether 
the new "Duty To Promote Disability Equality" will have any real impact on the 
lives of disabled people because there is currently, at the time of writing this 
dissertation, there is no case law to support or criticise the amendments to the 
DDA 2005. 
315 See Appendix 1 
316 DDA 1995 as amended DDA 2005 Duty To Promote Equality Among Disabled People Statutory 
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Appendix 1 - Comparison of the British American and Australian 
Disability Laws. 
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9.1 APPENDiX ONE -UK. L!S& £.ND AL!STRALI& 
BRITAIN AMERICA I AUSTRALIA 
Definition Section I of the DDA AMERICANS WITH AUSTRALIAN 
1995 provides that DISABILITIES ACT DISABILITY 
"(sisubiect to the 990 DISCRIMINATION ACT 
provisions of Schedule I a physical or mental 1992 
a person has a disability impairment that total or partial loss of the 
for the purposes of this substantially limits one or persons bodily or menial 
Act if he/she has a more of thei'ir) major life functions: or total or 
physical or mental activities .....or partial loss of a pan of the 
impairment which has a a record of having such an body: or 
substantial and lonti-tem impairment: or the presence in the body 
adverse effect on his that they are).. regarded of organisms causing .... or 
ability to carry out nonnal as having such an capable of causing 
day-to-day activities, impairment disease or illness: or 
the malfunction. 
malformation or 
disfigurement of a pan of 
the person's body: or 
a disorder or malfunction 
that results in the person 
learning differently from a 
person without the 
disorder or malfunction: 
or 
a disorder, illness or 
disease that affects a 
persons though 
processes, perception of 
reality, emotions or 
judgment or that results in 
disturbed behaviour 
Exclusions Definition of disability Definition of disability 
does not cover addiction excludes current illegal 
to or dependency on drug users and current 
alcohoL nicotine. or any alcoholics, ifs provisions 
other i non prescribed) do protect non-using 
although the addicts'"' 
result of such addicdons 
durhosis. emphysema. 
lung cancer, psychosis) 
are covered by the DDA 
1995 
Evidence required In the cases of Cook-v In the cases of Cook-v In the cases of Cook -v- 
Kitchen Range Foods, Kitchen Range foods, Kitchen Range Foods, 
Thorpe -v- The Royal Thorpe -v- The Royal Thoipe -v-The Ro yal 
Hospitals NHS Trust and Hospitals NHS Trust and Hospitals NtIS Trust and 
Alexandei- -v- Driving Alexander -v- Driving Alexander,  -v- Driving 
Standards Agency 302 The Standards Agenc003 The Standards Agency" TM The 
Claimants in these cases ADA's definition of ADD definition of 
would not be defined as disability would extend to disability would extend to 
disabled under Secuon I the Claimant and the Claimant and 
of the DDA 1995. therefore protect them therefore protect them 
ftmm discrimination. - from discrimination 
Ire
, Pam 10 of the Guidance 
ADA Section 104 (C ) (4) 3° Op Cit footnote 91 
302 Op Cit footnote 92 
Op Cit footnote 93 
Formatd: Font: 12 Pt, 
Englisri (U.S.) 
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Conclusions The DDA 1995 definition The ADA defines The ADD definition 
is based on functional disability more widely to follows closely the 
limitation caused by the include physical and recornniendations of the 
disability itself, however, mental impairments as HREOC's (Human Rights 
it ignores or fails to well as being regarded as & Equal Opportunities 
understand the importance having an impairment. Commission) Draft 
of social exclusion caused Evidence suggests the Position Paper. It is 
by disability. ADA is gradually interesting to note that the 
Furthermore, the DDA begmning to improve the HREOC in that document 
1995 linuts the protected jives of disabled in expressly reiected the 
class to those whose American while avoiding definition of disability set 
impairment causes a most of the problems out in the Americans with 
substantial effect, but is anticipated b' its Disabilities Act 1990. 
flawed by a failure to opponents. The ADA has 
include those who are not led to a flood of The UREOC argued that 
perceived or regarded as litigation and its legal the requirement that a 
having such an provisions have proved person's impainneni 
Impairment. relatively uncomplicated substantially limits major 
to enforce. While the Act life activities is a source 
has cost money. these of unnecessary legal 
costs have bee,, dispersed difficulties or 
between Government complexities. In 
companies and consumers particularly. it saw such a 
and have been offset by definition as posing 
many increased business difficulties for people 
opportunities and whose condition has 
significant savings to disabling effects only 
state, welfare and social intermittently rather than 
secunty budgets. continuously or whose 
condition is controlled by 
medication andjor other 
treatmeins (for example 
many people with 
epilepsy, some forms of 
mental illness orasthma), 
This would have also 
applied to the DDA 1995 
1995 where difficulties 
have occuned in 
determining whether a 
person is still deemed to 
be disabled with the effect 
of medical treatment. 
A CivU Rights Issue? 
The USA and Australia have adopted an anti-discrimination and/or Human 
Rights approach in which employment practices are part of an overall policy of 
law, recognising the rights of disabled people and seeking to address 
discrimination against them. Britain and most members of the European Union 
practice a more restricted approach in which specific Government 
Departments attempt to ensure that disabled people achieve full economic 
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and social participation by making incremental changes in their policies. In 
Britain it is argued that the lack of a written constitution or a Human Rights 
culture is inappropriate for this country and there was much resistance from 
the Government to allow a Civil Rights constitution being implemented. 305 The 
British Government is also opposed to a harmonisation of European Social 
policy and its record of promoting the rights of disabled people is significantly 
worse than many of its European partners. 306 Our Government often 
complains that comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation for disabled 
people is impractical or would not work in this country's legal system. In fact it 
could be argued it is those countries whose legal systems which are closest to 
ours which have pioneered anti-discrimination legislation such as Australia 
who have civil rights based anti-discrimination legislation for disabled people. 
The Australian Approach 
Australia's definition of disability is contained in the Australian Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (ADD) . 307 
The Australian ADD is administered through the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunities Commission through the Disability Discrimination Commission. 
The Disability Discrimination Commissioner investigates allegations, 
encourages conciliation, conducts inquiries, can make declarations on 
whether discrimination has taken place and orders prohibiting continuing 
discrimination. An Order can be endorsed through the Federal Court and may 
declare the Respondent should pay damages by way of compensation. 
Barnes 1991 Liberty 62-92 
Employment Dept., 1993 
See Appendix 1 
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The Australian definition of "disability" requires "no limitation of activities" 
as in the case of the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 or "effect on" the 
disabled person's ability to carry out daily activities" unlike the DDA 1995 
definition of disability which is based on the medical conditions. The 
Australian Act offers the disabled person protection if they can prove they 
have a disability regardless of whether or not they can carry out daily activities 
or have to prove that their disability has a substantial impact on their major life 
activities; all that a disabled person needs to prove is that they have a partial 
loss of a bodily or mental function and they will gain the protection under the 
Australian and American legislation. 
The definition of disability in the Australian Disability Discrimination Act 1992 
follows closely the recommendations of the Human Rights & Equal 
Opportunities Commission (HREOC) Draft Position Paper. It is interesting to 
note that the HREOC, in that document expressly rejected the definition of 
disability set out in the Americans With Disabilities Act 1990. The HREOC 
argued that the requirement that a person's impairment substantially limits 
major life activities is a source of unnecessary legal difficulties or complexities. 
In particularly, it saw such a definition as posing difficulties for people whose 
condition has disabling effects only intermittently rather than continuously or 
whose condition is controlled by medication and/or other treatments (for 
example many people with epilepsy, some forms of mental illness or 
asthma). 308 
Op cit footnote 45 
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The USA Approach 
The most comprehensive legal protection against discrimination of disabled 
people can be found in the United States and is achieved by the Americans 
With Disabilities Act 1990 (ADA). This Act came into force in 1992. The ADA 
specftically prohibits discrimination against disabled people and guarantees 
equality of opportunity for people with disability in employment, public services 
(including transport) private sector services and accommodations (access) 
and telecommunications. It has been argued that progress achieved by the 
American disabilities movement is partly due to the country's strong civil rights 
culture and the campaigning activities of many ex-service personnel disabled 
during the Vietnam War. 
President Bush, who signed the ADA 1990 commented 
"When you add together state, local and private funds it costs about 
£200 billion annually to support Americans With Disabilities, in effect 
to keep them dependent." 309 
The ADA defines disability more widely to include anybody who has a physical 
or mental impairment irrespective of the degree of how the impairments affect 
them, which unlike Britain's definition under Section 1310.  Research311 in the 
US has shown that anti-discrimination legislation is largely cost effective. It 
also suggests the ADA is gradually beginning to improve the lives of disabled 
George Bush, The White House. 2617190, in Liberty. Access Denied. o9 
310 op cit footnote 'I 
311 Scott V. 1994, Lessons From America, RADAR See Appendix 1 Table under title Condusions for 
America 
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people in the USA while avoiding most of the problems anticipated by its 
opponents. The ADA has not led to a flood of litigation and its legal provisions 
have proved relatively uncomplicated to enforce. White the Act has cast 
money, these costs have been dispersed between Government, companies 
and consumers and have been offset by many increased business 
opportunities and significant savings to state, welfare and social security 
budgets. In this way the legislators moved away from a strictly medical 
formulation whilst the meaning of redefinition of disability remains restricted to 
functional limitation. The category of people protected by the ADA is further 
widened to include people having a record of an impairment and people who 
have been misclassified as having a substantially limiting impairment. The 
ADA's definition of a disabled person includes anyone with a physical or 
intellectual impairment which substantially limits a major life activity, or has a 
record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. It 
also protects carers and people who have a known association or relationship 
with someone who is disabled and so affords considerably wider protection 
than the DDA 1995. 
Having discussed briefly the background of Australian and the USA 
international law it is necessary to discuss the background of how the British 
disability legislation was created, why it was created and whether it meets the 
requirements of protecting disabled people. 
Appendix 2 - Demonstration of Cases Brought Under Part II of the DDA 
1995 
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Type of Disability Total Number of Cases Number 	 of 	 Cases Number 	 of 	 Cases 
at Hearing Successful at Hearing Unsuccessful 	 at 
Hearing 
Mental Impairment 
Depression, 	 Bad 167 30(18.0 9%) 137 (82.0%) 
Nerves or Anxiety 
Mental 	 Illness, 	 Phobia, 47 12(25.5%) 35(74.5%) 
Panic or Other Nervous 
Disorders 
Specific 	 Learning 31 8 (25.8%) 23(74.2%) 
Difficulties i.e. Dyslexia 
Type of Disability 
Physical Impairment 
Disabilities 	 connected 188 37(19.7%) 151 (80.3%) 
with back or neck 
Disabilities 	 connected 146 24(16.4%) 122 (83.6%) 
with the arms or hands 
Disabilities 	 connected 141 30(21.3%) Ill (78.7%) 
with the legs or feet 
Visual impairment 54 15(27.8%) 39(72.2%) 
Auditory impairment 57 17 (29.8%) 40(70.2%) 
Heart, 	 blood 	 pressure 53 14(26.4%) 39(73.6%) 
or circulation problems 
MUM 
Diabetes 46 18(39.1%) 28(60.9%) 
Epilepsy 51 14(27.5%) 37 (72.5%) 
Chest 	 or 	 breathing 
problems egg. asthma 
or bronchitis 
47 13(27.7%) 34(72.3%) 
Stomach, 	 liver, 	 kidney 
or digestive problems 
32 9(28.1%) 23(71.9%) 
Cases brought under Part II of the DDA 1995 329 
329 Disability Rights Commission (DRC) The Social Exclusion Consultation Paper 2003 
- 187- 
Appendix 3 - Employment Case Law 
n 
(1) Foster v Hampshire Fire and Rescue Services (1998). The EAT upheld 
a decision that a woman who suffered from both asthma and migraine was not 
disabled, on the grounds that although she suffered from a physical 
impairment which had a long-term adverse effect on her mobility, that effect 
was not "substantial' taking into account all the evidence. She suffered from 
asthma attacks about two to three times a year and when these took place 
she was unable to walk or breathe properly. She also suffered from about 
eight or nine migraines attacks a year during which she had to lie in a 
darkened room. 
(2) Foord v J A Johnson & Sons ET Case No S1200300197. A shop 
assistant in a bakery refused to work extra hours to cover for a colleague who 
was on holiday because she would suffer from pains in her legs and feet by 
standing too long. She was then dismissed. She went to see a doctor who 
diagnosed her to have fallen arches which meant that she was unable to 
stand on her feet for long periods of time. It was held by the Tribunal that the 
Claimant did not have a physical impairment. She was able to cope with her 
normal working hours of 8.00am to 2.00pm six days a week and had only 
experienced difficulties on one occasion when she worked an extra 2 hours. It 
was not serious enough to indicate that she had a disability. 
(3)(a) Ekpe v Commissioner of the Metropolis Police 2000 ICR 1984 EAT 
The Claimant who suffered from a muscle wasting condition of her right hand 
was unable to do a number of daily activities. In the winter months she also 
suffered a lot of pain, to the extent that she had difficulty opening doors with 
her right hand. 
(3)(b)Ekpe v Commissioner of the Metropolis Police 2000 ICR 1984 EAT 
The Claimant, in relation to gender focused activities such as applying make 
up and nail varnish for example which are performed by females rather than 
by males, the Tribunal held that putting make up on or putting rollers in hair 
were not normal day-to-day activities, because they were carried out almost 
exclusively by women. However, the EAT said that this was plainly wrong 
because it would exclude anything done by women rather than men, or vice-
versa as not being normal. 
(4) Cook v Kitchen Range Foods 36 EORDCLD pg 4 The Claimant was 
able to carry normal weights and to stand for periods of up to two hours, with 
the effect that his back injury could not be said to have affected his normal 
day-to-day activities. 
(5) Thorpe v Royal Hospitals NHS Trust. 36 EORDCLD pgs 11-12 This 
decision must have been particularly baffling for the unsuccessful, Claimant. 
The Tribunal found the Claimant could not be regarded as disabled because: 
'she lives a full life, largely unaffected by her disability due to the good sight in 
her left eye and due undoubtedly to her determination not to let her partial 
sightedness prevent a normal life". 
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(6) Alexander v Driving Standards Agency36 EORDCLD pg 4. The Claimant, 
a driving test examiner, was diagnosed as having had two epileptic fits. These 
had both occurred at night and the chances of day time recurrences were 
"extremely small". She could not accordingly be regarded as suffering from a 
recurring illness. Further, the effects of each fit having lasted less than 
twenty-four hours, her condition could not be regarded as "long term" 
The Claimant advised the DVLA who suspended her driving licence and as a 
consequence her employer then suspended her from duties. The Claimant 
then made a claim for disability discrimination and the Employment Tribunal 
found that her epilepsy did not fall within the definition of a disability. The 
Employment Tribunal established that she had only had two epileptic 
seizures, both of which recurred during the night while she was asleep. The 
Employment Tribunal then went on to say that the chances of the Claimant 
having a seizure during the day were rated as extremely small by medical 
advisers and that the Tribunal thought it unlikely that any substantial adverse 
effect that the Claimant had experienced in the past would recur. It followed 
therefore that the effect of the impairment was not long-term. 	 The 
Employment Tribunal added that the only effects of seizure on a day-to-day 
activity were the side effects which could last up to twenty-four hours. These 
included a severe headache, memory loss, and speech impediment. In the 
Tribunal's decision these effects at the time were not substantial and as a 
consequence the Claimant lost her claim for disability discrimination. 
(7) (a) Goodwin v The Patent Office 1999. The EAT took the view that there 
was no need to specify what constitutes day-to-day activities on the basis that 
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while it is difficult to define, it is easily recognised. The EAT went on to say 
that when looking at day-to-day activities it should focus on normal daily 
activities and not on particular circumstances which could be considered as a 
subjective test. The EAT went on to quote in this case that: "the fact that a 
person cannot demonstrate a special skill such as playing the piano is not 
relevant as it is not a normal day-to-day activity even if the individual 
concerned is a musician. Similarly, if a person has organised his/her home in 
such a way as to accommodation a disability, the fact that a person is able to 
manage is not to be used when considering these issues. If a person is 
unable to perform any normal daily activities that person will then be 
considered to have an impairment." The EAT also stressed "the fact that a 
person with an impairment is able to carry out daily activities is not a relevant 
consideration and Tribunals will err if they focus on the thing a person can do 
instead of the thing that they cannot do" - 
7 (b) Goodwin v the Patent Office 1RLR 4 EAT. In this case the Claimant, a 
paranoid schizophrenic, was employed by the Patent Office as a patent 
examiner, but in the time he was employed he was not on proper medication 
during his eight months of employment. He was dismissed following 
complaints from other work colleagues about his odd behaviour and he 
brought a complaint of disability discrimination against his employers. A 
Tribunal in this case heard evidence from a doctor that the Claimant had a 
mental illness and his symptoms included imagining that other people could 
access his thoughts and mind and thereby putting a paranoid interpretation on 
the words and actions of other people. His auditory hallucinations caused him 
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often to leave his office or his place of employment and therefore impaired the 
Claimant's ability to stay in concentration for any period of time. The Tribunal 
had overlooked the detailed reasons for the Claimants dismissal the 
employers had set out in their response notice to the Claimant's Application 
Notice that there were various related incidents of the Claimant's behaviour 
towards work colleagues. 
(8) Leonard v South Derbyshire Chamber of Commerce 2001 IRLR 19 
EATThe Claimant suffered from clinical depression. The Claimant tired easily 
and slept for long periods. When debating these issues the Tribunal found that 
the Claimant's tiredness affected her mobility in terms of the distances she 
could walk and drive. Additionally, her manual dexterity and her physical co-
ordination were affected because of her tiredness. Her vision tended to blur 
and she could not maintain concentration and she suffered some memory 
loss. 
(9) Hudson v the Post Office. ET Case No 3100773198 The Claimant was a 
driver and when his employers discovered he had poor sight in his left eye 
they removed him from his driving position as a result of his poor eyesight. 
The Tribunal held that the Claimant did not come under the definition of 
disability because he was still able to carry out normal day-to-day activities 
since he could rely on the sight in his good eye. 
(10) Quinlan v B & Q 1997 EAT Case No 1386197 The Claimant underwent 
heart surgery and was unable to lift heavy bags. As a result the Claimant was 
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dismissed. The Tribunal found that that although the Claimant was unable to 
lift heavy bags he was able to lift everyday objects. It was therefore 
established that the claimant was not disabled within the definition of the DDA 
1995. The Tribunal also went on to state that "Para C 18 of the Guidance 
states that it would be reasonable to regard as having a substantial adverse 
effect an inability to pick up objects of moderate weight and the inability to 
carry a moderately loaded tray steadily. It would not be reasonable to regard 
as having a substantial adverse effect, an inability to carry heavy luggage 
without assistance and the inability to move heavy objects without a 
mechanical aid." 
(11) Coco Co/a Enterprises Ltd v Shergil/ EAT Case No 0003102. The EAT 
accepted that a person who suffered from an impairment of mobility that 
prevented him or her from taking part in any "normal endeavours at fitness" 
would probably be disabled. The EAT went on to state that the fact a person 
could not keep fit by playing a particular sport or game did not make that sport 
or game a normal a day-to-day activity. It followed that even if the Tribunal's 
findings that goal keeping, playing snooker and cycling were normal 
endeavours at fitness was correct it was to be disregarded because of the 
terms of the Guidance. The EAT considered the Tribunal's view that the 
Claimant's inability to engage in certain fitness activities demonstrated in a 
more extreme way, that the restrictions his impairment placed on his 
everyday life of how long he was able to drive or able to sit. The EAT took the 
view that the Tribunal could have investigated the restrictions on his mobility 
to determine whether or not the Claimant was disabled. Since the Tribunal 
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had failed to make any findings of fact with regard to the Claimant's difficulties 
in driving and sitting, it was impossible to decide whether he was disabled or 
not. As a result of this the EAT allowed the Appeal and ordered the case to be 
heard at a different Tribunal to determine the issue of whether the Claimant 
suffered from a disability, which was later held that he did suffer from a 
disability. 
(12) Greenwood v British Airways p/c. 19991CR 060 EAT The Claimant, a 
senior cargo assistant was off work because of nervous tension between 
October 1993 and March 1994 during which time he underwent counselling. 
When he returned to work the Claimant continued to experience flashbacks 
that caused him to be depressed and the depression made it difficult for him 
to concentrate. Between December 1996 and March 1997 the Claimant was 
off sick on four occasions. In May 1997 the Claimant saw the Company 
Doctor who reported the Claimant's treatment had been successful and the 
Claimant was fit and well. That month the Claimant applied for an internally 
advertised promotion but was informed at the end of June that he had not 
been successful because he was viewed as unreliable because of his 
previous sickness record. In August 1997 the Claimant went off sick with 
depression. He presented a claim of disability discrimination and at the time 
of the Tribunal Hearing in March 1998 was still absent from work. 
At the hearing the Tribunal noted that as at the date of the alleged 
discriminatory act - June 1997 the Claimant's condition had ceased to have 
any effect and his depression was not likely to recur. The Tribunal concluded 
that the Claimant was not disabled within the meaning of the Act because the 
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condition was not long-term. On Appeal the EAT overturned the Tribunal's 
decision, it's view being that even if it could be said that the Claimant did not 
have a current disability within the meaning of Section 1 the Claimant had 
nevertheless made out a case that he had had a disability in the past which 
was covered by Section 2. the Tribunal had failed to take into account the fact 
that the adverse effect of the Claimant's depression recurred and he was 
therefore to be regarded as having had a past disability by virtue of Para 5 (2) 
Schedule 2. 
(13) Farrell v Hammersmith Hospital NI-IS Trust and ors 1. ET Case No 
2200918/97 The Claimant suffered from bouts of depression in 1994. She 
became ill again with depression in January 1996 and her condition 
deteriorated in summer 1996 after she became pregnant. She was dismissed 
in December 1996 as a result of having time off work and on the grounds of 
capability. The Employment Tribunal dismissed the Claimant's claim of 
disability discrimination because on this occasion her illness had tasted for 
less than twelve months and there was no evidence that it was likely to re-
occur. Additionally there was no evidence that she was unable to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities. 
(14) Butler v Eastleigh Housing Association Ltd., ET Case No3101121/97 
ET Case No: 3101121197. The Claimant a finance manager became 
depressed following incidents at work during which he took exception to 
remarks made to him by a colleague in front of other staff. The GP diagnosed 
the Claimant as having reactive depression and he continued to be affected 
-196 - 
by work related stress. As a consequence he was signed off sick for two 
weeks. He was eventually dismissed in January 1997. However, a couple of 
months later he applied for another post and secured this position. He initially 
started the job on a part-time basis and later on a full-time basis. The 
Claimant brought a case against his former employers on the grounds of 
disability discrimination. The Employment Tribunal held that at the time of his 
dismissal the Claimant was suffering from some depression which started 
about October 1996, but the effects were not long lasting, as in less than two 
months from his dismissal he had also started another job. Therefore, 
accordingly he was found not to be disabled for the purpose of the DDA 1995. 
(15) Jobling v Corporate Medical Management Ltd., ET Case No 
70310112001. The Claimant suffered from depression between November 
1988 and February 1989 and was prescribed medication which she continued 
to take for some time thereafter. The Claimant was dismissed from her job 
and she submitted a claim of disability discrimination. Her claim failed on the 
grounds that she did not have a continuing depressive illness after February 
1989 despite her continued use of medication after that date. 	 The 
Employment Tribunal accepted medical evidence that her continuing use of 
medication was "almost a placebo affect" and the EAT saw no reason to 
interfere with the Employment Tribunal's original decision 
(16) Ayes y Bournemouth Internationa/Airport Ltd.. ET Case No: 3101789198. 
The Claimant was diagnosed as HIV positive in February 1998. At the end of 
1996 he suffered severe fatigue and tiredness which was relieved by anti- 
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retroviral therapy. The Employment Tribunal held that the Claimant was a 
disabled person for the purpose of DDA 1995 once his ability to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities was affected. 
(17) Cox v Careeragent Ltd.. tia Bell Toyota Ltd., ET Case No: 1700896198. 
The Claimant was dismissed soon after telling his employers that he had been 
diagnosed as having a malignant tumour on his jaw. The Employment 
Tribunal found that the main reason for the Claimant's dismissal was that the 
employers expected the Claimant to have a substantial amount of time off 
work for treatment. Although the Claimant was not suffering from a substantial 
adverse effect, the condition was progressive and he had some pain which 
was sufficient for the Employment Tribunal to find that he was disabled under 
the Act. 
(18) O'Donnell v Ministry of Defence ET Case No: 3101421197. The Claimant 
applied for a job with the MOD and was refused a job based on a medical 
which showed that he suffered from Ankylosing Spondylitis. This was an 
incurable condition causing some pain and stiffness of the back. However, 
the Claimant had learned to cope with this condition. The condition which he 
suffered from tends to affect male adults and was generally progressive until 
the age of forty when it levelled out. At the time the Claimant applied for the 
job he was thirty-nine. The Claimant made a claim against the MOD on the 
grounds of disability discrimination. The Employment Tribunal found that the 
Claimant's condition was not progressive since the medical evidence showed 
that the majority of pathological changes relating to his condition had probably 
already occurred. Even if the Employment Tribunal were wrong about that, 
they did not think that Ankylosing Spondylitis was likely to result in the 
Claimant having an impairment which had a substantial adverse effect on his 
ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. 
(19) Mowatl-Brrjwn v University of Surrey 2002 IRLR 235 EAT The EAT 
emphasised this point stating that the question to be asked is whether on the 
balance of probabilities the Claimant has established that the condition in his 
case is likely to have substantial adverse effects. It is not enough simply to 
establish that he has a progressive condition and that it has or has had an 
effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. The Claimant 
must go to show that it is more likely than not that at some stage in the future 
he will have an impairment which will have a substantial adverse effect on his 
ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. The EAT stated that how a 
Claimant does this is up to him. The EAT made it clear that in the Mowat-
Brown case the Employment Tribunal may well have to rely on medical 
evidence to determine whether a condition is likely to deteriorate and whether 
it is likely to have a substantial adverse effect on a person's ability to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities, 
(20) (a) Vicary v British Telecommunications 1999 IRLR 680 EAT. The 
Claimant suffered from an upper arm condition which caused her to lose 
strength in her arms. The Tribunal found that she was unable to do the 
following, prepare vegetables, cut up meat or roast potatoes, carry pans full of 
water, manually open jars, tins or packets, carry baskets of washing, read 
- 199- 
without resting the book on the arm of the chair, do heavy shopping, do any 
DIY tasks, file her nails, tong her hair, iron, shake quilts, groom animals, 
polish furniture, knit, sew, cut with scissors, hold a briefcase, suitcase or 
handbag with handles or carry a chair or a moderately loaded tray. 
(20) (b) ) Vicary v British Te/ecommuriicattions 1999 ITLR 660 EAT. In 
reaching their conclusion the Tribunal referred to evidence from the 
Respondent's regional medical officer. That doctor had a special qualification 
in Occupational Health and had attended seminars on the DDA 1995. It was 
her opinion that the Claimant's disability was not substantial within the 
meaning of the DDA 1995. The EAT held that the Tribunal's decision was 
perverse for a number of reasons, one of which was the Tribunal had 
misdirected themselves in respect of the medical evidence doctor. The EAT 
held that the Tribunal should have had had regard to the doctor's attendance 
at DDA 1995 seminars and that was irrelevant. Furthermore, the EAT ruled 
that it was not for a witness to determine whether or not the disabihty was 
substantial and whether or not an activity was a normal day-to-day activity for 
the purposes of the DDA 1995, these were matters solely for the Tribunal to 
decide. In this case the Tribunal had in effect delegated the responsibility of 
the decision to the company doctor. On the facts the EAT felt bound to 
conclude the Claimant suffered from a disability within the meaning of the Act 
(21) Kapadia v London Borough of Lambeth 2000 IRLR 14 EATThe Claimant 
suffered from reactive depression, complained of an inability to sleep, loss of 
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appetite, mood swings, lack of motivation and increasing difficulty in absorbing 
and organising information and communicating with other people. 
(22) Moraan v University of Sheffield EAT0322100. The Claimant was 
physically assaulted by her female supervisor whilst at work. She was offered 
alternative jobs within the University but none were such that her employers 
could not guarantee the Claimant would not encounter the supervisor if she 
continued to work for the University, so she resigned. The Claimant made a 
claim at the Tribunal, her claim form did not mention disability or the DDA 
1995. When the Claimant instructed Solicitors, they applied for the Claim 
Form to be amended to include 'discrimination under the Disability 
Discrimination Act.' 
The Tribunal did not allow the claim and the claim was heard on appeal by Mr 
Justice Lindsay at the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The Claimant lost her 
claim and this matter is regarded as a landmark case with regard to mental 
illness. The transcript of the proceedings is attached as Appendix 6 
(23) Walton v Mascot 2000 ET Case No 2305250100 It was decided that the 
Claimant's diabetes was aggravated by his stressful working conditions. 
(24) Taylor  v The Planning Inspectorate ET Case No 5302523100. The 
potential employer withdrew a conditional offer of employment when a medical 
report revealed that the Claimant suffered irritable bowel syndrome, migraine 
and stress. It was established that all these conditions were interrelated and 
exacerbated in her previous job as a result of having a difficult working 
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relationship with her line manager. It was established in her previous two 
years in her former place of work, she had taken a large amount of sick leave. 
The doctor who examined her stated in his report that he had serious doubts 
about the Claimant's ability to give a full effective service in the post because 
of her propensity to react badly to stressful conditions. The doctor stated in his 
report that this could well lead to further sickness absences. The Claimant 
made an application to the Tribunal on the grounds that she had been 
discriminated because of her disabilities, however, before the Tribunal the 
parties accepted that stress was not a clinically recognised condition that can 
constitute disability within the meaning of Section 1 although irritable bowel 
syndrome and migraines can be defined as disabilities. 
(25) Delamaine v Abbey National p/c ET Case No 2305204 /97.The part-time 
cashier was subjected to a robbery which resulted in her receiving counselling 
to help her to cope with the stress resulting from the robbery in her work 
place. Between the time periods of October 1995 to March 1996, a total of 
seven months, she was prescribed sedatives by her GP and continued to 
work until May 1996 when she left her work place in a distressed state. After 
a period of long term sickness absences she eventually resigned in August 
1997. The Tribunal in this case took the view that the post-traumatic stress 
disorder she suffered from could amount to a clinically well recognised illness 
and they found that the Claimant suffered quite severely between May and 
December 1996. Unfortunately, her claim failed since her condition had 
gradually improved and the Tribunal held  that from April 1997 she was no 
longer suffering from a substantial adverse effect. 
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(26) Abacieh v British Telecommunications plc 2001 EAT ICR 156. The 
Claimant, a telephone operator employed by BT, received a sudden blast of 
high-pitched noise through the left earphone of his headset. The incident 
caused the Claimant to suffer permanent hearing loss, Tinnitus and post-
traumatic stress disorder 
(27) Jones v The Selcare Trust ET Case 240464 1/97. The Claimant 
discovered a lump in her breast in May 1996 which was diagnosed as a 
Fibroadenonia in April 1997. This was removed the following month. There 
was some evidence linking her drug use with both the malignancy and the 
Fibroadenoma. As there were problems at work the Claimant did not return to 
her previous job. The only alternative employment offered her by her 
employers was unacceptable because the journey was impossible. At the time 
of the Claimant's dismissal in May 1997 she had been absent from work with 
severe depression since the previous July. The Tribunal held that the 
Claimant was disabled. 
(28) Ward v Signs by Morrell Ltd., 1997 ET Case No 2106342197. The 
Claimant complained that he was dismissed on 19th 
 August 1997 because he 
had suffered from depression for the previous 12 months. His depression was 
caused by matrimonial difficulties and problems at work which resulted in him 
not sleeping well. He was prescribed Prozac which he relied on. The Claimant 
complained of a lack of concentration and being generally forgetful especially 
when cooking for example, not remembering how long the potatoes had been 
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boiling. The Claimant enjoyed playing football but lost the enthusiasm to get 
into the team. At a preliminary hearing the Employment Tribunal held the 
Claimant was disabled as his depression amounted to a mental impairment 
which had a substantial long term effect on his normal day-to-day activities. 
(29) Cockhill v The Insolvency Service 1999 ET Case No 22001681908. The 
Claimant suffered from clinical depression between 1990 and 1994 at which 
time the depression ceased. The Claimant reported that in June 1997 he was 
not offered a post by the employers because of his previous depression. At a 
preliminary hearing the Employment Tribunal held that the Claimant suffered 
from a disability within the meaning of the DDA 1995 and as the disability had 
lasted for more than 12 months and on the evidence it could well recur. 
(30) Cassidy v.Beneflts Agency 1997 ET Case No 1900624197. The Claimant 
suffered from depression. The Employment Tribunal dismissed her claim that 
her depression was a disability under the DDA 1995. The evidence showed 
the Claimant had difficulty coping with the stress and strains of life but not to 
the extent that she was incapable of coping. The Claimant suffered from bouts 
of depression - feeling low - but this did not amount to a depressive illness. 
(31) Cruickshank v VAWMotorcast Ltd., 2002 IRLR 24 EAT. The Claimant's 
asthma was triggered by his exposure to fumes at work. His condition 
improved when he was away from work. A Tribunal's decision that his 
dismissal did not amount to disability discrimination was overturned on appeal 
by the EAT. The EAT held that an employer in these circumstances could not 
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avoid his obhgations under the Act by relying on the fact that if the employee 
was dismissed his/her condition would improve to the extent that the 
impairment would no longer have a substantial long-term effect. The 
employer must seek to make reasonable adjustments and should not dismiss 
unless he is justified in doing so. 
(32) Holmes v Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council 1998 ET Case No 
2403516198 in which the Tribunal held that the Claimant had dyslexia and was 
disabled within the meaning of Section 1. The medical report from a Clinical 
Psychologist showed that the Claimant was within the average range of 
general intelligence, but that he had severe difficulties in tests involving 
reading, spelling and writing. The Claimant had no difficulties in non-verbal 
reasoning, verbal fluency and semantic fluency and reports also stated that 
people with dyslexia often scored in a normal range in the tests. The 
Consultant also stated that the Claimant could be expected to understand and 
to carry out tasks that did not require literary skills, but he would have difficulty 
in completing tasks concerning reading, writing and arithmetic. The Tribunal 
found that the Claimant had difficulties in carrying out normal day-to-day 
activities that required literacy skills and that the effects were substantial. 
(33) Gittens v Oxford Radcliffe NHS Trus EAT 1200. The EAT upheld a 
decision that a nurse with bulimia nervosa (an eating condition) was not 
entitled to protection under the DDA 1995. The NHS Trust would not employ 
the Claimant because of her condition, but nevertheless argued that she was 
not disabled because her ability to carry out day-to-day activities was not 
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substantially impaired. It was accepted that her condition meant that the 
Claimant regularly brought herself to vomit and self-harm. She was 
prescribed anti-depressants and went to a Positive Thinking Group. Medical 
evidence also showed that the Claimant had an impaired memory and lacked 
the ability to concentrate. The report also showed that her perception of the 
risk of physical danger was also affected. Nevertheless, the Tribunal held that 
the Claimants 
 condition did not affect her day-to-day activities and the EAT 
upheld this decision thereby declaring her as not being disabled because she 
was able to carry out day-to-day activities and they were not substantially 
impaired. 
(34) Blackledge v London General Transport Services 2000 EAT 1073/00. 
The Claimant claimed he was suffering from a post-traumatic stress disorder 
because in the 1970's and 1980's he had served in the Armed Forces as a 
soldier during which time he witnessed shootings and death. Gethng on with 
his job or his day-to-day life. The Claimant described to the Tribunal as an 
example of the problems he experienced, an occasion when he had been 
driving his bus and heard a pneumatic drill which reminded him of a machine-
gun fire. He explained for a few seconds he froze but thereafter he was able 
to carry on driving his bus. As a consequence of these experiences he had 
flash-backs and intrusive memories of the violence he had witnessed, 
although these did not prevent him from doing his job. 
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(35) Shaughnessy v The Lord Advocate ET S1401513199 2000 A lawyer with a 
stammer was turned down for a job and complained under the DDA 1995. The 
claim failed on the grounds that the stammer did not have a 'substantial" 
effect. It was acknowledged that all the other requirements for the stammer to 
be a disability were met. The evidence as summarised in the judgment was 
broadly as follows. 
The Claimant was a highly intelligent individual who was in regular 
employment and had achieved a degree of success in the field of litigation. 
The Tribunal had no difficulty understanding him and communicating with him. 
These processes were undoubtedly slowed down but the problems soon 
melted into the background and they had fewer communication problems with 
him than with many Claimants and qualified representatives. The Claimant 
had developed various self-help techniques, including avoiding particular 
words or phrases. He had specific problems in numerous situations, including 
introducing himself in company which he found impossible, delegating tasks to 
colleagues which he therefore often found easier to do himself, and in 
emotionally charged litigation. In his ordinary day-to-day activities the stutter 
affected him in a number of ways, including avoiding the telephone where 
possible, limiting social contact outside the family, and in various other ways. 
There was evidence in medical reports that in this case the emotional 
consequences were more severe than the physical symptoms, which were 
mild or moderate. His stammer presented as primarily a covert or interiorised 
one in that it may not be obvious to everyone he meets. It might though take 
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him longer to get his message across at times and what he said may sound 
convoluted. The effect of his stammer on his ability to perform normal day-to-
day activities had a much greater impact because of how he managed his life 
to avoid difficult speaking situations, resulting in a 'moderate' disability. 
The Tribunal quoted the Guidance in Para C 19 as to what it would be 
reasonable to regard as having a substantial adverse effect and what not. It 
considered that the Claimant fell somewhere in between the two positions, so 
that the Guidance was only of limited assistance. 
It seemed to the Tribunal in this case that the only argument between the 
parties was in relation to the use of the word "substantial" to describe the 
Claimant's condition; every other aspect of the test being satisfied. To the 
Claimant, the stammer and its consequences were substantial. The reports 
referred to it variously as mild or moderate. 
The Tribunal concluded that the physical condition by itself was not 
substantial, given how he had addressed the Tribunal. It accepted, however, 
that on occasions, in emotional or stressful circumstances, his self-help 
mechanisms could break down (for an experienced practitioner an 
Employment Tribunal should not be stressful). In examining the Claimant's 
reaction to his condition, the Tribunal held that it had to look at what the 
Claimant does:. 
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"As far as possible, he simply avoids or evades situations where he can get 
into difficulties, in this respect he is no different from someone who is 
extremely shy, for example; or someone who has a facial disfigurement. Most 
of the time, he has the option to avoid the situation, and take these options. 
Inevitably there are going to be some situations which cannot be avoided, but 
from the evidence, these are few and far between." 
Clearly the Claimant did not regard his condition as "minor or trivial", but an 
observer might well do so. Taking a corrimonsense view the Claimant did not 
have a "limitation going beyond the normal differences of ability which might 
exist among people (Guidance Para Al) The Tribunal had considerable 
sympathy for the Claimant but could not consider him a disabled person within 
the DDA 1995. 
(36) Power v Panasonic UK Ltd., IRLR 151 EAT The Claimant appealed to 
the EAT. In considering whether the Tribunal had erred in law in its 
conclusion. The EAT decided that the Claimant did not have a disability within 
the meaning of the DDA 1995 1995. The EAT found that the Regulations and 
Guidance were different but not in conflict. The EAT stated that the cause of 
the impairment in issue was not material when deciding whether a person is 
disabled within the meaning of the DDA 1995 1995. The EAT stated that the 
Tribunal should have considered whether the alleged disability fell within the 
definition contained in the Act and then moved on to consider whether it was 
excluded by the Regulations. The EAT found that the Tribunal had erred in 
law in failing to consider whether, at the material time, depression had a 
- 209 - 
substantial and long term adverse effect on the Claimant's ability to carry out 
her normal day-to-day activities. 
The employer argued that although there were errors in the Tribunal's 
conclusions, these had not tainted its decision. The EAT rejected this 
submission, stating that the Tribunal's use of the phrase 'core issue' indicated 
that it had wrongly focused on the cause of the Claimant's impairment rather 
than on whether she was disabled within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, 
the decision could not stand. 
(37) Perkins & St George's Health Care Trust 2006 IRLR 934. The Claimant 
was a Director of Finance. The Trust had concerns over his personality and 
style of management and asked him to resign. After he raised a grievance the 
Claimant was invited to a disciplinary meeting where it was alleged that he 
was not a team player, did not contribute to problem solving, and had a 
negative and disabled approach to difficult tasks. The Claimant countered by 
making allegations of bullying, dishonesty and a lack of integrity on the part of 
senior colleagues. The Claimant was summarily dismissed. 
The Court of Appeal held whilst the dismissal was procedurally unfair, the 
Tribunal had been entitled to make a 100% reduction to the compensation 
awarded to the Claimant. The reduction was on the basis that the Claimant's 
conduct at the disciplinary hearing was such that it destroyed any possibility of 
him working with senior colleagues in the future. 
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The facts in this case were partly extreme and the Tribunal had been heavily 
influenced by the Claimant's behaviour at the hearing. White personality itself 
cannot be grounds for dismissal if an employee's personality manifests itself 
in such a way as to lead to a breakdown in trust and confidence then the 
dismissal could be potentially fair by reason of condur or "some other 
substantial reason. 
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Appendix 4 - ICD-10 Codes and DSM-IV Codes 
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.com 	 Mental Illness I Drug Info j Fast Facts I DSMTM j Testing 
IGet the help you need rJte. COil? 
- 
PSYwebPRO 
PsvwebForum 	 Chapter V codes for Mental Disorders: 
PsYwebNews 
Online Counseling 
Free-RX 	 FOG- Organic, including symptomatic, mental 
F09 	 disorders. 
FiG- 	 Mental and behavioral disorders due to 
Personality Test F19 	 psychoactive substance abuse. Depression Test 
Anxiety Test F20- 	 Schizophrenia, schizotypal and 
Neuro Testing F29 	 delusional disorders. 
F30- Mood (affective) disorders. 
DM5-TVTh F39 
Sales 
Diagnosis P40- Neurotic, stress-related and 
ICD-9 P48 somatoform disorders. 
lCD-b 
Human Brain P50- Behavioral syndromes associated with 
Treatments P59 physiological disturbances and physical 
Studies factors 
Resources 
Assessment P60- Disorders of adult personality and 
Glossary P69 behavior 
Mental retardation 
Disorders of psychological development 
Advanced Search 
F90- 	 Behavioral emotional disorders with 
onset usually occurring in childhood or 
r 
adolescence 
ICD-10 codes consist of a single letter followed by 3 or more 
digits, with a decimal point between the second and third 
e.g 1(35.1, "Acute Appendicitis with peritoneal abscess" ). As 
there are many thousands of variations at the 4 character 
level - where all three digits are used 
- it is common practice 
to summarize at the 3 character level 
( e.g. K35, 'Acute 
appendicitis", which includes peritoneal abscess and all other 
forms of the condition ). 
The diagnoses are presented in code order ( i.e. rather than 
by the diagnosis name ). The list of lCD-lU chapters below 
LJIU 
	 Page 2 
should help you locate the particular diagnosis you require 
from these tables: 
Codes: 
and B Certain infectious and parasitic diseases. 	
] 
COO to 
D48 
Neoplasms, 
ID50 to D89 Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs and certain disorders involving the 
immune mechanism. 
IE Idiseases. Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic  
F 	 Imental and behavioral disorders. 
G 	 IDiseases of the nervous system. 
HOO to 
H 59 
Diseases of the eye and adnexa. 
1H60 to 
LH 9 S 
Diseases of the ear and mastoid process. 
1 Diseases of the circulatory system. 
________ 
Diseases of the respiratory system. 
K Diseases of the digestive system. 
L Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous 
:issue. 
M Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and 
connective tissue. 
N IDiseases of the genitourinary system. 
0 IlDregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium. 
P Certain conditions originating in the 
perinatal period. 
ongenital malformations, deformations and 
}chromosornal abnormalities. 
R Symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and 
laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified. 
S and T [njury, poisoning and certain other 
consequences of external causes. 
Jrhis letter is currently left vacant. 
Jv, W, X 
andY 
lExternal causes of morbidity and mortality. 
lZ 
I 
Factors influencing health status and contact 
1with health services. 
English I German I Spanish j French I Italian  I Japanese  i Korean  I Dutch  I Portuguese I Russian 
I Swedish  I Chinese 
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.com I Mental Illness j Drug Info Fast Facts I DSMTM I Testing 
Get the help you need ?STb. :Ofli 
DSM-Ifl Multiaxial System (Made easy) 
PSYwebPRO 
PSvwebForum 
PSvwebNews 
Online Counseling 
Free-RX 
Personality Test 
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Anxiety Test 
Neuro Testing 
DMS-IV" 
Sales 
Diagnosis 
ICD-9 
lCD-b 
Human Brain 
Treatments 
Studies 
Resources 
Assessment 
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Advanced Search 
• Disoders Diagnostic Criteria ( DSM-IV'M Made 
Easy). 
• Free Testing. 
• DSM-IV Diagnoses and Codes - Alphabetical 
• DSM-IV Diagnoses and Codes - Numerical 
• e.g. 
• Axis I: 
Clinical Disorders, most V-Codes, and conditions 
that need Clinical attention. 
Diagnosis Flow Charts. 
• Axis II: 
Personality Disorders and Mental Retardation. 
• Axis III: 
General Medical conditions. 
• Axis IV: 
Psychosocial and Environmental Problems. 
• Axisv: 
Global Assessment of Functioning Scale. 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) is the standard classification of mental disorders 
used by mental health professionals in the United States. It 
is intended to be applicable in a wide array of contexts and 
used by clinicians and researchers of many different 
orientations (e.g., biological, psychodynamic, cognitive, 
behavioral, interpersonal, family/systems). DSM-IV has 
been designed for use across settings, inpatient, outpatient, 
partial hospital, consultation-liaison, clinic, private practice, 
and primary care, and with community populations and by 
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurses, 
occupational and rehabilitation therapists, counselors, and 
other health and mental health professionals. It is also a 
necessary tool for collecting and communicating accurate 
public health statistics. The DSM consists of three major 
components: the diagnostic classification, the diagnostic 
criteria sets, and the descriptive text. 
The diagnostic classification is the list of the mental 
disorders that are officially part of the DSM system. "Making 
a DSM diagnosis" consists of selecting those disorders from 
the classification that best reflect the signs and symptoms 
that are afflicting the individual being evaluated. Associated 
SM V-Codes 	 Page 2 
with each diagnostic label is a diagnostic code, which is 
typically used by institutions and agencies for data 
collection and billing purposes. These diagnostic codes are 
derived from the coding system used by all health care 
professionals in the United States, known as the JCD-9-CM. 
For each disorder included in the DSM, a set of diagnostic 
criteria that indicate what symptoms must be present (and 
for how Long) in order to qualify for a diagnosis (called 
inclusion criteria) as well as those symptoms that must not 
be present (called exclusion criteria) in order for an 
individual to qualify for a particular diagnosis. Many users 
of the DSM find these diagnostic criteria particularly useful 
because they provide a compact encapsulated description of 
each disorder. Furthermore, use of diagnostic criteria has 
been shown to increase diagnostic reliability (i.e., likelihood 
that different users will assign the same diagnosis). 
However, it is important to remember that these criteria 
are meant to be used a guidelines to be informed by clinical 
judgment and are not meant to be used in a cookbook 
fashion. 
Finally, the third component of the DSM is the descriptive 
text that accompanies each disorder. The text of DSM-IV 
systematically describes each disorder under the following 
headings: "Diagnostic Features"; "Subtypes and/or 
Specifiers"; "Recording Procedures"; "Associated Features 
and Disorders"; "Specific Culture, Age, and Gender 
Features"; "Prevalence"; "Course'; "Familial Pattern"; and 
"Differential Diagnosis." 
DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition), published in 1994 was the last 
major revision of the DSM. It was the culmination of a six-
year effort that involved over 1000 individuals and 
numerous professional organizations. Much of the effort 
involved conducting a comprehensive review of the 
literature to establish a firm empirical basis for making 
modifications. Numerous changes were made to the 
classification (i.e., disorders were added, deleted, and 
reorganized), to the diagnostic criteria sets, and to the 
descriptive text based on a careful consideration of the 
available research about the various mental disorders. 
In anticipation of the fact that the next major revision of 
the DSM (i.e., DSM-V) will not appear until 2010 or later 
(i.e., at least 16 years after DSM-IV), a text revision of the 
DSM-IV called DSM-IV-TR was published in July 2000. The 
primary goal of the DSM-IV-TR was to maintain the 
currency of the DSM-IV text, which reflected the empirical 
literature up to 1992. Thus, most of the major changes in 
DSM-IV-TR were confined to the descriptive text. Changes 
were made to a handful of criteria sets in order to correct 
errors identified in DSM-IV. In addition, some of the 
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Appendix 5 - Information re: NOAH 
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NOAH (The National Organisation for Albinism and Hypopigmentation) 
wv,/w.albinism.org/publications/social.htmi.The  Americans With Disabilities Act 
defined disability with respect to an individual as 'a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such an individual; a record of such an impairment or being regarded as 
having such an impairment". Since Albinism involves a visual impairment 
some people consider it as a disability. One definition of handicap is "the 
obstacles of a person encountered in the pursuit of gold in real life, no matter 
what their source". Thus a person with a disability may or may not be 
handicapped in pursuing the life they want to live. The identification of 
albinism as a disability is complicated by the concept of legal blindness. In the 
United States a person is legally blind if his/her vision cannot be corrected 
with glasses or contacts to better than 20/200 in his/her better eye. By this 
standard some with albinism fit the legal category of visual impairment and 
some do not. Yet, in spite of varying visual acuity, many of the problems 
experienced by those with albinism remain similar. 
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Mrs Samantha Morgan V Staffordshire University 
	 Page 3 of 13 
MR JUSTIcE LINTSAY (PRESIDENT) 
We have hefbre us an appeal from the Employment Tribunal at Shrewshun under the 
Chairmanship of Mr D.P. Thompson. The Tribunal held that the Applidani below. Mrs Samantha 
Morgan. was not disabled within the meaning of section 1 of the Disahilin
- Discrimination Act 
1995. Whilst others of the necessan: components of dkahijitv within that Act ("the DDA") were 
proven, the Tribunal albeit with some reluctance. concluded that Mrs Morgan did not have a mental 
impairment. the univ impairment she was elaiminu to havc. Mrs Morgan appeals. 
2. On 22nd March 1999 Mrs Morgan had lodged an 111 idennik'ing iler, complaint as 
"Constructive DismissaL She had been employed by the Respondent in the catering theiiitv. She 
had been assaulted, whilst at work, by her female supervisor hut had later been offered alternative 
jobs within the University's employ but which were such that the employer could not guarantee that 
she would not again encounter that supervisor. who continued to work for the University. She 
accepted none of the alternatives offered and resigned. She said:- 
"I consioer that my employer forced mc to this position iw its failure to recognise. in cicahuFI with 
my Supervisor, the mental effect of her assault on me and the totally unrensonaijie cxpecration 
that I could conrin oc to work for her." 
Although her IT I mernioned the stress and anxiety which the assault had caused her and her going 
off sick on that account, she had for a time returned to work before reshming. She identified a 
Senior Regional Officer of her Union as representing 11cr. Her ITI does not mention any disabiiit' 
or the DDA. 
3. On 7th April 1999 the University lodged its 113. Mrs Morgan. some time after the assault. 
had been cxarnincd by the University's Occupational Physician. He had reponed that he could not 
see Mrs Morgan being able to work alongside the Supervisor (or, with the colleagues. 7 in all, who 
had supnorted that Supervisor by writing a letter of support for her during her disciplinary process). 
He had suggested that Mrs Morgan shouid be given a rOle in which she would not cotne into contact 
with am' of those peonle. Henc the University ottej
-ed alternative jobs to Mrs Morgan, hut none 
had been accepted h\ her. The Un0e:'sir\' averred that it had taken all reasonable SleDS to meet the 
situation and that there wa's accordingly no bread: of any express or implied terni of contract which 
couRt amount ic, iusriftcatiun for Mrs Morgan's recci
-ding herself as dismissed on account of the 
Uth vcrsit 's bread
- : The 173 did no: mention disability or the DD,", 
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By iviav 1 999 Soi ieitors had taken over crnouct of Ms Morgan's ease and on 8tfl 
 une 1 Q99 
they wrote to the Tribunal indicatiritr in wows the anienument which they wished to make to Mrs 
Morgan's cinim, they havine earlier ra:sed the uuestion of amendment, as it would seem, only 
generally. The amendment sought, however. was remarkably unspeciflc. 11 was to iitscn as a head 
of complain: 'Discrimination contrary to the Disability Discrimination Act" and. in ampulication. 
paragraph as follows:- 
also beiieve that m' Cal inc: failed 10 make reasonable adj ustni en is in an work in 
conditions contrary to secTion ô of we tiDAl, in that ty  failed to accept an renuest to i.e 
transferred 1mm my work place andmr iaiied To adjust rn' woricine arrangements so as in 
t'uable ale Ia earn out tar c:nfliovrnent. Conirar,' to (tic r,rov,s,ons Of the AcU' 
5. On 15th July 1999. at a flrst preliminan hearing, the Employment Tribunal gave leave to 
Mrs Morgan to incorporate a claim under the DDA within her ITI. However, although the 
University's representative at the hearing indicated that the DDA claim would he resisted, no more 
explicit form of words was then put to the Tribunal as the proposed amendment than had appeared in 
Mrs Morgan's Solicitors' letter. No one would wish Employment Tribunals to encumber 
themselves with unnecessary formality but it is difficult to resist the thought that had Mrs Morgan's 
advisers been reouired to spell out in writing exactly what disability she was claiming to have and 
also, perhaps, when it couid he expected to have conic to the University's attention that adjustments 
were needed out account of that disability, that wouid have focused the attention of her advisers on 
what evidence they voLIld need to produce to substantiate the claim against the opposition which 
they were told the DDA claim would nice,, .lt& rnati v l y , a requirement that Mrs Morgan should 
specify her disability might have led to a recognition that she would not he able to do so and might. 
in turn, have provoked an ahandonnien: or compromise of the DDA issues which had been added by 
the amendment. As it was, the Employment Tribunal at their first preliminary hearing accepted 
from Mrs Morgan's advisers that the amendment she Was permitted would he clarified by way of 
Further and Bener Particulars, though we have seer: no order on the point. nor can any time limit for 
their sen'ice he seen to have heen prescribed. 
6. Or: 23rd August i t9 the University wrote to the Tribunal io say that it wished to amend its 
1T3 to add a denial oc discrimination under the UDA and indicating that it denied that Mrs Morgan 
was then o: had bee;] disabled within the mearina of that Act. it also denied that it had failed to 
make adjustments contrary u Section 6 of the DDA. The University set out its proposed amendment 
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to its 113 verbatim: it included an indication that the Univcrsirv would he adducing evidence from 
its own Ocaupationa] Health Physician that the alternative Jobs offered to Mrs Morgan had been 
suitable to meet her medical needs. The letter stated that the Ilniversin' had not received any 
Further and Belier Particulars from Mrs Morgan's advisers. 
7. On 9th December the Tribunal at Shrewshun' had before it a second preliminary hearing. to 
 
decide whether Mrs Morgan was a disabled person within section 1 of the DDA. When and in wnat 
terms the Tribunal had earlier specified the question to he heard and whether. hcIdrc the hearing, an
-' 
more clear specification by Mrs N4organ's Solicitors of her alleged disability had emerged in 
particulars is not a matter on which the parties before us were able to help us. However, no medical 
practitioner gave evidence on Mrs Morgan's behalf, either orally or by way of any report directed to 
the requirements of the DDA, although copies of a good ninny of her medical notes, going hack as 
far as 195. were produced by her, for the Tribunal's scrutiny. Nor was any medical evidence called 
by the University. Only Mrs Morgan gave evidence. 
8. Mrs Morgan was represented below by Counsel, who indicated that it was a mental rather 
than a physical impairment that was being asserted. That being so. Mrs Morgan needed to satisf 
para 1(1) of Schedule I of the DIM which provides:- 
"1. (I I 	 Mental impairment includes an impairment resnh big from or consisting of a 
mental illness univ if the illness is a clinicall - vel!-recocnised illness." 
9. Section 3 of the DDA enables the Secretary of State to give guidance about matters to he 
taken into account on a number of issues likely to arise in disability discrimination cases, guidance 
which n'ihunals in some eases are obliged to take into account. Whilst the nature of mental 
impairment is not, in terms. one of the issues so described, the guidance issued by the Secretary of 
State on 25th July 1996 (after he had laid a draft of it before Parliament) included, as paras 12.1 5:- 
"12. Physical or, 
 mental impairnient includes scnsury inipairnients. such as those affecting sight 
(Jr iicarinii. 
3. NI entail mi Pairnient includes a wide ra age of' urn nairnients relating to in entail fund nfl Leg. 
including what are often inown as learning disauiilh ies (formerly known US 'menral 
hand i cati"). II owever, the Act states that U does not in elude any impal rmcnl rests IOn g from or 
Coil Sistinti of a nien taf ill nets u ness that illness is a cant lea Ily well- recon ised ill tess (S cli 1. para 
I. 
11. A clinically well-recognised illness is a mental ifiness tvh kit is recoenised in a respected lioth 
of medical oninior.. It is very likely that di is would include those specificalk mentioned in 
publications such as the World i-i ealth Organisnriou s International Classification of Diseases. 
5. The Act states that n, en tail impairment d ties it (It have the special Inca fling used in I lie I entail 
Ii cal It Act 198 3 or tie Mental II eafth (Scotland) Act ! J$4. altli oteelt tuiis does lint prcc tide a 
men tat impairment with in the en can ists of that leQislal ion front enm i ng wi hut the d efin it inn in 
the Disability Discrimination Act ts. 6fli," 
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\Vhiist it may he debated whether a '1 I rihunal is hound to accept the guictance ti tere WVCII. It PIZLIflJ' 
cannot ne wror.g to accept U. Accordingly in gemeral there will he 3 or possibly 4 routes to 
establishing the existence of "mental iinnainnent" within the DDA nameb:- 
(U 	 proof of a mental illness speeiiiealiv mentioned as such in the World Health 
Organisation's international Classification of Diseases ("WHOICD" 
UI) 	 prom of a mental illness sneci heali v menuonecj as such in a nubli cation ''sucu 
	 its'' 
that ciassificarion. resunian) therefore i'efemnu to some other 
	 ciassiricanon of very wide 
proressional acceptance: 
(i) 	 proof by other means of a mcci cal illness recoumsec by a respected body of 
medical opinion. 
A fourth route, which exists as a matter of construction hut may not exist in medical terms. derives 
from the use of the word "includes" in para 1 (1). Schedule I to the Act. If as a matter of medical 
oninion and possibility, there may exist a state recoenisable as mental impairment vot which neither 
results from nor consists of a mental illness, then such state could be accepted asarnenial 
impairment within the Act because the starutcin' de±initioii is inclusive only rather than purportinc to 
exclude anything not expressly described by it. This fourth category is likely to he rarely if ever 
invokcd and could hcexpectcd to require substantial and very specific medical evidence to support 
its existence. 
10. It is against that legislative background that the Tribunal had to determine whether Mrs 
Morgan was at any relevant time a disabled nerson. As for whether wnatever she was suftèrinu 
from had "a substamial and long-term adverse efftct on Iherj abilit to carry out normal day-to-day 
activities", those being other necessa• - 
 ingredients heibre a finding of disahiiiiy can he made within 
sCciion 1 (1) of the DDA. the Trihunal held that if there had been mental impairment they wouid 
have held those other components to have been present. Thus the crucial issue v;as whether she had 
adcuuateiy shown she had a mental imnainhitnt within the Act. 
11. The 'Tribunal set out the evidence derived from ivirs Moruan's medical notes relatinu ic 
periods aflershe had heen assaulted by the Supervisor on 16th Februari 1 99S. They said:. 
% C ii 25 Feb run n 1995 I lie a 1,1)1 lentit 'V2F1 I La NOV lien' ii DC Lor and lie recorded: "FeelIng 
ñeurtssed. cant 5I?tp ...... anxious". 
4. 	 On 14 .-i,rii the :IlJ:,ii:anit :n:'air' t'iciinc! tier docior and lit' rc'orc1cc!: "tad still. 	 i_fur 
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fliccussion. Lung urns an\ietV(iei,rescion. keeas rounseli fl1 - tgreef; this Unit' Slit 'vill attend. 
Ut-ti rca 
5. On 28 April 1948 the noctot recorot,: "Ven' ioW Court case nending re. assault hr her 
supervisor at svork.' 
ñ. On 28 April 1998 tue nocior shined tire applicant off work hit two weeks and his diagnosis 
was nervous cieniliiC. Then' followed two mn her sick uotct. One is tInted 12 Ma 998 for 
lout weeks' diagnosititr - anxiet'' and another dated 0 iune !98 for jive 'veeks aiso dkwnosing 
•anxietv'. 
7, Tnt' applicant was awa' ill [runt work tiiicil her resignal ion nit 28 becenihet' I 99t, 
8. On 5 june !998 ins' (tudor records ihc' appiie:irit as '''itiiiroviri'. I
- laying t'r,ttr,seliirte,' 
9. On 20 Attetist the app bean r was aescrihed b- l)ocror P SVilIdig. the resnounenCs consu tans 
in ('ccli isa riona I mcdi ci tie. in a letter of that date to Un at . I eliot. human resort "ccc manager as  
1uIIii'.'s: 
"Un relating [!It a "nyc series of eye" is to me today. Mrs rs organ heca me onviousi s agitated 
and extremely tearful. She is obviously stressed and anxious h' the sequence of events.' 
0. On 18 May 1999 her, general practitioner describes the applicant as: 
	 Feeliitg 1(1W, Not 
sleeping following lass year's "assault" iii cident at work, still has orobicrits although she resi g ned 
in Dec 1998. i
-ins counselling ....helpful to it certain exteiis" 
	
12, 	 Then the Tribunal referred to matters derived from the medical notes relating to dates heibre 
the assault, as follows:- 
II. 	 The Tnilsu nal 's a ttcn non was ci raw" to a leo Cr from the Salisbury Ceo era I 
lulirinary dared 12 September 1985 sviiei'e it stated:- 
"This young lady "as seen in A & E in a h'sierieal clan' and I) as "acute stress react ion 
I suspect she is depressed arid needs continuing care." 
2. The I rihuna 5 attention sva S also ci raw'n to a general prtietition cc s note dated 18 October 
1 990 where it indicates that the aupitcant was sui'iering From •'rnild elsression."" 
	
13. 	 Then the Tribunal summarised the oral evidence which Mrs Morgan had given in their 
paranraph 14. as follows:- 
"14. The anplicanr gave evidence that her life was adversely affected from the dare of the assault 
until she went on holiday in August 1999. She stated that before the incloent she would mop the 
kitchen floor and vacun rn her Ca rpets even single morning. Alter the incident slit', only 
rd a clan tIc did this on a Sn n day with moral pressure from her h ushan d. Sb C would often gel 
the vacuum out in the rlrorrung. on virtually nothing all da. and jtut it away in tile evening 
without osing it. She would mix up the chiidreit 's sandwiches and sometimes fail to give them 
the correct sandwiches or any sandwiches at all, anti sometimes onl gave them a drink. She 
sometime omitted to inciude a spooji so that they could eat their vog'rturt. She had problems 
with ma king lip their sandwiches a bout three rim es out of jive even week .5 he would 'Va 1k the 
ctriltireri to senool and her head would he bill cii hougurts about the incitleni at work. sue iaiied 
to listen to what her children were saving and talking ii her about, and she would take an 
estraorciritarv long tiriie in cross: (lie road, She hartlie ever skin. Before tire incident site used 
it read nooks from rh e lilt ran every in on Lii and air ens a rds she did no: rca d as all. She u si'd i 
do some etnhi'oiden before the incident but did not do so afterwards. jrior to rite incident she 
U.Wd to i-ni os going Out with her fami iy at the weekend, in eluding visiting National 'I fist 
properties. 6000irtg and having genies etc.. After the incident site was iust not itireresied in 
citing out tin ivinereat-ji! with rite f'antile at tveekeu:l,;. l'iit'rt' were a; eniurtie of dates "hen she 
had at utirtie attack, iiflee itt a 1ioiiilt' iirtLise and ('(net' in s'tnhi.vorri)s .vhn"i'.' silt just tad in leave 
tIle orcmis2q a rid go h ttale for no annarvir reasoil. A I di ought she was p reccrh 'ed medication (In 
one occasion in the rlocntrr. for in ost of the Den s.d sht. was not on inns ntedi casio u.S She had 
eounseliino.S She had nrsrljlems with the p hvsical relationship with her husband. She wished to 
embark on ant NVQ course, she staned. but she had to give it up. She conid riot ecrnieenit. aie, 
Nit rmaile site 'viru id ila'tt' enj oyetj ci (ring 
	
14, 	 The Tribunal then refer-led itself to a number of leading knd relevant autheriucs, The 
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wroeci to consider whether Mrs Moreans state fell within am specific description mentioned in the 
WHOICD. The- were thus iouking at "hat we have' called rouw (h in nara 9 above. They Said:- 
i'hcrc 'Va certain doubt in the 1 rihun a! t5 
 mind. lucre was no medical revon as such hefore 
the Trii,iiiial. It reiles on be evidence of the apililcant and in general lernis I he general 
riracfiIuuiers notes. \%e ivill not repiea the evidence ih;n has mcii found in this regard which is 
Cl 0111 eariier in this decision. Vc 
 were parti cularic trouhied in the aI,ccnt-e of an flrnt 
indication on lii e cviii ence nefo re us Eli at chic anol I cant tna or may AM have i,een cii iferin o from 
a dial Ca liv well recognised i in ess. I; was rica r that die applicant was su fierinsr from anxier' 
and stress. sometimes variously descrihed as nervous debility or cIet;ressti,n. The 1 ribunat "crc 
ri-ahI Id; fit their own Oevices to see ilk might Ipt- possible to Iii in 'tie ap.hicant s symptoms with 
those matters set 'jilt that navy earlier ilescrihteti in the Internaujonal Ciassiflzarion of 
Diseases. Tic- aJJI,IICtIIIt has i,eeo icipeth titruuliout in her Trade uuiion then solicitor, and 
n(Amnsel at be H CT Wi I Ii earing. H owevet . rn as we m IChit the I rihinkai were ii nubile to t)C 
sat islied on the evidence (na C I h cv hea nil a ad inc d tIcti in en cc that I bee saw that the appiicaii C W85 
lad ted su fferine from a mental linflairmen I as descni neil in the Act. iii crc nas no haul,; chat 
she was suffering from stress and aniicrv and now depressed and this certainly had an effect on 
her file as is oliviolls from this iieeusiojj. 
15. 	 Neither the whole nor even the whole of the material parts of the WFIOICD was put before 
the Tribunal helow but onjv the first sheet and two pages of parts (little. if anything, more than 
indices) relating to 'Mood [affective] disorders 1730-F39" and "Neurotic. stress related and 
somatofurm disorders F40-F487 Those extracts merely subdivide the headings into sub-headings 
and ibrther into suh-suh-licaciings but attempt no description of the symptoms to he expected with 
each. Thus, for example (tnouuh we cannot say this was necessarily the most relevant of the sub-
headings). under F43 one finds:- 
F43 	 Reaction in severe stress, and adjustriieni disorders 
P43.0 	 Acute stress reaction 
P43.1 	 1 1 os'-I rail macic stress disorder 
1 743.2 	 Ad jussnient disorders 
.20 	 BrieF depressive reaction 
.21 	 rotonged depressive reach Ott 
.22 	 Ni ixed ansico- and depressive reaccicin 
.23 	 With p  redom man I distip ri,a net' of other emotions 
.24 	 With predominant dicru rUn flee or road uct 
.25 	 With mttixeci clisturliance of etiioiioIis and conutict 
15 	 With other specifled p reilorri t:tnt svntp!oms 
543.5 	 ()tijcr reactions to severe stress" 
There was nothing before the Tribunal by sc'a7 (if informed medical cuagnoss which n!ainlv or in 
tcrm ascribed Mt's Moruan To any of the !)CIQH12S in TflC \vHJlE) or v - hicn eVeI told the Tribunal 
what could he expected to he lounu h Way of svmntoms or 111am estatioll UI any of the hsied mental 
and behavioural disorders AFter reIen-ing to pa
-. L 14 of the Secretary of Stare's guidance (sunma) the 
Tribunal conc!udeci:- 
"Tiier -c' 'Lt5 ju5r tIn e,i(id,ict' or :tsNic:aiice trunk it. , applicant. or ti,'tse rL'prcscntrne itt::. It: ass:s! 
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in t , i riounai in reacu inc a concal sion that the a pi icant ivas su fiering from a mental illness 
nhich N rcco"rjised in a resnccljvt sici laid' of inedizal opinion. Accordingly, the Triliunal 
have %onlcwHat reioctanhlv Collie lo the conclusion that the auplucana is 111)1 ilisalik-ni as she (lid 
lint halve a menial inlr,airnicilt within the nicaning a! tête Act.' 
16. On 24th Januan 2000 the Tribunal sent its decision to the parties and on 6th March 2000 Mn 
N4orgaa tudued her Notice of Appeal, Mrs Morgan IS flU IOIOIL'T represented by Solicitors or 
Counsel hut her husband. NO Si. Morgam as her mv representau.c. put in a skeleton argument and 
anpeared hefore us on her behalf. Mr Kihiing anpeared for the Uniersirv. 
17. Mrs Morcan drew' our alientioii to some oi the medical notes that had been put to the 
Tribunal. some of wicn were summarised by the 'Tribunal in the passages we have cited. These 
included notes as to an Accident & Enienieney incident in September 1985 when 4 tablets of vat urn 
were prescribed and "?UndeTiving depression" and "I suspect she is depressed and needs continuing 
care" was noted. However, by 3rd Fehruaj' 1987 a J'roiessor of Psychiatry was reporting "no 
substantial evidence of depressive illness" and by 3 At Math 1987 that "it was gratifying that there 
was such substantial improvement in her niental state". The Professor reported "No frank evidence 
of a major depressional neurosis" in May 1987. Mrs Morgan was unfortunately frequently in need 
of medical care Idr a tzreat range of physical discomforts or conditions over the years and by October 
1997 a doctor reports "on-going recurring cpsoUcs of' depression" consisting of "losing her temper 7  
irritability, 
 and izuiliv feelings" that led to 5 counselling sessions. By March 1999, Mrs Morgan 
having made a claim to the Criminal injuries Compensation Board ("C1.C13") in relation to the 
Supenrisor's assault, there was a note of her having been "Of low rnoou pending Court case" and 
that it was "not known" if tile assault had cojitri huted to "an exacerbation of pre-existing long-
standinu anxierv'depression problem for which she has attended counsehinu in past. No obvious 
suggestion of this except CI.P. Note of 28.4.98". Her G.P:5 clinical notes noted her sneaking in 
September 1997 of problems then making her depressed, to icr starting drinking and, in Anti! 1993. 
of "Torte-term anxrety'ciepressmn and. as the C10E note rekrred to, to her hein "\'ery low with 
the Cow-i case as to the Supervisor's assault pending All these medical notes were before the 
Tribunal and, as we have sai. Sonic WCtC SneciflcaiJv referred to in the passage from the decjsioa 
cued abu't. On utanv of the rtotcd occasions lTiectACaticw t'as nrescrbcd hut not in all cases and 
there was no onc to tell the Tribunal what_ ii anvt' ing. could he inferred rc,n the substances and 
amounts deserihed or to periods over which they were. prescribed. 
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18, Mr Morgan not iinreasonahiv argues that it would be remarkable if an illness could he long- 
tern. ha'c a substantial effect on day-to-day activities. receive clinical treatnient consisnnc W 
medication, time off, work and counselling and NOT he a clinically well-recognised mental iliness. 
However. that argument, first of alL assumes illness: secondly, in the absence of an informed 
explanation as to the medication, that reference to it adds little: thirdly, as to time off work. it hills to 
distinguish between physical and mental and s'non-term and tong-tenn causes for absence front work 
and. fourthlv. as to counselling. it fails to deal with whether or not the counselling was successful in 
eradicating the (assumed illness. Mrewer, it is inure an argument that Mrs Morgan's condition. 
had only it been more fully explained than it was at the hearing, could have been properly recotznised 
as an illness and as a clinically well-recognised one or as one specifically mentioned in the 
WHOTCD than an argument that such was the conclusion which the Tribunal should have arrived at 
on the exiguous material put heIbre the Tribunal at the time. 
19, That Mrs Morgan could perhaps have satisfied the Tribunal that she had at sonic material 
nmesuficTed from a clinically wel!-recocnised illness is evident from a letter she obtained from Dr 
David Loughnev on 2nd October 2001. It speaks of her suffering from "clinical depression" and 
that her mild depression of the past had been mscie worse by the assault. Even so, doubt remains 
because the \VHOiCD suggests the need (fbr example. under "Generalized Anxiety Disordet") ior 
primary symptoms to he expected most days and usually for months and (for "Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorcicr'i "there must he repetitive, intrusive recollection or re-enactment of the event in memories, 
daytime imagining ordrcams. Conspicuous emotional detaehmenL niunhing of feeling .....are often 
present but are not essential for the diagnosis". If wnar is being attempted is a claim to fall within a 
WHOICD category tlicn "clinical depression" without more is insufficient. The work has no such 
simple category. That apart, we say only that Mrs Morcan could perhaps have satisfied the Tribunal 
as to her having "a clinically wejl-rec,gnie illness" as it is conspicuous that although, in her letter 
to him. Mrs Morcan indicates to Dr Louuhnev that she had to he very pedantic about that particular 
LvOi'Uing. Dr Loughne't'. nvmaseor ciesgm we know not whi cli I. Edo to answer in those rev Lured 
terms. However, an inescapable shortcoming in W. Looghnev' icrter ta. of' course. its cate, over 5 
nionths afier the heartne at the Tribunal and longer still after the- relevant cvcnt. Furtner, as Dr 
Loughnev sceins in have proejued the letter only a few days alter heinc asked to do sv there is no 
reason to think that ii or sonlcmin2 i i-:e it would not have been atailabi e at the hearing. 
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2u. 	 Dr Loughnev's loner cannot therefore be relied upon in the search for some error of law on 
the Tribunal's part. We have to limit our view or the evidence to that adduced at the hearing as it 
coutd and should have appeared to the Irmunal at the hearing. Wnilsr the words "anxiet". "stress" 
and "depression" could he dug at imervals out of the copies of the medical notes put before the 
Tribunal, it is not the case that their occasional usc. even by medical men, will, without further 
explanation, amount to nroof of a mental impairment within the Act. still less as its PFOOT as at some 
particular time. Evcn G.F.s. we suspect. sometimes use such terms without having a technical 
meaning in mind and none 01 the notes. without further explanation, can he read as intending to 
indicate the presence of a classifled or ciassiflabie mental illness, either after the exacerbating events 
of the assault proceedings were over or at all. indeed, the notes of the Professor of Psychiatry, 
possibly the most authoritative although speaking of a distant time. suggests its absence. There was 
no evidence from any doctor to explain what he had meant at the time his note was made. nor to 
assert that Mrs Morgan was at any time mentally impaired within the Act. Without our here setting 
out further extracts from the WI-1OIC.D, we notice that the work shews at many parts of its 
classificanon that specific symptoms, often required to he manifest over a minimum snecifled 
periods or with a minimum specined frequency, are required if a claimant relies upon falling within 
it, For Mrs Morgan to have pointed, as happened below, to the occasional references in the medical 
notes and then to the indices in the WHOICD, without any informed medical evidence beyond those 
notes. was to invite failure. We cannot say that the Tribunal's conclusion on that evidence was in 
error of law. We must therefore dismiss the appeal. hut we do not do so without making some 
general observations. 
(1) 	 Advisers to panics claiming mental impairment must hear in mind that the onus on a 
claimant under tile DDA is on him to prove that inipain'nent on the conventional balance 01 
probabilities. 
() 	 There is no good uround for expectinu the Tribunal members (or Employment .knpcal 
Tribunal rnemnet's to have :imthing more than a ia:1nan's 
 i-udimentary familiarity with psycniarric 
classlulcation. Things therefore riced to he spelled out. 'What it is that needs to he spelled out 
depends unan which of the 3 or 4 routes we described earlier in our paragraph 9 is attempted, It is 
unwise for claimants not oieariv to identify in good time before the hearing exactly what is the 
irnnarnrlenl they sa'is relevant and for respondents ic indicate Whether impairment is an issue and 
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it is. ii is corall" unwise for Tribunals not to insist that both sides should dcscj. Oni\ if that is 
Clone can the parties he clear as to what has to be proved or rebutted, in medical terms, at the hearing. 
As the \VHO]CD does not use such tei -ms without auaiificaiiort and there is no general 
acceptance 
 
of such loose terms, it is not the case that some loose description Sitcil as "anxiety'. 
'srress" or "denression' of itself will suffice unless there is credible and informe(I evidence that in 
the particular circumstances so icose a description nonetheless identifies a ehinicalh' weh-recogntsed 
illness, in any case where It dispute as to such impairment is iik-eiv. the well-advised claimant will 
thus eauip himself, if he can. v'ith a wi -iting hon-i a suitably auaiified medical nractirioner that 
indicates the grounds upon which the practitioner has become able to speak as to the claimant's 
condition and which in terms dearly diatmoses either an illness specified in the WHOICD tsaying 
which) or. altenativelv. diairnoses some other clinically well-recognised mental illness or the result 
tnereof. identiing it specifically and ('in this alternative case) giving his grounds for asserting that. 
despite its absence from the WHOICD (if such is the case). it is nonetheless to he accepted as a 
clinically well-recognised illness or as the result of one. 
(4) Where the WHOICD classjflcatjon is relied on then. in any case where dispute is likely, the 
medical deponent should depose to the presence or absence of the symptoms identified in its 
diagnostic guidelines. When a dispute is likely a bare statement that does no more than identi'ing 
the illness is unlikely to dispel doubt nor focus expert evidence on what will prove to he the area in 
Ciispute. 
(5) This summan we dye is not to he taken to require a hill Consultant Psychiatrist's report in 
every case. There will he many cases where the illness is sufficiently marked for, the claimants C.P. 
by letter to prove it in terms which satisfy the DDA. Whilst the question of what are or are not 
"dav-it'-dav activ;tjes" within the DDA is not a matter for medical evidence- ViLar% -v- British 
Tcleeornununieatjon pic 1199 4 )1 !RLR 680 EAT. the existence or not of a mental impairment is yen' 
much a niatter for qualified and informed medical oPinion. Whoever deposes. it will he prudent for 
the specdit' rcauirenlcnts o ftic Act to ne drawn tO the deponent's attention. 
if it becomes clear, despite a Ci.P's letter or other initially available indication, that 
imr,uiriTIeni is to he disputed on technical mecical arounds Uttel] thouhi will need to be tivdn to 
further XpeTt evidence. as to which see & Kevner -v- Wilson 120(11) {RLR 324 at p 30. 
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There will he many cases. particularly if the failure to make act usinienIs is in issue. where 
the medical evidence will need to cver not merely a uescriptior of the mental illness but wnen. over 
what nenods and how it can be e:nected to have manifested itself. either generally or to the 
employer in the course of the eiamant's employment. Thus claimants advisers, before seeking 
medical evidence. must consider also whether it wil I neenough to Drove a present impairment and 
whetner. instead or in acdunon. they will need to nrove it at some earlier time or times and to nrove 
how it could. earlier or at present. have been expected to have manifested itselc 
(8'; 	 The daniers of the Tribunal forming a view on •'mental impairment" from the way the 
claimant gives evidence on the day cannot he over-stated. Aside from the risk 0? undetected. or 
suspected but non-existent, plav-actip.L, by the claimant and that the date of the hearing itself will 
seldom he a date as at which the presence of the impairment will need to be proved or disproved. 
Tribunal members will need to remind themselves that few mental illnesses are such that their 
symptoms are obvious all the time and that they have no traimriu or. as is likely. expenise. in the 
detection of real or simulated psychiatric disorders. 
(9) 	 The Tribunals are not inquisitorial bodies charged with a duty to see to the procurement 01 
adequate medical evidence - see Ruuamer -v Sony Music Entertainment UK Ltd. 120011 JRLR 
(144 at para 47. But that is not to say that the Tribunal does not have its normal discretion to 
consider adjournment in an appropriate case, which may he more than usually likely to be found 
where a claimant is not only in person but (whether to the extent of disahilit or nofl suffers some 
mental weaka ess. 
2 1 . 	 No doubt as more cases are contested on "impairment" these general guidelines will require 
'efinemem hut. ic revert to our immediate task, we dismiss the appeal. 
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-215- 
Appendix 7 - Public Authorities subject to the specific duties as set out 
in The Disability Discrimination (Public Authorities) (Statutory Duties) 
RegulatIons 2005 SI No 2966 
Appendix A: Public authorities subject to the specific duties 
As set out in The Disability Discrimination (Public 
Authorifies)(Statutory Duties) Regulations 2005 SI No. 2966. 
SCHEDULE 1 	 Regulation 2 
PART I 
The Adult Learning Inspectorate 
The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
Any of the naval, military or air forces of the Crown (except in 
relation to employment in the armed forces) 
The Arts Council of England 
The Arts Council of Wales 
The Audit Commission for Local Authorities and the National 
Health Service in England and Wales 
The Arts and Humanities Research Council 
An Assembly subsidiary as defined by section 99(4) of the 
Government of Wales Act 1.998(1) 
The Big Lottery Fund 
The Biotechnology & Biological Sciences Research Council 
A body corporate established pursuant to an order under section 
67 of the Local Government Act 1985(2)(transfer of functions to 
successors of residuary bodies, etc) 
The British Broadcasting Corporation, in respect of its public 
functions 
The British Council 
The British Educational Communications and Technology Agency 
(BECTA) 
The British Library 
(1) 1998c.38. 
(2j 1985 cS!. 
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The British Museum 
The British Tourist Authority 
The British Transport Police 
The British Waterways Board 
The Central Police Training and Development Authority 
(CENTREX) 
The Channel Four Television Corporation, in respect of its public 
functions 
The Chief Constable for the Ministry of Defence Police appointed 
by the Secretary of State under section 1(3) of the Ministry of 
Defence Police Act 1987(3) 
A chief constable of a police force maintained under section 2 of 
the Police Act 1996(4) 
The Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service 
The Children's Commissioner for, Wales 
The Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection 
The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health 
The Commission for Racial Equality 
The Commission for Social Care inspection 
The Commissioner of Police for the City of London 
The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
The Common Council of the City of London, in its capacity as a 
local authority or port health authority 
The Common Council of the City of London, in its capacity as a 
police authority 
In England, a county council, a London borough council or a 
district council 
In Wales, a county council or a county borough council 
The Council of the Isles of Scilly 
The Council for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils 
13) 1987 cA. 
(4) 1996 c1ó. 
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The Countryside Council for Wales 
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority 
The Director-General of the National Crime Squad 
The Disability Rights Commission 
The Economic & Social Research Council 
The Electoral Commission 
English Heritage 
English Nature 
English Partnerships 
The Engineering & Physical Sciences Research Council 
The Environment Agency 
The Equal Opportunities Commission 
Estyn 
The Financial Services Authority 
A fire authority constituted by a combination scheme under section 
5 or 6 of the Fire Services Act 1 947(5) 
The General Dental Council 
The General Medical Council 
The General Social Care Council 
The General Teaching Council for England 
The Greater London Authority 
A Health Authority established under section 8 of the National 
Health Service Act 1977(6) 
The Health and Safety Commission 
The Health and Safety Executive 
The Heritage Lottery Fund 
The Higher Education Funding Council for England 
The Higher Education Funding Council for Wales 
5, 1947 :41. Sections 5 and 6 were repeated. in relation to England and Wales, by the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 
(c.21). but a scheme in force immediately before the repeat of (hose sections is given continued effect. 
(6) 1977 c.49. 
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The Historic Royal Palaces Trust 
The Horniman Museum 
A housing action trust established under Part 3 of the Housing Act 
1988(7) 
The Housing Corporation 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
The Imperial War Museum 
The independent Police Complaints Commission 
The Independent Regulator on NHS Foundation Trusts 
The Independent Review Service 
The Information Commissioner 
A joint authority established under Part 4 of the Local Government 
Act 1985 (police, fire services, civil defence and transport) 
A joint authority established under section 21 of the Local 
Government Act 1992(8) 
The Law Society of England and Wales 
The Learning and Skills Council for England 
The Legal Services Commission 
A Local Health Board established under section 16BA of the 
National Health Service Act 1977 
A local probation board established under section 4 of the Criminal 
Justice and Court Services Act 2000(9) 
The London Development Agency 
The London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority 
The Medical Research Council 
The Metropolitan Police Authority established under section S of 
the Police Act 1996 
A Minister of the Crown or government department 
The Museum of London 
The Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester 
:7 1989 c.50. 
115 
The Museums, Libraries andArchives Council 
The National Msembly for Wales 
The National Audit Office 
The National College for School Leadership 
The National Consumer Council 
The National Forest Company 
The National Gallery 
A National Health Service trust established under section 5 of the 
National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990(10) 
The National Library of Wales 
The National Lottery Commission 
The National Maritime Museum 
The National Museum for Science and Industry 
A National Park Authority established by an order under section 63 
of the Environment Act 1995(11) 
The National Portrait Gallery 
The Natural Environment Research Council 
The Natural History Museum 
The Nursing and Midwifery Council 
Ofcom 
The Particle Physics & Astronomy Research Council 
A Passenger Transport Executive for a passenger transport area 
in England and Wales within the meaning of Part 2 of the 
Transport Act 1968(12) 
A police authority established under section 3 of the Police Act 
1996 
A primary care trust established under section 16A of the National 
Health Service Act 1977 
The Qualifications and Curriculun-i Authority (QCA) 
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A regional development agency established under the Regional 
Dev&opment Agencies Act 1998(13) (other than the London 
Dev&opment Agency) 
Remploy Limited 
Royal Mail Group 
The Science Museum 
The Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body 
The Security Industry Authority 
The Service Authority for the National Crime Squad 
The Service Authority for the National Criminal lntelhgence 
Service, otherwise than in respect of its Scottish functions within 
the meaning given by section L2 of Part II of Schedule 5 to the 
Scotland Act 1998(14) 
Sianel Pedwar Cymru (Welsh 
respect of its public functions 
Sir John Soane's Museum 
Fourth Channel Authority), in 
The Social Fund Commissioner of the Independent Review 
Srvce 
A special health authority established under section 11 of the 
National Health Service Act 1977 
The Sports Council for Wales 
Sport England 
The Standards Board for England 
A Strategic Health Authority established under section 8 of the 
National Health Service Act 1977 
Student Loans Company Ltd. 
The Sub-Treasurer of the Inner Temple or the Under-Treasurer of 
the Middle Temple, in his capacity as a local authority 
The Tate Gallery 
The Training and Dev&opment Agency for Schools 
Transport for London 
UK Film Council 
'HA 
UK Sport 
The UK Sports Council 
The Victoria and Albert Museum 
The Wallace Collection 
PART II 
The governing body of a secondary school, in England, within the 
meaning of section 5(2) of the Education Act 1996(15) and any 
such school as may be determined by the Secretary of State to be 
treated as a secondary school under section 5(4) of that Act 
The proprietor of a City Technology College, City College for 
Technology of the Arts, or an Academy 
The governing body of an institution within the further education 
sector within the meaning of section 91(3) of the Further and 
Higher Education Act 1992(16) 
The governing body of an institution within the higher education 
sector within the meaning of section 91(5) of the Further and 
Higher Education Act 1992 
A local education authority 
PART Ill 
The governing body of a primary school, in England, within the 
meaning of section 5(1) of the Education Act 1996, and any such 
school as may be determined by the Secretary of State to be 
treated as a primary school under section 5(4) of that Act 
The governing body of a community special school or a foundation 
special school, in England, within the meaning of section 20 of the 
School Standards and Framework Act 1998(17) 
A local authority with respect to the pupil referral units it 
establishes and maintains, by virtue of section 19 of the Education 
Act 1996 
PART IV 
The governing body of an educational establishment maintained 
by a local education authority, in Wales 
118 
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Appendix S - Legal Services Commission Appeal on Behalf of a Claimant 
LecTal Service 
Community 	 LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION 
UKAS II North Western Region 
001 2nd floor, Lee House. 90 Great l3ridgewater St, 	 I 	 II 
Manchester MI 51W DX:14343 
Tel:0161 244 5000 Fax:0161 244 5196/7 
go 	 Our Case Refrrence Number: 
Date: 	 .w09,z0u6 
YourRef: -• 
Dear Sirs 
Ihave received your application for public.funding. 
Your request for an emergency certificate has been refused. The reason for this is it is considered that 
the emergency can bernet by the client acting in person with the assistance of a solicitor under Lci 
Help or Help at Court if appropriate. 
Your application for a full certificate is now being considered and I will write to you sborfly. 
The applict has received a copy of this letter. 
Yours fththflffiy 
kcgionat Direetot 
LETUAS7S 
MOOD-G 
24139771 
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW 
The applicant wishes to make an Application fora Review on the following 
grounds: 
1. The Legal Services Commission should be aware that their 
comment in their letter dated 19 th September 2006 "the 
assistance of a solicitor under Legal Help or Help at Court if 
appropriate" is discriminatory under the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 Part III in which you have imposed an unfair procedure 
rule on the Applicant and thereby will be deemed to be treating 
him less favourably because of his disability. Your comment 
would also be unlawful under the Duty to Promote Equality for 
Disabled People due to be in force in December 2006 as a Public 
Authority. 
2. The provisions of Legal Help and Assistance does not apply to 
litigation cases such as this case as it is a Judicial Review matter 
against a Local Authority. Furthermore, Legal Help and Assistance 
and Representation at Court only represents clients in the County 
Court and not in a High Court matter. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
3. The Applicant suffers from severe MS and severe depression. He 
is unable to walk very far and relies on local shops to deliver him 
food such as take-aways. The Applicant is desperate need of care 
via carers because he cannot bathe, cook, dress or toilet himself 
properly. 
Upon visiting the client at his home on 7th September 2006 it was 
apparent to his legal representative that the Applicant was 
unable to walk or to attend to his personal hygiene and personal 
care needs. The representative noticed that there was several 
weeks of post behind the front door which were unopened. In 
addition to this it was also noticed that the house was very 
unclean and smelt of strong urine and it appeared that the 
Applicant was sleeping rough downstairs on the couch. It also 
appeared that the Applicant was undernourished and very 
unkempt in his appearance. 
4. The Applicant's legal representative, (who at the time worked at 
F.A.I.R. Limited in Liverpool, but who is now working at Pannone 
LLP in Manchester) made a telephone referral via the Care Line in 
Liverpool on behalf of the Applicant in July of this year. A further 
telephone call was also made by the Applicant to the Care Line 
the same month and subsequently in August of 2006 a further 
telephone call was made by the Applicant only to be advised that 
he was on a waiting list for a number of weeks. The legal 
representative, since joining Pannone LLP have made two further 
telephone calls to the Care Line on 15 th and 18k" September. A 
third attempt has been made to contact the Care Line today 20th 
September and was put on hold for 25 minutes and then the line 
disconnected. 
S. In accordance with the CPR Rules the Pre-Action Protocol was 
dispensed with on Counsel's Advice that this matter was 
extremely urgent based on the client's unmet needs. 
6. The Legal Services Commission have stated in their letter dated 
19th September 2006 "that this emergency can be met by the 
client acting in person with the assistance of a solicitor under 
Legal Help or Help at Court". It is submitted that due to the 
client's mobility issues he is unable to access legal services as he 
is unable to leave his home. Furthermore, this case was referred 
by the GIno Centre in Liverpool (a help/advise centre for people 
with various medical issues) to the legal representative who 
visited him at home to take instructions. 
